特朗普将如何输掉与中国的贸易战

 编者：本文是保罗·克鲁格曼于2024年11月15日发表于《纽约时报》的一篇评论文章。特朗普的重新当选有全球化退潮的背景，也有美国民主党没能及时推出有力候选人的因素。相较于民主党的执政，特朗普更加具有个人化的特点，也给时局曾经了更多的不确定性。

好消息：我认为特朗普不会引发全球贸易战。

坏消息：我之所以这么说，是因为我相信，即使特朗普输掉了大选，贸易战也会爆发，这主要是因为中国不愿意像一个负责任的经济超级大国那样行事。不幸的是，要引导美国政策度过可能即将到来的动荡，特朗普可能是最糟糕的人选。

他不会是我们打贸易战的原因，但很可能是我们输掉贸易战的原因。

中国是历史上最了不起的经济成功故事。它曾经非常贫困，至今仍有很多人记得1959～1961年的大饥荒。但在1978年开始改革之后，中国经济飞速发展。即使现在，它依旧是一个中等收入国家，人均GDP远低于我们或西欧的水平。但中国拥有庞大的人口，因此以某些标准来衡量，它目前是世界上最大的经济体。

然而，所有迹象都表明，中国经济高速增长的时代已经过去。几十年来，中国的增长动力主要来自两个方面：适龄劳动人口的不断增长，以及引进技术推动的生产率快速增长。但适龄劳动人口在大约十年前达到顶峰，目前正在下降。尽管取得了一些相当厉害的成就，但中国的整体技术进步速度（经济学家通过“全要素生产率”来衡量）似乎已经放缓到了爬行的速度。

但增长放缓未必就是一场灾难。日本在上世纪90年代经历了类似的人口和科技的衰退，总体上处理得相当得当，避免了大规模失业和社会动荡。

然而，中国建立了一个为高增长时代设计的经济体系——一个抑制消费者支出、鼓励高投资率的体系。

只要经济的高速增长创造了对更多工厂、办公楼等的需求，那么这个系统就是可行的，这样高投资就可以找到生产性的用途。但是，虽然一个年增长率为9%的经济体可以将GDP的40%用于有效投资，但一个增长率3%的经济体就没法做到这一点。

答案似乎很明显：将收入重新分配给家庭，并将经济从投资转向消费。但不知出于何种原因，中国政府似乎不愿意朝着这个方向迈进。一次又一次，刺激政策的目的更多地是为了扩大产能，而不是让消费者能够利用这些产能。

那么，如果你拥有大量产能，但消费者无法或不愿购买你所生产的商品，你该怎么办？你试图将问题向外输出，通过维持巨额贸易顺差来维持经济运转。

我的意思是，巨大的贸易顺差。值得注意的是，中国似乎对贸易数据做了手脚，试图使它的顺差看起来比实际规模要小。然而，中国的出口额似乎比进口额多出近1万亿美元，而且还处于上升趋势。

因此，贸易战即将到来。世界其他国家不会被动地接受中国如此规模的贸易顺差。本世纪前十年的“中国冲击”告诉我们，无论自由贸易有什么（真实的）好处，进口激增都会对受影响的工人和社区造成不可接受的损害。此外，中国是一个不认同民主价值观的专制国家。任由它支配战略上至关重要的产业会带来无法承受的风险。

这就是为什么拜登政府一直悄然对中国采取强硬立场，保留了特朗普的关税，并试图限制其在先进技术方面的进步。这就是为什么欧盟对中国制造的电动汽车征收高额关税，这可能只是贸易冲突扩大的开始。

因此，贸易战即将来临；在某种程度上，它已经开始。那么，特朗普会带来些什么？

无知、缺乏重点，以及任人唯亲的可能性。哦，还有容易上当受骗。

无知：特朗普坚称关税不会损害消费者——尽管美国各地的企业都计划在他提议的关税生效时提高价格——这强烈表明，无论是他还是给予他建议的人，都不了解全球贸易是如何运作的。在发生贸易冲突的时候，这可不是一件好事。

缺乏重点：特朗普提议全面征收关税，而不仅仅是针对中国，这将提高许多美国企业的成本，并疏远本应参与合作应对的盟友。

任人唯亲：总统在授予特定公司关税豁免方面有着很大的自由裁量权。在特朗普的第一个任期内，这种豁免不成比例地流向了与共和党存在政治联系的公司。如果认为这种情况不太可能再次发生，规模不再可能那么大，就太天真了。

