When one man’s lack of moral value trumps on the conscience of the society

 编者：一个人的失德可以成为对整个社会良知的践踏

我们为什么要读书？读书是为了懂得道理。我们为什么要懂道理？是为了让这个世界更温暖。这个世界如何能变得更加温暖？一个值得奋斗的目标就是每个人都能够有尊严的生活。

全世界很多人向往来到美国，就是美国能够给每一个人提供一个梦想：只要你努力生活，生活就会变得更好。可是，梦想很丰满，现实很骨感。当努力工作的人们，在去工作的路上，在工作场所中，或者在自己的家里，在路人的注视中，在自己孩子惊恐的哭喊中，被当局粗暴的戴上手铐，塞入囚车。他们的尊严呢？然后家业尽失，曾经的努力化为泡影，曾经的积累毁于一旦。这一切只是因为他出生在了错误的地方？每一个人也许可以选择自己最终的栖息之所，但是又有谁能选择自己出生的地方？但是每一个对未来有所期许的人，都会为自己和自己所爱的人，争取更好的生活。这是人的本能。

哈耶克曾经说过，“如果允许人类自由迁徙，那人流的方向， 就是文明的方向”。哈耶克口中的文明，除了能吃一口饱饭，还有很多其它的东西，大概也包括司法，尊严，和彼此的包容。不过，如果只用一个词来描述文明的话，这个词一定是体面。难道现在满街的军警，手铐和枪声，就是那个所谓的文明？!

如果有其它选择，谁愿意背井离乡？谁愿意寄人篱下？移民之路，哪怕是合法的，也是历尽艰辛，更何况是冒着生命危险的非法之路？一路上有土匪，有野兽，有饥饿，有疾病，更有无数的艰难和跋涉。但是他们还是愿意去冒险，他们的每一步都是通向未来的努力，都是生命的呐喊。

如果他们来这里是为了杀人越货，作奸犯科，那么我们依法惩处，无可厚非。可是绝大多数人，只是想要一个勤劳工作的机会。他们用自己的汗水和辛劳，在田野间，在工地上，在餐厅里，在康复院，给社会带来更多的选择，给自己带来更好的生活，给他们女人的脸上带来更多的笑容，给他们孩子的眼睛里带来更多的光亮。如果我们的确不能给他们提供一个安身立命的机会，至少也可以给他们一个体面离开的选择吧？因为体面，是文明的底线。在这个世界上，任何事情都不会永远。也许有一天，他们会成为我们，而我们也会变成他们。如果彼此之间不能有善意和温暖，至少也该有一些尊重和体面。因为我们都是人。

美国是一个有250年历史的移民国家。不同时期的移民政策，有松有紧。谁走谁留，有相关的司法过程。这个过程并不完美，也随时会根据形势而调整。但是当这个过程因为某些人的表现欲望，而变成一场以践踏人的尊严为噱头的真人秀，那么我们也许该问问自己，我们是谁？哪怕抛开其中的司法程序问题，我们是不是应该提醒自己，“对待弱者的态度，体现的不仅是人的素质、还是一个社会的良心”！

Why do we need education? Because we need to understand this world. Why do we need to understand this world? Because we want to make this world better. And how can the world become better? One goal worth striving for is that everyone can live with dignity.

People around the world regard the United States as the beacon of the world for its value of freedom and democracy, also because the famous American dream, that “dream of a land in which life should be better and richer and fuller for everyone…”. Well, it is only a dream, and reality is harsh and cruel. When hard-working people—on their way to work, at their workplaces, or in their own homes—are roughly handcuffed by authorities, thrown into detention vehicles, under the gaze of passersby and amid the terrified cries of their children, where is their dignity? Then their livelihoods are destroyed, years of effort vanish into thin air, and everything they have built collapses overnight. Is all of this simply because they were born in the wrong place?

A person may be able to choose where he is eventually buried, but who can choose where he is born? Yet anyone who has hope for the future will strive for a better life for themselves and for those they love. This is what we do as human.

