(转) 你的行为让我们感到恐惧：从莫言的牛鬼蛇神说起

李幺傻：著名暗访记者、畅销书作家。出版书籍三十余部，代表作品《暗访十年》、《江湖三十年》

 《你的行为让我们感到恐惧》，这是莫言一篇小说的名字。

莫言是一个隐藏很深的阶级敌人，貌似忠厚，实乃奸佞之辈。

莫言写那些年的历次运动，写批斗，写饥饿，写计划生育……他没有明写，明写是肯定不能通过的，他故意创造了一个虚幻世界，在这个世界里，牛会说话，驴会上天，猫会做梦，猪会像专家一样思考，鬼会打着灯笼赶路……他貌似写妖魔鬼怪，实际上写的是人。

莫言的小说中，始终贯穿着一个主题：苦难。

这是一片苦难深重的土地。

这片土地上生活着一堆令人费解的人群。

这群人的行为和思维，你无法用常理来推论。

他们狂热，他们盲从，他们暴戾，他们愚昧，他们又自作聪明。

他们已经背离了人类文明，却自以为站在人类文明的至高点。

文学大师林语堂说：中国就有这么一群奇怪的人，本身是最底阶层，利益每天都在被损害，却具有统治阶级的意志。在动物世界里，也找不到这种奇怪的类别。

当年，岳飞在河南朱仙镇大破金军，准备直捣黄龙府，迎接二帝回京。

突然，皇帝赵构连发12道金牌，召岳飞回来。

岳飞一回到临安，也就是今天的杭州，立刻被捕下狱。

一同被下狱的，还有他的儿子岳云和义子张宪。

岳云和张宪是当时宋军最凶悍的两名战将，他们是宋军最具攻击力的“背嵬军”首领。“背嵬军”曾以八百破十万，令金军胆寒。

皇帝赵构以“莫须有”的罪名，将岳飞父子三人押赴刑场。

别栽赃秦桧，要是没有赵构在背后支持，秦桧怎敢诬陷手握当世最强军队的岳飞？

岳飞父子三人站在囚车上，路过街道，临安百姓抓起石块，高喊着“卖国贼”，砸向岳飞父子。

还没到刑场，岳飞父子已经被砸得奄奄一息。

屠刀举起，大幕哗然坠落，大宋的江山在漫天风雨中渐渐飘落。

岳飞父子还不是最惨的。

后面还有袁崇焕。

金国灭亡后，几百年后又出现了后金。

后金成为大明帝国最严重的威胁。

书生袁崇焕从两广招募勇士，成立关宁铁骑，一次次挫败后金。

但崇祯皇帝却认为袁崇焕有反心，诱捕袁崇焕，然后押赴刑场。

北京市民手持剪刀，纷纷扑向袁崇焕，从他身上剪下一块块肉，生吞活吃。

袁崇焕还没有走到刑场，已经被北京市民吃光了。

抗清义士张煌言，曾任南明兵部尚书。

张煌言起兵反清，兵败被俘，清军押解赴杭州。

沿途百姓听说他和清军作战，纷纷向他身上吐口水，他们说：皇帝你也敢反，好大的胆子！

更有小孩子捡起石头，砸得他头破血流。

清军笑吟吟地站在一边，讥笑张煌言：这就是你要保护的老百姓！

张煌言被押解渡河，时值除夕，远远近近的村庄，锣鼓喧天，鞭炮齐鸣，百姓都不知亡国之恨，都在忙着欢庆春节。

后，张煌言拒绝投降，英勇就义。

无数底层人，根本就没有判断力。

他们只听从于一个声音，谁的声音大，他们就听谁的。

皇帝说岳飞是叛徒，那么岳飞就是叛徒；皇帝说袁崇焕是卖国贼，那么袁崇焕就是卖国贼；清军说张煌言是坏人，他们也跟着说张煌言是坏人……

他们迷信权贵，听信权贵，崇拜权贵，尽管他们不是权贵，他们只是权贵的奴才，但他们仍然把自己当成了权贵。

凡是反权贵的，就是反他们。

他们始终站在权贵的立场上。他们心中没有对错，只有立场。

他们认为，爱国家等于爱权贵。

他们反抗一切外来的东西。

当年他们拔电线杆，砸毁汽车，捣毁教堂，杀害教民，

今天他们反日、反韩、反美……成功地把一家家外资企业赶出了中国。

他们至少让几百万中国人失去了工作，他们至少让上百万人还不起房贷，他们至少让上百万家庭坠入了饥寒交迫。

越南人民最感谢他们，因为被他们赶走的外资企业，搬迁到了越南，给越南人民创造了几百万个工作岗位。