最后一点，容易上当受骗：在他的第一个任期内，特朗普在最后签署了其所谓的“历史性贸易协议”后停止了提高关税，根据该协议，中国同意购买2000亿美元的美国商品。中国实际购买了多少？一分没有。

正如我所说的，随着中国试图向外输出其政策失败，严重的贸易冲突即将到来。但美国刚刚选出了可能是最糟糕的领导人来处理这场冲突。

404文：委内瑞拉，这个上天眷顾的国家是如何毁掉的？

编者注：读这篇文章，想起了王莽。伟大的理想，高尚的品质，如果加诸于自我，大概可以成为半个圣人。但是如果想加诸于整个社会， 则往往会带来巨大的灾难。何也？人性。

按：原文发表于2023年12月15日，目前已遭到屏蔽。（近期，委内瑞拉总统选举投票后，选委会宣布卸任总统马杜罗赢得第三个总统任期引发委内瑞拉国内外广泛质疑。委内瑞拉数千人在首都加拉加斯举行游行示威，抗议总统马杜罗通过欺诈手段赢得选举。）

很大程度上，智利和委内瑞拉在过去2、30年来，走了一个完全相反的道路。智利，在走向民主化的同时，经济也获得了长足发展，而委内瑞拉，在民主崩溃的同时也出现了经济崩溃。智利转型以来，经济从拉美的中下游水平一路上升到名列前茅，贫困率从46%降到3.7%；委内瑞拉则相反，1999年查韦斯上台之际，它的人均购买力GDP在拉美顶端，但是20年后的今天，委内瑞拉经济成为一片废墟，贫困率高达90%。

很长一段时间里，委内瑞拉政府试图掩盖经济衰退，从2015年以后停止发布经济数据。但是，网上流行的一句话说得好：世界上有三种东西是不可能隐藏的，喷嚏、爱情还有贫穷。委内瑞拉经济现在糟糕到什么程度呢？有几个数据可以反映。

一个是通货膨胀率。根据IMF的估算，2018年这一年，委内瑞拉的通货膨胀率高达1,000,000%。这是什么概念呢？就是钱几乎没有意义了。你一个月的工资可能只能买两盒鸡蛋，三个月的工资买一瓶橄榄油，所以，才发生委内瑞拉老百姓宁愿把钱当厕纸用、也不去买厕纸的情况，因为厕纸比钱贵多了。更糟的是，历史上的超级通胀，大多是来得快去得也快，但是委内瑞拉的超级通胀，从2016年左右开始到现在，已经4年了，还没有结束。我写这个稿子的时候专门去查了一下，最近的数据是2020年8月，通货膨胀率还是2,000%多。这几乎是现代史上延续时间最长的超级通货膨胀了。

除了通胀，另一个指标是难民数据。说起难民，我们通常想起哪些国家？叙利亚、也门、阿富汗之类的战乱国家，对不对？但是，另一个我们几乎从不谈及的难民危机，发生在委内瑞拉，而它的规模与叙利亚的难民危机旗鼓相当。根据布鲁金斯学会的一个报告，叙利亚内战导致480万难民外逃，委内瑞拉呢？截至2019年底，有460万人外逃，也就是其人口的16%。委内瑞拉医生去哥伦比亚端盘子，律师去秘鲁扫大街，老人儿童在墨西哥沿街乞讨，这样的故事太多了。和平年代出现如此之多的逃难者，委内瑞拉真的是奇迹创造者了。

根据IMF的估算，从2013到2019年，委内瑞拉的真实GDP缩水了65%，几乎是过去半个世纪左右全球最严重的经济衰退，唯一比它更严重的衰退是内战期间的利比里亚。要知道，这些数字不仅仅是数字，背后是无数人的命运，其中有在垃圾堆里翻找食物的儿童，有不得不去购买臭肉的母亲，有因为停电而在停尸房慢慢腐烂的尸体，有翻山越岭到邻国乞讨的老人……2017年的一项调查显示，63%的委内瑞拉人因为饥饿体重减轻，减幅平均高达23磅。所以委内瑞拉人开玩笑说，“马杜罗餐”是历史上最见效的减肥餐，因为马杜罗是他们的总统。在我读过的各种报道中，印象最深的是两条：一个是说委内瑞拉的小学门口经常是救护车的呼啸声，为什么？因为上课的学生不停因为饥饿而晕倒。另一条是一个需要做癌症手术的老太太，医生对她表示，你可以来做手术，但是，你必须自筹手术用品、绷带、药品、麻醉剂、消毒剂……等等，因为医院里真的什么都没有了。这样的荒诞，真的是小说家都编不出来。