Friedrich Hayek once said, “If people are allowed to migrate freely, the direction of migration is the direction of civilization.” The “civilization” Hayek referred to meant more than merely having enough to eat. It likely also included justice, dignity, and mutual tolerance. But if there is one word to describe civilization, that word must be decency. Are streets filled with armed police, handcuffs, and gunfire truly our idea of civilization?！

If there were other choices, who would willingly leave their homeland? Who would choose to live at the mercy of others? The road of migration—even when legal—is filled with hardship, let alone the illegal ways, people literally risk their life for the journey. Along the way there are bandits, corrupted officials, wild animals, accidents, not even mentioning hunger and disease. And yet they are still willing to take the risk. Every step they take is an effort toward a better future, toward a better life itself. If we were they, are we going to make the journey ourselves?

If they come here to rob, to kill, or to commit crimes, then punishing them according to the law is entirely justified. But the most majority of them come here simply for an opportunity to work. With their sweat and labor—in the fields, on construction sites, in restaurants, in nursing homes—they bring lower cost to the society, bring themselves better lives, bring more smiles to the faces of their women, and more light into the eyes of their children. If indeed we cannot offer them a chance to settle and make a living, we should at least offer them a dignified way to leave. Because dignity is the bottom line of civilization.

Nothing in this world lasts forever. Perhaps one day, they will become us, and we will become them. If we cannot show goodwill and warmth to one another, we should at least show respect and dignity—because we are all human.

The United States is a nation of immigrants with a history of 250 years. Immigration policies have tightened and loosened at different times. Who stays and who leaves is decided through legal processes. These processes are imperfect and constantly adjusted according to circumstances. But when the process is turned—out of one person’s whimsical desire to impress his constituents—into a reality show that trumps on human dignity as its spectacle, then perhaps we should ask ourselves: Who are we?

Even setting aside the legal and procedural questions, shouldn’t we remind ourselves that “how we treat the vulnerable reflects not only individual character, but also the conscience of a society”?

德不配位必有灾殃 - 特朗普的二进宫

 编者：古往今来，德不配位的人很多，或者也许大多数时候都如此。天下太平，风波不惊的时候，无碍大局。不过当时局变幻，风急浪高的时候，如果舵手无能，则一招不慎，满盘皆输。大国兴衰，时运乎？人祸也！

世事难料，很多时候世事也非世人能左右。有些事情无碍大局，但是有些事情则影响深远。2024年特朗普重新当选美国总统，就属于后者。这件事给世界格局带来的变化，将会成为历史课本里浓墨重彩的一章。

特朗普之为人，在他2020年败选的时候，已经展示的淋漓尽致。民主制度下，选票定结果，参选者愿赌服输，已是百年传统。“君子和而不同“，哪怕意见相左，也可以和气相处。这就是为什么历史上经常会有败选者给当选者打电话表示祝贺。君子之风，从容大度，成为美谈。而2021年1月6日的特朗普，居然打算调动军队，干预选举结果。如此目无法纪的总统，已经给美国宪政带来了一次百年不遇的危机！如此拙劣的表现足以让世人认识到他是一个不折不扣的输不起的小人。结果这样一个厚颜无知的自恋者，居然能够在2024年重新登上总统的宝座，真是让人瞠目结舌。

当今的世界，并不太平。战争，瘟疫，气候，贸易，等等。处理好这些问题需要智慧，勇气和运气。而二进宫的特朗普，可以说给“德不配位，必有灾殃“这句老话做了一个完美的注解。