中国百姓曾经拥有的富裕生活，被他们拱手让给了越南百姓。

吹哨人李文亮被定为造谣者，他们在后面有了61万个点赞。

英国首相感染了新冠肺炎，他们在后面有了41万个点赞。

巴黎圣母院失火了，他们疯狂庆祝。

美国感染人数成为全球第一，他们奔走相告。

疫情在欧洲蔓延，他们呼吁欧洲抄作业；欧洲各国给百姓发钱，他们却装着看不见。

湖北封城了，他们高喊武汉加油，湖北加油；湖北人想出来讨生活，他们却纷纷关闭大门。

………

他们穿着西装夹克，却还处在长袍马褂的时代。

他们脑后的辫子剪掉了，心中的辫子保留至今。

他们疯狂而愚昧，暴躁而固执，生命力非常强大。

他们不但不懂人类文明，而且拒绝人类文明。

他们距离人类文明，还有一亿光年。

人类文明想要染化他们，还需要一千零一年。

美日欧制造企业回撤，中企如何应对

原标题：美日欧制造企业回撤，中企如何应对

　　写在前面：

　　中国和全球疫情此消彼长，对世界政治经济格局产生直接深远影响。疫情大爆发后，全球经济逐渐停摆，加速了抬头后的贸易保护主义快速发展，欧美传统经济强国纷纷打算把制造业撤回本国，不搞全球化国际分工了。近日美国白宫国家经济会议主席库德洛多次呼吁所有在中国的美国公司全部撤离，100%报销搬家费。日本政府宣布出资22亿美元（158亿人民币）协助日本企业撤离中国，避免过度依赖中国产业链。对于中国和中国企业来说，这是机遇还是挑战？在此时局下，应该如何应对？

　　疫情对世界经济的影响和之后的变化

　　疫情发展到今天正如我上周所预测的，全球大爆发，截止到4月14日确诊总人数达到180多万，日增7万多，本周内即达200万人。死亡11万多，每日死亡5000多人。美国是目前疫情震中，确诊人数58万，日增2-3万，死亡2万3千，日增1500-2000人，病死率已经超过中国的4%。确诊人数和/或死亡人数超过中国的国家已经有八个了：美国，西班牙，意大利，法国，德国，英国，伊朗，比利时。中国疫情进一步获得控制，大部分地区零增长，口岸输入性病例增加，必须严控，境内外国人要一视同仁，不能有超国民待遇，否则扩散开前功尽弃。全球疫情进入高速增长期，病死率快速攀升，美国病死率即将超过中国的4%。目前看来疫情还将向纵深发展，亚非拉地区增速很快 …

　　在此疫情下，确诊人数和病死率节节攀升。世界各国纷纷无奈开始封城，隔离，让民众带上口罩，进行居家防疫。但是这些防范举措似乎来的有点晚了。世卫组织和中国的抗疫过程和经验第一时间都分享了数据和成功的方法。有些国家和地区非常重视，迅速采纳和采取措施，就控制的比较好，没有爆发，例如韩国和台湾岛地区。但大部分国家和地区都没有太当回事，也没有虚心接受和参考。虽然2月份就有可参照和防范的案例了，但结果是，每个国家都得要重新来过，自己尝试一遍才相信。造成非常惨痛的损失和代价，群体免疫的黑洞深不见底，防疫物资由于没有忧患意识，毫无准备，很多国家医护人员“赤裸上阵”，连口罩都没有，成为最早一批被感染者。世界各国目前是深陷泥潭一筹莫展，没有找到有效的解决方案。这让各国民众大跌眼镜。

　　原来希望保经济，但现在大量人员发病，不得已都得停工停产，停止一切聚集和娱乐餐饮活动。经济逐渐停摆。这是引发了各国政要的恐慌。这就有了一开始出现的情况，纷纷要求在中国投资的制造业和全球产业链搬回国内。减少对中国的依赖，有人甚至说经济要完全与中国脱钩。那这能解决问题吗？这是问题的关键吗？我们一起来分析一下。

　　首先，完全脱钩是不可能的。为什么？因为在中国制造的最大块蛋糕 85% 是被跨过公司和西方国家吃掉了。15% 小部分是中国的，同时这15%部分里面还包括所有制作成本和人工，真正的利润只有1-2%，甚至都不到。