显然的问题是，何以至此？为什么拉美地区曾经最富有的国家，在短短20年间，会走向经济崩溃？毕竟，委内瑞拉是个先天条件特别好的国家，盛产各种矿产资源。很多人不知道的是，委内瑞拉是世界上石油储备最丰富的国家。它的石油储量，甚至超过沙特阿拉伯，这也是它70年代以来走向经济繁荣的主要原因。油田是什么？油田就是一个哗哗地往外喷钱的地下取款机啊，但是，明明抱着一个取之不尽的取款机，委内瑞拉经济还是走向了崩溃，为什么？

这就必须从一个人讲起：委内瑞拉的前总统查韦斯。查韦斯，何许人也？一言以蔽之，一个左翼民粹主义者。这个人是个贪污腐败的窃国贼吗？其实不是。不但不贪，甚至可以说，他是一个同情心爆棚的现代罗宾汉。用他自己的话来说，“当我看到社会不公的时候，看到孩子因饥饿而死去的时候，我会痛哭。”他的一生，似乎也是与“社会不公”斗争的一生。

1992年，还是一个普通军官的他，因为对委内瑞拉的贫富悬殊不满，对“新自由主义经济模式”充满怨恨，加入了一场政变。政变失败了，当时他作为军人代表，在电视直播中表示：“遗憾的是，我们没有达成目标，我对失败承担全部责任。”事后，他被投入监狱。但是，当时全国民众都记住了这张年轻、勇敢的脸庞。1994年他被新总统特赦特出狱的时候，受到了民众英雄凯旋般的欢迎。1999年，人们干脆抛弃了那些传统政党，以压倒性的优势把这个现代罗宾汉选上了台去。现在，他终于可以抛弃“新自由主义经济模式”，大刀阔斧地施展自己的蓝图了。他给这个蓝图起了一个名字，叫做“21世纪的社会主义”。

“21世纪的社会主义”，使命是什么？就是打击豪强、扶弱济贫、实现“社会正义”，用查韦斯自己的话来说，就是“挑战特权精英，把权力交给穷人”。为了实现这些目标，他一边改组委内瑞拉最大的石油企业PDVSA，以确保石油收入能够流入到国库当中；一边用滚滚而来的石油收入，建设各种扶弱济贫的“社会项目”。左手取钱，右手撒钱，可谓行云流水。

我简略介绍几个此类社会项目，大家就能明白为什么我说查韦斯是“现代罗宾汉”了。第一， Mission Mercal。抱歉我不懂西班牙语，所以可能念的不对。这个Mission Mercal是干什么的呢，是针对穷人的食品补贴项目，保证穷人能够买到物美价廉的食品。据报道，全国1.6万个商店加入该计划，高峰期雇用了8万多人，1000多万穷人受益于该项目。第二，Mission Barrio Adentro。这是“走入贫困社区”的医疗项目，用意是改变医疗资源的贫富悬殊。报道称，数千个社区医疗诊所建立起来，高峰期有3万多个医生在其中工作，包括1万多个古巴医生。第三，Mission Robinson。这是针对贫困人口的教育扫盲运动。为达成目标，政府动员大量士兵深入偏远地带，挨家挨户去普及识字。第四，Mission Zamora。这是一个土地改革项目，不但农村的土地大量再分配，城市贫民窟的“临时搭建”住房也都统统被追认了产权……此类项目还有很多很多，由于时间关系，我不能一一列列举。但是，仅仅从我列举的这几个，大家应该已经能够看出，查韦斯真的是“一颗红心为人民”。

尤其值得一提的是，为了确保这些项目不被既有的官僚集团颠覆破坏，查韦斯还专门成立了无数的“社区委员会”，在农村是数十家一组，在城市是数百家一组，让普通民众加入这些社区委员会，由他们来参与决策，决定政府分配的资源怎么花，并监督官员是否公正、清廉。截至2010年，全国成立了大约两万个这样的“社区委员会”。

经济上扶弱济贫、打击豪强，政治上推动基层民主、打击官僚，外交上，查韦斯则是个不畏强权的“反美斗士”。他在电视上高呼“打倒美帝国”，把小布什称为“魔鬼”和“蠢驴”，布莱尔是“帝国主义走狗”。与此同时，和他一样、敢和美国叫板的阿萨德是“兄弟”，穆加贝是“自由战士”，而卡扎菲则是他心目中的“革命烈士”。