作为现有国际秩序的受益者，美国本应该是国际秩序的维护者。现有的国际秩序是以美国为主导的联合国在战后，为了维护世界的和平和发展而建立。这套秩序在战后的80年里，基本上维持了世界格局的稳定，为战后资本主义的发展提供了必要条件，这也是自由世界在冷战中能够战胜东欧集团的主要原因。因为一个基本稳定的格局，给资本的发展创造了良好的条件，让原材料，资本和市场能够更有效的运行，也让资本主义主导的自由世界在经济发展上完全战胜了以苏联为首的计划经济阵营。冷战结束后，更多的国家加入到国际贸易体系，融入世界经济合作。这对资本主义的进一步发展，提供了更为宽松的环境。世界局势的缓和，也让原来发展军备的资金得以发展民生。所以冷战以后，缓和的国际环境引出经济全球化这个概念，更多的人加入经济合作体系。合作让交易成本降低，交流让信息广泛传播，科学技术飞速发展，从台式电脑到智能手机，从互联网到人工智能。以中国为代表的制造业的转移，让更多的人走出贫困。而这一切，都因为俄国对乌克兰的悍然入侵，而戛然而止。

冷战后30年的缓和局势，给世界各国提供了发展的契机，也让各国的实力得到了改变。一些地区强国因为实力的提升，对周边地缘政治格局产生了影响。在这个纷争渐起的时候，一些政治强人和独裁者，隐隐然重新现身，重新成为不安定的因素。俄国更是狼子野心，悍然入侵乌克兰，欲图重塑前苏联。美国作为自由世界的领袖，此时本应高举道义之大旗，合纵连横，内和政敌，外结盟友，讨伐侵略，重整国际秩序。而美国曾经拥有的朋友圈，不仅是美国实力的体现，也是美国实力的坚强后盾。只可惜时也运也，看看特朗普的第二次上台，他做了什么？滥用关税，打击盟友，从加拿大到丹麦，从欧洲到澳洲，几乎和所有的盟友反目。进而，他公然和普丁勾结，背叛盟友，助俄为虐，施压乌克兰割地求和。以致二战以来，百万美军将士以血的代价所构建的国际秩序，摇摇欲坠，危如累卵。更可怕的是，如果强权可以改变国界，如果侵略可以得到益处，那么大大小小的强权一定会摩拳擦掌，对周边的小国虎视眈眈。而周边弱小的国家或者依附，或者结盟，或者致力发展军备，乃至核武！军备竞赛，兵凶战危的时候，就不远了。而所有这些后果，都是因为特朗普口中的所谓的“和平“！“自由需要代价，和平需要正义”，这是千百年来人类历史的教训。一个不学无术的人，怎么会以史为鉴，“观之上古，验之当世”？

总统作为一个国家的代表，即便不是一个君子，也要有做人的底线。但是如果是一个真小人，则没有底线可言。一个没有底线的人，不用说尊严，连信用都谈不上！“人无信不立，国无信则衰“。二战到现在，刚好80年。也许新的一个周期又将开始了？或者已经开始了？

A new world order isn’t coming, it’s already here − and this is what it looks like

编者：俄国侵乌，招致众怒。美国本当借此良机，外和盟友，内振军工，打击专制集团，捍卫国际秩序。可惜特朗普的上台，让世界重回强权。一极和两极都不长久，三极会稳定一些吗？

On Sept. 3, 2025, China celebrated the 80th anniversary of its victory over Japan by staging a carefully choreographed event in which 26 world leaders were offered a podium view of Beijing’s impressive military might.

The show of strength was deliberate and reignited a debate in Western media over whether we are on the cusp of a China-centric “new world order” to replace the U.S.-dominated international “rules-based order.”

But as someone who writes about geopolitics, I believe we are already there. It might be in flux, and the U.S. still has a big role in it, but a new world order has begun – and as it develops, it will look increasingly different than what it’s replacing.

A brief history of world orders

Global history can be understood as the rise and fall of different orders, defined as a given era’s dominant power relations and attendant institutions and norms.

From 1815 to 1880, the United Kingdom was the undisputed world superpower, with an empire and navy that spanned the globe. The period from 1880 to 1945 was one of imperial rivalries as other countries – largely European and the U.S. – sought to copy Britain’s success and replace its dominance. Supplanting that was the bipolar world of two competing superpowers, the Soviet Union and the U.S., marking the period from 1945 to 1991.

The fall of the Soviet Union was the beginning of a brief period, from 1991 to 2008, of a unipolar world centered on U.S. global dominance, military power and economic might. With the retreat of global communism, the U.S. increased its influence, and that of the international rules-based order it helped establish after 1945, through institutions such as the World Trade Organization, World Bank and International Monetary Fund.