　　但是西方国家很多人包括国内的很多人都认为中国是全球化的最大赢家。其实并不客观。轻信了西方政客为了自己的政治目的所做的虚假宣传。全球化最大受益者是跨过企业和西方发达国家。因为他们有先进的科技，产品和品牌成熟解决方案，需要进入世界各国市场倾销他们的产品。同时为了大幅降低成本，增加利润率需要找到大批量的廉价劳动力。中国是他们梦想的完美目的地，一手有消费市场，另一手有大批廉价劳动力。生产即可当地倾销，同时输出全球各个市场，成就全球品牌。我在《卢晓：人民币铸币权的前提是要有强大的精品工业》中分析了，全球最强一百个品牌中，美国常年占一半以上，这些都是世界上最赚钱并且体量最大的公司。他们是全球化整合最优资源，提高效率和降低成本，同时全球200个市场最大化变现的最大赢家。

　　我在《品牌赋能：国际精品品牌战略》一书中分析过：价值链中，生产制造只是最初级的价值创造，所产生的生产利润是相对微薄的，真正的高利润在品牌产品研发和分销零售环节。所以没有中国市场这片沃土提供制造和收割两个环节，跨国公司是无法在全球潇洒增长的。金融市场股票不可能持续上涨，投资人就无法获益。。。

　　中国近四十年为全球经济增长每年贡献超过30%。这些收益和增长空间是跨国公司留在中国的主要原因。为什么中国的成本越来越高，但是外国直接投资每年还是增长呢？道理很简单，这里有奶啊。离开中国就好像离开自己的奶妈，变成无人饲养无人痛爱的小孩。虽然回到了亲生父母的怀抱，但他们没有能力和资源喂养他们，最后可能变得瘦小，甚至夭折。有正常思维的跨国企业都不会做出这样自杀的选择。

　　有人说中国受益了。这句话也没有错，属于正常，合作不可能一方得利，另一方损失。但利益分配差异是非常悬殊的，地位也是不平等的，我们一直在喝汤，没有吃上肉。只有一家中国公司华为依靠自己起早贪黑，忍辱负重，没日没夜的努力刚刚开始吃上肉了，却被老地主打压，并且让其他地主富农不要和他合作。

　　地主家有一群羊，佃农家只有一头羊，地主也要霸占过去。逻辑是，只有我有羊，你佃农不许有羊，不配有羊，所有的羊都是我的。有个歇后语：希特勒看地图，都是我的…

　　作为奶妈我们含辛茹苦的把小孩养大，最后被小孩的父母一脚踢开，并且恶狠狠的说，你养我们小孩占了大便宜，得赔款。我们最多就是挣了一份打工微薄的工资而已，而且这工资挣战战兢兢，如履薄冰，而且这是我们应得的劳动报酬啊。

　　作为老板如果不算大帐，看看自己兜里挣的钱，而只盯着工人兜里挣的一块一块铜板就眼红受不，那谁还给你打工呢 ？最后不是生意越做越小？所有的事情都自己办，那不就是个体户吗？

　　美日欧如果真和中国脱钩了，会发生什么？

　　第一后果就是竞争力下降。制造离开中国后，产品制造出来还是需要找市场进行倾销的。中国是世界上最大的消费市场，提供全球最大份额的增长，这些工业产品还要进入中国进行销售。这时成本和关税都会增加。如果这些产品不是全球稀缺的高精尖产品，中国市场会有各种替代品，价格不占优的情况下，很难有竞争力。

　　第二后果，格局变小，影响力下降。美国制造业撤回国内，会让制造成本上升，同样工作内容和工作量中国工人的工资是美国工人工资的五分之一。美国制造的美国品牌产品国际竞争力会比中国制造的美国品牌产品低，进入其他国家竞争力同时也会降低，美国企业和产品对于世界各国市场的影响力就会削弱。

　　第三后果，导致美元体系瓦解。美元成为全球主要计价货币的前提是美国高质量的工业产品和服务的全球化。美元是美国有竞争力精品工业和全球化贸易的结果，因为需要支付和计价工具。坚船利炮是保障，真正维持体系的是竞争力和先进性。自然谁有有竞争力的产品，就用谁的货币。美国工业竞争优势是全球优质资源配置整合的结果，竞争力全球第一。如果都收缩回美国，竞争力下降，出口的竞争力赶不上全球化结果的竞争力，美国将从超级大国，缩小成区域性国家。可控制的范围也将从全球缩小到北美地区，将会失去对从亚太和欧洲市场的控制。