正是因为这些左翼理念和措施，让查韦斯在委内瑞拉赢得了无数人心。1998年，他以一匹黑马的身份赢得大选后，成为无数委内瑞拉人的精神教父。之后，除了一次公投和一次议会选举，查韦斯和他支持的力量赢得了几乎所有选举或公投。即使是那次失败的公投，也被后来的公投所推翻。1998年，查韦斯赢得总统选举时，领先优势是16%；2000年大选，优势提升到了22％；2006年，26%。2012年的选举虽然只领先11％，但这是在他公布了癌症消息后得到的结果，民众对他可以说是“一往情深”。2013年他去世时，上百万民众深夜守候十几个小时，无数人声泪俱下，只为“十里长街送总统”。哪怕他去世几年之后，也就是查韦斯模式已经走向破产的时候，2017年一项调查仍然显示，有79%的委内瑞拉民众选择查韦斯为其“最喜爱的总统”。

不但在国内深受爱戴，查韦斯在国际上也粉丝无数。美国政治家桑德斯曾表示：“现在是委内瑞拉更可能实现美国梦”，英国工党领袖科尔宾则认为，查韦斯“展示了一种不同的、更好的道路，它叫做社会主义、叫做社会正义。”查韦斯去世时，好莱坞演员西恩·潘写道：“全世界的穷人失去了他们的领路人”，著名导演奥利弗·斯通则表示，“我为一个真正的英雄哀悼。”

这样一个“穷人的领路人”，一个“真正的英雄”，为什么将委内瑞拉带入了经济灾难？可能有人会说，查韦斯2013年去世，委内瑞拉经济危机2014年后出现，问题肯定完全出在他的继任者马杜罗。这话其实不对。为什么？因为马杜罗无论是经济路线、外交政策还是政治倾向，都完全继承了查韦斯的遗产。他自己也是查韦斯一手栽培，在他任下一路担任议长、外交部长、副总统，最后成为查韦斯指定的接班人。所以，查韦斯虽然死了，但是查韦斯主义还在。

当然，马杜罗虽然继承查韦斯的遗志，却没有他的个人魅力，结果就成了一个东施效颦版的查韦斯。但是，这两个人真正的区别还不是个人魅力，而是一个更重要的因素：国际石油价格。查韦斯那一套“左手取钱、右手撒钱”的经济模式之所以搞得下去，是因为他在任期间，刚好赶上国际油价的大幅上升。1999年他刚上台时，油价是20美元左右一桶，到2013年他去世时，爬升至110美元左右，最高峰期甚至到达过150美元左右。马杜罗却没有这个运气，他一上台，国际油价就开始节节下跌，从110美元左右跌到现在的40美元上下。倒霉的马杜罗，接过了查韦斯办得如火如荼的盛宴，却发现冰箱里已经开始弹尽粮绝。

正因为查韦斯运气绝佳，他在任期间，他那些民粹主义经济政策一度对经济起到了一个“兴奋剂”的作用。短期来看，各项经济数据似乎都不错，2000到2013年，经济年均增速是3.5%，人均GDP从4800美元升至12000美元，贫困率从23%降至8.5%。总之一切看起来都欣欣向荣，也正是在这个时候，桑德斯、科尔宾等等都为“21世纪社会主义”的新篇章给查韦斯纷纷鼓掌。

但是，好运气不可能永远持续。事实上，在国际油价大跌之前，也就是查韦斯还活着时，通货膨胀、短缺经济、民营部门萎缩等等“民粹经济病兆”都已经开始显现。查韦斯最骄傲的政策之一，是通过补贴保证穷人买到廉价食品，但是到2011年，委内瑞拉的食品价格已经是2003年的9倍，而平均工资只增长了不到40%。贫困率、犯罪率也已经重新开始上升。某种意义上，查韦斯的英年早逝是一种“幸运”，因为命运没有残忍地让他亲眼看到自己的革命全面破产。
 

虽然国际油价下跌是“查韦斯主义”的拐点，但这并非它破产的最根本因素。道理很简单：这个世界上石油国家很多，但是没有哪个像委内瑞拉摔得这么惨。哪怕是俄罗斯，大家可能记得，我前面讲到过，由于国际油价的下跌，普京的经济奇迹最近几年失去魔力，但是在俄罗斯，后果也只是真实收入水平的停滞，而不是GDP缩水65%这样恐怖的情形。上期节目我们还讲到智利，智利的支柱性产业是铜，也是高度依赖国际市场，但是，由于智利长期实行反周期的财政模式，居安思危、未雨绸缪，所以尽管国际市场大起大落，仍然保持了经济稳定与增长。至于马杜罗天天挂在嘴边的美国制裁，更不是最重要的因素，因为石油制裁从2017年左右才开始，这时候的委内瑞拉经济已经在暴风眼当中了。