It did not last long in the face of a long war on terrorism, the fiasco of the invasion of Iraq, the long occupation of Afghanistan and finally the 2008 global financial crisis that undermined U.S. strength and weakened domestic support for Washington’s role as the world’s policeman.

Toward a multipolar world

In recent years, a new multipolar world has emerged with at least four distinct sources of power.

The U.S. remains central to this world order. It is blessed with a huge territory, a dynamic economy and the strategic luxury of large oceans on its east and west and much smaller powers to its north and south. The U.S. had a global military presence in the previous bipolar and unipolar order. But the cost of this imperial overstretch has prompted Washington to shift the cost burden toward its former allies, leading to a new militarization in Europe and East Asia where most countries now aim to increase military spending.

There is also a change in economic arrangements. In the unipolar order, the U.S. promoted a frictionless free trade arrangement and economic globalization. This resulted in the global shift of manufacturing that in turn created a populist backlash in those countries where manufacturing employment was hollowed out.

Now, economic nationalism is becoming a much more common refrain than free trade. Long the promoter of purportedly open markets, the U.S. is now leading the way in resurrecting tariff barriers to levels that haven’t been seen on the global stage in decades.

The military realignments and growing trade barriers will make it increasingly difficult to assemble durable alliances. In the short term the U.S. can leverage its existing power to its advantage, but over the long term other countries will likely pivot away from too much reliance on the U.S. The American Century that publishing magnate Henry Luce famously described in 1941 has to all intents and purposes come to an end.

China is now a peer competitor to the U.S. in both economic and military power. Increasingly, under the powerful leadership of Xi Jinping, China openly seeks a more Sino-centric world order with institutions and a global arrangement to match. To that end, it is assembling an axis of resistance to a U.S.-dominated world order. Russia, suffering from post-imperial syndrome, is an important member but not an equal partner.

Russian power is limited to establishing a Eurasian sphere of influence across its former Soviet republics and disrupting liberal democracies. But in that, Russia is more of a spoiler than an architect of the new order.

And then there is Europe, facing what British Prime Minister Keir Starmer referred to as a “generational challenge” as the U.S. pivots away from Europe toward the Indo-Pacific just as Russia poses a more serious threat to Europe, especially for its easternmost states.

Europe is remilitarizing after decades of demilitarizing. Sweden and Finland joined NATO in 2023 and 2024, respectively. In the coming decades, Europe could emerge as an independent source of both economic and military power with a different agenda from the U.S. – more keen to confront Russia, less willing to support Israel, and perhaps more willing to engage with China.

But all three power centers – the U.S., China and Europe – will struggle with similar and unique internal challenges.

All of them have sluggish economies and aging populations. The U.S. faces growing inequality and political instability as it shifts from a liberal democracy to competitive authoritarianism. China has an untested military, a looming demographic crisis, a faltering economy and a forthcoming succession struggle.

Finally, Europe is beset with a nationalist populism and growing social welfare costs just as military expenditures are set to increase.

The growth of the Global South

This threefold division is strangely reminiscent of the tripartite global division in George Orwell’s “1984,” where Oceania, Eurasia and Eastasia fought a permanent war of shifting alliances.

But Orwell was writing at a time when much of what is now called the Global South was either under the informal or formal control of the superpowers. That is no longer the case in the Global South, especially in the case of the larger countries such as Brazil, India and Indonesia.

The Global South is not yet a coherent bloc, more an informal arrangement of independent actors that tend to hedge between the major powers.

A world in flux

Yet none of this new global reality means that things are now fixed. Indeed, the new world order is in a state of disruptive flux that promises years of growing pains. Both the U.S. and China need allies, and countries in the Global South will continue to hedge between the competing powers.

As such, the world is in for a process of constant jostling as the major powers seek alliances while dealing with domestic pressures. In that messy status quo, many questions remain: Who will be most effective in building durable alliances? Will China manage its internal challenges? Will Europe get its act together? Will Russia continue its disruptive ways? Could a post-Trump U.S., post-Putin Russia and post-Xi China move the world in yet a different direction altogether?