　　第四后果，会加速国内矛盾的激化，政府的垮台和制度的瓦解。一部分制造业基地在中国是符合美日欧企业资源配置最优化和利益最大化的。因为真正的高精尖制造业和技术研发部门都在他们各自的国内，新产品研发论证成功，定型后，才会零部件分解，到全球最优的生产基地去最优配置供应链体系。中国制造业的优势并不是单一的成本最低，而是性价比和效率最高，可以准确无误的和全球产业链配套，中国的存在能让他们专心集中高精尖资源和能力针对全球顶尖创新科技进行研发，而不会牵扯过度精力和资源进行工厂和供应链管理的繁重复杂高风险的工作，同时节省大量人工。如果都回归美日欧，成本上升的同时关键问题是效率会降低，因为美日欧的工人不象中国的产业工人对于工作时间强度那么好商量和灵活。最终会影响公司的运营效率和收益，如果亏本，经济账算不过来，工厂还是会关闭。当大量工人失业，本来就很严重的社会矛盾和危机就会加剧。大量失业和不满的工人会发动罢工引发社会动荡直到推翻现政府。

　　世界各国制造业选择中国做生产基地，是市场竞争的最优生存选择，而不是偶然的和可替代的。中国政府考虑到产业工人的利益，社会制度和治理保障机制有利于解放生产力和从事社会化机械化大生产。这次疫情让中国政府和企业看到高质量发展的重要性，加速了数字化基础设施的投资力度和速度，5G，数据中心，IoT，人工智能，物联网能力，全球导航定位系统等。这使得中国作为制造业中心的能力优势更加明显。这一点是美日欧政客没有想到的，中国的技术工人是数量最为庞大并且最稳定高效的产能，是世界唯一，不可替代的。

　　中国政府的机遇和挑战

　　通过上面的分析，可以看出来，美日欧制造业回撤对中国来说的机会大于挑战。但是从政府层面会面临较多国内外挑战。

　　这次疫情由于明显的制度和以人为本的文明思想优势，使得我们在强有力的领导下打赢了抗击瘟疫的人民战争。在短时间内控制住了疫情，虽然付出了很大代价，但是保障了14亿人民生命财产的安全。目前挑战是海外中国公民回国入境有输入性风险，但是如果安排严密合理，风险是可控的。中国这次有条不紊，科学高效，透明合理的快速应对紧急疫情的成功举措，获得了国际社会和国际组织的肯定。虽然有些国家和地区羡慕嫉妒恨，这也都是正常的，人性使然，我们要泰然处之。在积极应对的同时，还需要继续本着科学高效透明的精神，持久性的应对抗击疫情的新挑战。

　　国际上会不可避免的面临纷争和攻击。出于制度优劣零和博弈的需要，出于根深蒂固的种族歧视和殖民主义优越感，西方社会不会停止对中国政府和人民所做出的一切努力进行攻击的。政府需要在实力和事实的基础之上，做有理有据的斗争。尤其是我们高效的外交部门将会付出辛苦的努力，抓住机遇，进行多方国际斡旋。主要底气是中国高质量发展的精品工业，军事科技，以及巨大内需市场。我们在这些领域加速发展，综合实力的增长，话语权也会随之增长。贸易，金融和货币作为工具和手段也会随之发展。

　　在国际上打交道，一方面要和敌对势力做有理有据的斗争，丝毫不能放松警惕；另一方面还要和世界上大多数国家开展正常的互利互惠和平共处的合作。在力所能及的范围内，进行公平贸易，帮助大家共同度过难关。体现出我们中华文明自古的智慧和先进的世界观，中国古人一直都有对全球治理和世界最优秩序的理解，在人类命运共同体的框架下，体现中华文化价值观，以德服人，以理服人，低调务实，开展持久性战略。广交朋友，互通有无，在一带一路的框架下，通过亚投行， 把中国的精品工业产品和服务，通过贸易的方式提供給世界各国消费者，通过人民币金融解决方案便利双方的采购和支付，规避不受控制的美元汇率风险。

　　外交上在韬光养晦，有所作为的原则下坚持斗争。以斗争求和平，则和平存；以和平求和平，则和平亡。赵立坚华春迎隔空喊话推特针锋相对，和崔天凯一线斡旋都是外交需要，都是斗争手段。手里的牌越多出声的管道越多，也就越主动。基辛格博士最近指出：中美关系的基础已经改变，两国都退不回去了。这番表态代表了美国对华政策的调整。幻想回到改革开放初期时的中美关系状态已经不现实了。这不是中方一厢情愿的结果。美国上下都调整了对华的态度和策略。这一点从所有对华法案在参众两院全票通过就可以看出。对华政策的本质变化已经超越了美国内部党派之间的分歧，与中国对抗的统一战线已经形成。所以中方采取保护自己利益的措施也是逼不得已。当然中国政府早已表态，我们从来不惹事，但也从来不怕事。兵来将挡，水来土屯，来而无往非礼也。