And there is one large question above all others: Can the major powers manage their competition through shared global interests, such as combating climate change, environmental pollution and pandemic threats? Or will mounting conflict in the newly contested areas of the Arctic, cyberspace, outer space and the oceanic realm, and in ongoing geopolitical hot spots provide the trigger for outright conflict?

All world orders come to an end. The hope is the old one is doing so with a whimper rather than a bang.

How Russia keeps raising an army to replace its dead

编者：如果民主不能战胜专制，民主又有什么意义呢？

For Russian men, war now advertises itself like any other job.

Offers for front-line contracts appear on the messaging app Telegram alongside group chats and news alerts, promising signing bonuses of up to $50,000 — life-changing money in a country where average monthly wages remain below $1,000. The incentives go beyond cash, with pledges of debt relief and free childcare for soldiers’ families and guaranteed university places for their children. Criminal records, illness and even HIV are no longer automatic disqualifiers. For many men with little to lose, the front has become an employer of last resort.

Behind the flood of offers is a coordinated recruitment system run through Russia’s more than 80 regional governments. Pressured by the Kremlin to deliver manpower, the regions have become de-facto hiring hubs, competing with one another for contract soldiers. What began as a wartime fix has hardened into a quasi-commercial headhunting industry powered by federal bonuses and local budgets. Regional authorities contract HR agencies, which in turn deploy freelance recruiters to advertise online, screen applicants and shepherd men through enlistment paperwork.

Any Russian citizen can now work as a wartime recruiter, with many operating as freelance headhunters who earn commissions for delivering bodies to the front. Axel Springer Global Reporters Network, which includes POLITICO, reviewed recruitment channels across Russia and interviewed multiple recruits and recruiters for this report.

This labor defense market is being closely studied in Western capitals, where the continued growth of Russia’s army — despite having around 1 million soldiers killed or severely wounded since 2022 — has stunned intelligence services and vexed diplomats, who see the increase as crucial to understanding the country’s posture in peace negotiations and the possibility of future expansion into neighboring territory.

“Assuming that Putin is able to continue to fund the enormous enlistment bonuses (and death payments, too) and to find the manpower currently enticed to serve,” former CIA Director David Petraeus told POLITICO, Russia “can sustain the kind of costly, grinding campaign that has characterized the fighting in Ukraine since the last major achievements on either side in the second year of the war.”

Russia’s ability to sustain manpower levels amid massive battlefield losses helps explain why, four years into the invasion, Vladimir Putin appears more convinced than ever that he can force Ukraine to accept his terms — whether through diplomacy or a grinding war of attrition. Speaking to Russian journalists last week, Putin made clear the war would end only if Ukrainian forces withdrew from the territories Russia claims — otherwise, he warned, Moscow would impose its terms “by armed force.”

A Marketplace for Soldiers

When Russia invaded Ukraine in early 2022, Olga and her husband Alexander were running a small hiring operation in Moscow — placing construction workers, security guards and couriers in civilian jobs. About 18 months ago, they pivoted to something far more lucrative via Russia’s main classified ads platform: recruiting riflemen, drone operators and other soldiers for the war.

“Our daughter saw a job ad on Avito looking for recruiters, and that’s how it all started,” Olga told POLITICO in a series of voice messages over WhatsApp. Her profile picture displays the Russian coat of arms. (Olga and Alexander’s surname has been withheld to protect their anonymity under fear of governmental reprisal.)

As what it once expected to be a blitz has become a war of exhaustion, the Kremlin has reengineered its mobilization accordingly. In September 2022, Putin announced what he called a “partial mobilization” of 300,000 reservists, triggering a surge of public anger and emigration as hundreds of thousands fled the country to avoid being sent to fight. At the same time, the state opened its prison gates to the battlefield, luring inmates into uniform with promises of clemency and pay.