　　在经济上，迅速对外资企业所投资的产业，领域，区域，数量质量进行360度扫描，并组织中国同产业企业发展自主知识产权的替代产品技术和服务，走高质量发展的精品道路，对其产能进行接收，升级换代，再上新的台阶。忘记任何幻想和捷径。建立和完善完备的独立的工业化体系，各领域品牌企业配备国际精品品牌战略解决方案。企业把品牌战略，产品研发，高精尖产能，全球营销和全零售开发放在国内总部，整合全球一切可以整合的最优资源，为我所用，建立最优产品和服务，为世界各国消费者创造价值。

　　中国企业的机遇和如何应对

　　对于中国企业来讲，美日欧制造业撤回国是个重要机遇，中国市场会产生份额的空白。只要中国企业能够及时的转型升级，走高质量发展的的精品之路，用国际精品品牌战略做好品牌和能力升级的工作。即可通过替代产品和升级产品占领美日欧企业离开在中国市场空出的市场份额。

　　同时，中国企业需要做好资金，人力，高质量发展战略规划等一系列工作，准备接手美日撤出后在华企业。对其厂房，机器设备进行折旧打折处理后最优价格收购，产业工人，管理人才等资源进行接收工作。这一工作可以通过各个产业园的管委会提前摸底，进行协调。保证美日欧企业走的省心安心，中国企业接受的舒心放心。

　　当然，有人会担心外国高精尖制造业会撤出中国。这个担心大可不必，因为外资企业在中国的制造业基地基本上属于一般性的技术，都是透明的，没有禁运的绝密技术，都不是最先进的高精尖制造业。基本上都可以有中国企业进行替代，这次撤出会加速中国企业发展自己的高精尖制造业，同时更加规范化，精品化，国际化，推动中国企业向高质量发展迈上新台阶。

　　高精尖制造业是每个国家各领域企业掌握在自己手里的制胜法宝，不会转移到其他地方。中国的高精尖制造业市场机会非常大，需要中国企业掌握这个领域的规律和方法。这就是国际精品品牌战略理论和解决方案在各个领域的应用。

　　国际精品品牌战略是中国企业快速抢占美日欧企业撤出市场的思路和方法

　　中国企业必须走国际领先的精品道路，才有可能在国内和国际两个市场上产生替代效应。否则世界各国市场的消费者不会认可一个低附加值的产品替代一个原来就领先和高附加值的产品和品牌的。

　　中国企业提升的窗口期就是疫情在全球持续的这段时间。疫情结束或可控后，美日欧企业有可能就开始撤离工作。所以中国品牌企业必须迅速把自己的国际精品品牌战略开发和制定出来，对标国际最领先企业，与现有商业模式所有方面进行对比找差距，提出自己的解决方案和行动方案。根据新战略高标准对各业务板块，各条线制定目标、解决方案和路线图，一步或几步提升起来，才有可能快速实现品牌企业的整体提升。才能快速接收美日欧企业撤回所遗留下的产能和市场。

　　这一次的提升一定要站在国际制高点的提升，这样才能从上到下的把每个业务板块的每个价值创造条线（品牌，设计研发，产品，人事，批发，全零售，全营销，整合营销沟通等等）的方向明确，标准统一，工具开发出来，人员组织配备到位，根据完整的工作计划和架构才能高效迅速的稳步向前推进。（作者卢晓 教授国际精品品牌战略研究院院长卢晓）

An unsubstantiated theory suggests the coronavirus accidentally leaked from a Chinese lab — here are the facts

有未经证实的说法指新冠病毒是从中国实验室里意外泄漏的 ---- 一些事实如下。

awoodward@businessinsider.com (Aylin Woodward)

Business InsiderApril 15, 2020, 4:16 AM PDT

A laboratory technician working with samples from people to be tested for the coronavirus at "Fire Eye" laboratory in Wuhan, China.

Getty

• Experts think the novel coronavirus most likely originated in bats and then may have jumped to an intermediary animal species before infecting humans.
• Chinese authorities suggested that animal-to-human jump occurred at a wet market in the city of Wuhan, but a growing body of research suggests the outbreak's origins are unrelated to the market.
• A fringe theory suggests the coronavirus could have leaked from a Chinese research laboratory in Wuhan, but there's little evidence supporting this possibility. One high-security lab there says it has no record of the novel coronavirus' genome.
• Visit Business Insider's homepage for more stories.

A key unanswered question about the coronavirus pandemic is how exactly it started — and when.

Most scientists agree that the virus originated in bats; one study found that it shares 96% of its genetic code with coronaviruses circulating in Chinese bat populations. Experts have suggested that an intermediary animal species may have passed it to people in a wet market in the city of Wuhan in December. But a growing body of evidence shows coronavirus infections were spreading in the city before the cluster of cases linked to the market arose.

These lingering questions about the outbreak's start have given rise to a range of unsubstantiated theories. One suggests the coronavirus may have accidentally leaked from a Wuhan laboratory in which scientists were researching coronaviruses.

An anonymous UK government official reportedly told the Daily Mail earlier this month that the alternative explanation was "no longer being discounted."

There's no evidence, however, that the coronavirus came from a sample stored in a lab. Here's what we do know about the origin of the coronavirus.

Where the theory of a lab leak comes from

Authorities at the Wuhan CDC first informed the World Health Organization about an unknown, pneumonia-like illness on December 31. They reported that most of the 41 cases first detected were among handlers and frequent visitors of the Huanan market, which was shut down January 1.

A week later, experts at the Wuhan Institute of Virology identified the new coronavirus and sequenced its genome; the disease it causes was later named COVID-19.

An illustration of the new coronavirus, SARS-Cov-2.

Getty Images

Much of the theory about a lab leak is based on the proximity of those research labs — the Wuhan CDC and the Institute of Virology — to the Huanan Seafood Wholesale Market, the wet market previously thought to be the outbreak's origin point. That's because a non-peer-reviewed paper, which was retracted, cited the market's proximity to two labs.

The paper's author, Botao Xiao of the South China University of Technology, previously worked in Wuhan. In the paper, he suggests that "the killer coronavirus probably originated from a laboratory in Wuhan" and was tracked out accidentally by an unsuspecting scientist.

A branch office of the Wuhan CDC is located about 600 meters — less than half a mile — from the Huanan market via main roads (though it's not the Chinese CDC's only site in Wuhan).

The Chinese mapping app Baidu showing the proximity of the Wuhan CDC (the red dot) to the Huanan Seafood Wholesale Market (green dot).

Baidu

The agency, which includes labs that study AIDS and influenza, is responsible for disease surveillance.

The Wuhan Institute of Virology, meanwhile, actively researches infectious diseases — including coronaviruses — and did before the pandemic started. But that facility is more than 14 kilometers, or 8 1/2 miles, and across a river from the Huanan market.

The Wuhan Institute of Virology is more than 8 miles from the Huanan market and requires crossing the Yangtze River.

Screenshot of Google Maps

Botao wrote that the Wuhan CDC "hosted animals in laboratories for research purposes," including bats. Bats were the original hosts of SARS, which is also a coronavirus. In the case of that outbreak and this new one, bats most likely passed the virus to other animals via their poop or saliva, and the unwitting intermediaries transmitted the virus to humans.

Botao described a CDC researcher who was known for collecting viruses and had previously been forced to quarantine himself after the bats he studied attacked and peed on him. That researcher — though not named in the paper — is most likely Tian Junhua, who was profiled in a Chinese news report about his effort to sample 10,000 bats in 2012 as part of a study on hantaviruses. According to Tian's 2013 study, the events Botao referred to occurred while Tian was in the field.

Still, Botao's paper claimed that dangerous pathogens had escaped from Wuhan labs in the past, and concluded: "Safety level may need to be reinforced in high risk biohazardous laboratories."

Botao told The Wall Street Journal on March 5, however, that he withdrew the paper because "the speculation about the possible origins in the post was based on published papers and media, and was not supported by direct proofs."

'Minimal protections against infection of lab workers'

In four instances, SARS has leaked from laboratories in Taiwan, Singapore, and Beijing. But Business Insider was unable to find evidence that any such laboratory accidents have occurred in Wuhan.

Matthew Pottinger, the US's deputy national security adviser, asked intelligence agencies in January to look into the idea of a Wuhan lab leak, The New York Times reported. But CIA officers didn't find any evidence.

Gen. Mark Milley, the chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, said on Tuesday that evidence for the lab-leak idea was "inconclusive, although the weight of evidence leans towards natural," Defense One reported.

Still, Richard Ebright, a microbiologist at Rutgers University, told Business Insider that he thought Botao's paper was accurate.

"All statements of fact in the document can be verified," Ebright said in an email.

Ebright previously told The Washington Post that he thought the virus "could have occurred as a laboratory accident."