The approach worked, establishing a new blueprint: less coercion, more cash. To bring in volunteers who would not qualify for the draft because of age, health or lack of prior military service, the Kremlin targeted society’s most vulnerable — from prisoners to migrant workers and indebted men — by raising wages, offering lavish signing bonuses and selling military service as a path to dignity and survival. In September 2024, Putin formalized the strategy by ordering that the armed forces grow to 1.5 million active-duty troops. The sales pitch changed, too: subpoenas and summonses were replaced by money, benefits and appeals to manhood.

“These measures target a specific demographic: socially vulnerable men,” says political scientist Ekaterina Schulmann, who studies Russian government decision-making as a lecturer at the Osteuropa Institute in Berlin. “Men with debts, criminal records, little financial literacy — or those trapped by predatory microcredit. People on the margins, with no prospects.”

For several months, Alexander and Olga worked for a company they found through Avito before going independent and growing their business. “Now recruiters work for us — 10 people,” Olga said.

The couple do most of their headhunting on the messaging app Telegram, across a vast ecosystem of channels now devoted to wartime hiring. In one group with more than 96,000 subscribers and a profile picture labeled “WORKING,” as many as 40 recruitment ads are posted per day, advertising openings for infantrymen and drone pilots alongside detailed bonus offers from rival regions.

Each post is essentially a wage bid. While wages remain generally constant, the regions typically compete for workers by bidding up the value of labor through incentives like signing bonuses. While the Kremlin last year introduced a minimum bonus benchmark of 400,000 rubles ($5,170) via presidential decree, the amounts on offer now fluctuate wildly. Recruiters steer applicants to whichever territory is currently paying best.

“We help with documents and put them in touch with regional officials,” Olga explained. “And then we pray — that they come back alive and well.”

The couple declined to say how much they earn per recruit. But, as with bonuses offered to volunteers, recruiter pay appears to vary widely by region. Another recruiter who spoke to POLITICO confirmed figures previously published by the independent Russian outlet Verstka, which put commissions at between $1,280 and $3,800 per signed contract.

Russian regions are tapping reserve funds to maintain recruitment levels. According to a review by independent outlet iStories, just 11 regions had budgeted at least $25.5 million on recruiter payments — amounts comparable to regional spending on health care and social services.

An analysis by economist Janis Kluge of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, based on data from 37 regions, shows that average signing bonuses have now climbed to roughly $25,850, including federal payments. In early 2025, increased incentives triggered a surge of volunteers. In places like Samara, bonuses rose to more than $50,000 in summer, enough to buy a two-bedroom apartment. (In some regions, bonuses have recently fallen, which likely indicates they successfully recruited an above-average number of volunteers and had already met their quotas.)

For many families, military service has become one of the few routes to upward mobility. In many regions, weak local labor markets leave few alternatives. The more precarious the economic outlook, the stronger the recruitment pipeline.

“This kind of money can completely transform a Russian family’s life,” said Kluge. “The program works surprisingly well, but it has become far more expensive for the Kremlin.”

How the War Was Staffed

This recruiting machine helps to bring roughly 30,000 volunteers into the Russian armed services each month, enough to offset its heavy casualty rate and sustain long-term operations. The Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies estimated this summer that Russia had lost about 1 million killed and wounded — in line with estimates from British and Ukrainian officials.

Moscow is not relying solely on volunteers to fill its ranks. A law signed several weeks ago shifts Russia’s conscription system — which drafts medically fit men aged 18 to 30 not yet serving in the reserve — from biannual cycles to year-round processing. Experts say the change effectively creates a permanent recruitment infrastructure, enabling the Defense Ministry to funnel more people into the armed forces.

“They are moving forward, but they don’t care about the number of people they lose,” said Andriy Yermak, who as head of the Ukrainian Presidential Office served as the country’s leading peace negotiator before resigning Friday amid a corruption investigation. “It’s important to understand that we are a democratic country, and we are fighting against an autocratic one. In Russia, a person’s life costs nothing.”