According to Ebright, a video from Chinese state media in December 2019 showed Wuhan CDC staff "collecting bat coronaviruses with inadequate PPE" — personal protective equipment — "and unsafe operational practices (bare skin on faces, bare skin on wrists, no goggles, no face shields)."

In the footage, however, Tian and his CDC colleagues wear protective suits, goggles, gloves, and masks while handling bats and collecting samples in caves across the Hubei province. In the video, Tian describes his work studying viruses like SARS to "lay a firm foundation for making vaccines."

A greater horseshoe bat, a relative of the Rhinolophis sinicus bat species from China that was the original host of the SARS virus.

De Agostini/Getty

Ebright also suggested that coronaviruses were being studied at a Wuhan lab with a biosafety level of 2, which he said provides "only minimal protections against infection of lab workers" compared with the highest level, BSL-4.

"Virus collection, culture, isolation, or animal infection at BSL-2 with a virus having the transmission characteristics of the outbreak virus would pose a high risk of accidental infection," Ebright said, adding that one BSL-2 lab was part of the Wuhan CDC.

The US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention allows research into the new coronavirus to be performed at BSL-2 labs as long as the facilities also provide respiratory protection and a designated area for workers to put on and take off protective equipment.

A lab's proximity to the Huanan market is irrelevant

A woman in front of the closed Huanan Wholesale Seafood Market in Wuhan on January 12.

NOEL CELIS/AFP via Getty Images

Another issue with the theory described in Botao's retracted paper is that studies and reports are increasingly finding that people in Wuhan were getting sick in early December and potentially even November. Many early cases had no connection to the Huanan market.

A recent study in the journal Nature Microbiology suggests that the new coronavirus had already established itself and begun spreading in Wuhan by early January. Earlier research published in The Lancet showed that the first person to test positive for the coronavirus was most likely exposed to it on December 1 and then showed symptoms on December 8. The study found that 13 of the 41 original cases showed no link to the wet market.

A team of infectious-disease researchers in China also reported in February that they'd found surges in the use of terms related to the coronavirus on WeChat more than two weeks before officials confirmed the first case.

So the proximity of any lab to the Huanan market is most likely irrelevant in the true timeline of the outbreak's beginning.

Genetic sequences of coronavirus samples in Wuhan's BSL-4 lab don't match this virus

A researcher in a biosafety lab.

Shutterstock/Tonhom1009

Scientists at the Wuhan Institute of Virology have also been considered as possible culprits in a lab leak.

In 2018, US officials raised concerns about safety issues at that lab, according to diplomatic cables obtained by The Washington Post.

"The new lab has a serious shortage of appropriately trained technicians and investigators needed to safely operate this high-containment laboratory," the officials wrote on January 19, 2018, The Post reported.

The Institute of Virology houses China's only BSL-4 laboratory, which is one of only a dozen in the world. Scientists study the most dangerous, infectious, and fatal microbes known to humankind in these types of facilities. BSL-4 lab researchers have to change their clothes before entering, shower before exiting, and wear a pressurized, full-body suit during experiments. Such labs are required to be in separate buildings or wings and have independent air-filtration systems, according to the US CDC.

Wuhan's BSL-4 lab, which opened in 2017, studied the Ebola and HIV viruses before tackling the new coronavirus. Some of its researchers, including the virologist Shi Zhengli, also collected, sampled, and studied other coronaviruses from Chinese bats. In 2013, Shi and her collaborators pinpointed the bat population most likely responsible for spreading SARS, in the Shitou Cave near Kunming. They sampled coronaviruses from those bats and others around China.

A researcher with a bat.

Benjamin P. Y H. Lee/BMC Ecology Image Competition

After her team sequenced the COVID-19 virus, Shi told Scientific American that she quickly checked her laboratory's record from the past few years to check for accidents, especially during disposal. Then she cross-referenced the new coronavirus' genome with the genetic information of other bat coronaviruses her team had collected. They didn't match.

"That really took a load off my mind," she told Scientific American in March, adding: "I had not slept a wink for days."

Ryan Pickrell contributed reporting to this story.

Read the original article on Business Insider

China didn't warn public of likely pandemic for 6 key days

In the six days after top Chinese officials secretly determined they likely were facing a pandemic from a new coronavirus, the city of Wuhan at the epicenter of the disease hosted a mass banquet for tens of thousands of people; millions began traveling through for Lunar New Year celebrations.

President Xi Jinping warned the public on the seventh day, Jan. 20. But by then, more than 3,000 people had been infected during almost a week of public silence, according to internal documents obtained by The Associated Press and estimates based on retrospective infection data.