Ukrainian units, by contrast, are stretched thin; in many places, they can barely hold the line. Ukrainian officers told POLITICO that in parts of the eastern front, there are as many as seven Russian soldiers for every one of theirs. This dynamic has been exacerbated by tens of thousands of Ukrainian soldiers who, over the past year, have left their posts without authorization or abandoned military service altogether.

Russia’s personnel advantage is one reason its army now seizes Ukrainian land every month roughly equivalent in size to the city of Atlanta. As Kyiv relinquishes territory, it has worked to expand foreign recruitment, drawing volunteers from across the Americas and Europe.

German security officials say Putin is well-positioned to hit a declared target of a 1.5 million–troop army next year. That rapid industrial and military build-up has rattled European policymakers, who increasingly see it as preparation for military action beyond Ukraine.

“Russia is continuing to build up its army and is mobilizing on a scale that suggests a larger military confrontation with additional European states,” says German Bundestag member Roderich Kiesewetter, a security expert from Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s party.

A Fighter by Necessity

Anton didn’t join the military because he believed in the war. He slipped into the army after a financial collapse. By the time the 44-year-old father of three from the Moscow region walked into a military recruitment office last year, he felt he had run out of options. He was unemployed, drowning in debt and facing a possible prison sentence over a fraud case that made finding legal work nearly impossible. (Anton’s name was changed to protect his anonymity under fear of governmental reprisal.)

Opening Telegram, he also kept seeing persistent ads promising lavish bonuses. “My wife was on maternity leave, my mother is retired — the family depended on me,” Anton told POLITICO in voice messages sent over Telegram. “During one argument, my wife said: ‘It would be better if you went to war.’ A month and a half later, I signed the contract. It felt like the only way out.” In Anton’s case, no recruiter was involved — he went to the recruitment center on his own.

The contract promised Anton about $2,650 a month, plus a signing bonus from the Moscow region of roughly $2,460, more than 10 times what he had earned under the table as a warehouse worker and courier. He was dispatched to the Pokrovsk sector in Ukraine’s Donetsk region, at a remove from direct combat — though, as he puts it, under “occasional shelling” — keeping his unit’s drones operational.

There, said Anton, he met many men who, like him, had been unable to make ends meet in civilian life. “Some are paying alimony, some were sent by creditors to work off their debts,” Anton said. “There’s no patriotic talk here — no ‘for victory’ or ‘for Putin.’ Nobody speaks like that. Everyone is tired. Everyone just wants to go home.”

In July 2025, Anton received a state decoration for his service, which may help clear his criminal record. “That was another reason I signed,” he said. “It was the only way to avoid prosecution — either die or earn a medal.”

Eluding prison time remains a strong motivator for many. A relative of a missing soldier from the Moscow region described how 28-year-old Ivan, a cook, was arrested for drug trafficking in 2025. “He signed the military service declaration in custody and asked the court to replace his sentence with service,” the relative said. Within a week, he was deployed to the front. Ivan disappeared in April after less than a month in combat. His wife and 1-year-old son have heard nothing since. (Ivan’s name was changed at the family’s request, for fear of retribution.)

While tens of thousands have enlisted from Russia’s wealthiest urban centers, according to official databases and analysts, most recruits come from Russia’s economically depressed regions, where life has long been defined by poverty, crime and alcoholism.

“For many men, this is the last opportunity to build a life that feels meaningful,” said Alexander Baunov of the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center. “Instead of dying as failures in their families’ eyes, they die as heroes on the front.”

For the men volunteering — often treated as expendable by their commanders — the war has become a high-risk lottery for a better life. Survival brings transformative earnings. Even severe injuries come with fixed payouts: roughly $12,000 for a broken finger and $36,000 for a shattered foot.

During brief trips closer to the front to deliver equipment, Anton says he was repeatedly targeted by Ukrainian drones. On one occasion, one exploded just meters from him. Even that narrow escape wasn’t enough to make him reconsider.

“My financial situation improved significantly. It may sound sad, but for me personally, signing the contract made my life better,” Anton says. “The hardest part is being far from my children. But even knowing that, I would do it all over again.”