The delay from Jan. 14 to Jan. 20 was neither the first mistake made by Chinese officials at all levels in confronting the outbreak, nor the longest lag, as governments around the world have dragged their feet for weeks and even months in addressing the virus.

But the delay by the first country to face the new coronavirus came at a critical time — the beginning of the outbreak. China’s attempt to walk a line between alerting the public and avoiding panic set the stage for a pandemic that has infected almost 2 million people and taken more than 126,000 lives.

“This is tremendous,” said Zuo-Feng Zhang, an epidemiologist at the University of California, Los Angeles. “If they took action six days earlier, there would have been much fewer patients and medical facilities would have been sufficient.”

However, another epidemiologist, Benjamin Cowley at the University of Hong Kong, noted that it may have been a tricky call. If health officials raise the alarm prematurely, it can damage their credibility — “like crying wolf” — and may cripple their ability to mobilize the public, he said.

The six-day delay by China’s leaders in Beijing came on top of almost two weeks during which the national Center for Disease Control did not register any new cases, internal bulletins obtained by the AP confirmed. Yet during that time, from Jan. 5 to Jan. 17, hundreds of patients were appearing in hospitals not just in Wuhan — which finally reopened last week — but across the country.

China’s rigid controls on information, bureaucratic hurdles and a reluctance to send bad news up the chain of command muffled early warnings, experts said. Without these internal reports, it took the first case outside China, in Thailand on Jan. 13, to galvanize leaders in Beijing into recognizing the possible pandemic before them.

The Chinese government has repeatedly denied suppressing information in the early days, saying it immediately reported the outbreak to the World Health Organization.

“Allegations of a cover-up or lack of transparency in China are groundless,” said foreign ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian at a Thursday press conference.

The documents show that the head of China’s National Health Commission, Ma Xiaowei, laid out a grim assessment of the situation in a confidential Jan. 14 teleconference with provincial health officials. A memo states that the teleconference was held to convey instructions on the coronavirus from President Xi Jinping, Premier Li Keqiang and Vice Premier Sun Chunlan, but does not specify what those instructions were.

“The epidemic situation is still severe and complex, the most severe challenge since SARS in 2003, and is likely to develop into a major public health event,” the memo cites Ma as saying.

In a faxed statement, the National Health Commission said China had published information on the outbreak in an “open, transparent, responsible and timely manner,” in accordance with “important instructions” repeatedly issued by President Xi.

The documents come from an anonymous source in the medical field who did not want to be named for fear of retribution. The AP confirmed the contents with two other sources in public health familiar with the teleconference.

Under a section titled “sober understanding of the situation,” the memo singled out the case in Thailand, saying that the situation had “changed significantly” because of the possible spread of the virus abroad.

“All localities must prepare for and respond to a pandemic,” it said.

The National Health Commission distributed a 63-page set of instructions to provincial health officials, obtained by the AP. The instructions, marked “not to be publicly disclosed,” ordered health officials nationwide to identify suspected cases, hospitals to open fever clinics, and doctors and nurses to don protective gear.

In public, however, officials continued to downplay the threat.

“The risk of sustained human-to-human transmission is low,” Li Qun, the head of the China CDC’s emergency center, told Chinese state television on Jan. 15.

Under the new orders, on Jan. 16 officials in Wuhan and elsewhere finally got CDC-approved testing kits and a green light to start confirming new cases. Across the country, dozens of reported cases then began to surface, in some cases among patients who were infected earlier but had not yet been tested.

On Jan. 20, President Xi issued his first public comments on the virus, saying the outbreak “must be taken seriously”. A leading Chinese epidemiologist, Zhong Nanshan, announced for the first time that the virus was transmissible from person to person on national television.

The delay may support accusations by U.S. President Donald Trump that the Chinese government’s secrecy held back the world’s response to the virus. However, even the public announcement on Jan. 20 left the U.S. nearly two months to prepare for the pandemic — time that the U.S. squandered.

Some health experts said Beijing took decisive action given the information available to them.

“They may not have said the right thing, but they were doing the right thing,” said Ray Yip, the retired founding head of the U.S. Centers for Disease Control’s office in China. “On the 20th, they sounded the alarm for the whole country, which is not an unreasonable delay.”

But others say an earlier warning would have saved lives. If the public had been warned a week earlier to practice social distancing, wear masks and cut back on travel, cases could have been cut by up to two-thirds, one paper later found.

“The earlier you act,” said Los Angeles epidemiologist Zhang, “the easier you can control the disease.”

___

Contact AP’s global investigative team at Investigative@ap.org