委内瑞拉经济危机的根本原因，还是其经济理念，而不是外部因素。为了实现所谓“社会公平”的伟大理想，查韦斯犯了一些教科书式的错误。第一，过度支出，寅吃卯粮。反正大地在喷钱，不花白不花。于是，委内瑞拉的社会开支一路攀升，直到地下取款机突然坏掉为止，毕竟，中了一次奖的人不会一直中奖。第二，大搞国有化，打击民营经济。本来，石油产业萎缩，如果其它行业、企业如果能顶上，经济或许也能挺住，但是查韦斯严重削弱了民营经济。据统计，查韦斯政府征收了1168个企业和农场，征收价格往往严重低于市场价格；那些没有被征收的，也因为政府的种种管制政策而破产或主动关门，比如政府强行要求企业低价出售商品，不断提高最低工资，要求企业“民主化管理”，要求银行必须提供“社会性贷款”……等等，总之私有企业的生存空间越来越窄。有报道称，1999年委内瑞拉有49万个私人公司，但是到2018年，只剩28万个。第三，煽动经济民族主义。比如，他坚决要收回石油公司的美资股份，当美国的两大石油公司拒绝转移股权，他一纸令下，以极低的价格强征了这两个公司。

马杜罗上台后，这一套经济民粹主义更是变本加厉。他就任后，经济政策方面的第一个举动是什么呢？就是发动所谓的“经济战争”。什么叫“经济战争”？很简单，不让商店和企业涨价。根据他的理论，委内瑞拉的经济困难是因为贪得无厌的资本家囤积居奇，以此破坏社会主义革命，所以挽救困局的办法就是不让涨价。你非要涨价怎么办，那就派军队来“占领商店”。大家想想看，一边是生产成本急剧通胀，一边是商品不让涨价，结果是什么？结果当然是商店关门大吉了。于是，委内瑞拉的短缺经济变得更加严重。我看相关报道的时候，有一个小细节印象很深，因为短缺经济造成人们到处排长队买东西，而政府觉得超市门口到处是长队太有损国家形象了，于是发明出各种办法限制排队，比如，只能在超市后门排队，或者人们按照身份证号码轮流出门排队，比如，身份证尾号是1、周一排队，尾号是2周二排队，等等，可以说是各种荒诞。

我经常会听到一种说法，查韦斯主义出了问题，不是因为经济模式有问题，而是因为查韦斯和马杜罗走向了政治独裁，所以，是好鸡蛋被坏大厨给炒坏了。我认为，这话也不对。的确，查韦斯和马杜罗的统治越来越威权化，这与委内瑞拉的经济危机同步发生，但是，这里面的因果关系，主要不是他们的威权政治打破了经济蓝图，而是他们的经济蓝图倒推出了威权政治。为什么？因为他们的经济理念太依赖于一套“敌我话语”了，所以必须要依靠强力去“专政”那些反对派势力：强取豪夺的资本家，囤积居奇的商店老板，新自由主义的阴谋家，给美帝国主义代言的媒体……而所有的政治反对党和街头抗议，一定都是捍卫等级压迫的“既得利益集团”。因此，为了神圣的、人民的利益，压制这些反动的、邪恶的势力，实属迫不得已的“无奈选择”。

查韦斯上台后，通过各种方式打击制衡他的反对派力量。2000年，支持他的“第五共和国运动”党赢得议会多数席位，议会从此成为橡皮图章。事实上，为了绕开碍手碍脚的议会反对党，议会曾经四次授权总统实行“政令统治”。什么叫“政令统治”？就是允许查韦斯无须经过议会批准就制定公共政策。

搞定了立法机构，再来搞定司法机构。查韦斯一上台，就对司法系统展开了“大换血”，无数法官被解职。为了让最高法院臣服于执政党，查韦斯把大法官从20个增加到32个，从此保证了最高法院的政党忠诚。此后，面对司法系统，查韦斯可以说如履平地。

对付不听话的市场媒体，政府也有各种办法：拒绝续发经营许可证、罚款、起诉、禁止国有企业发放广告、给支持政府的电视台发放补助等等。所有这些做法，是不是听上去有点耳熟？记忆力好的听众朋友可能已经想起来了，我前面讲俄罗斯的时候提到过一个概念：不自由的民主。在俄罗斯之外，查韦斯时代的委内瑞拉，是不自由民主的又一个典型。事实上，从2009年左右开始，大多数的国际政体评估机构不再将委内瑞拉视为“民主政体”。

然而，正如普京的权力不仅仅来自于对反对派的打压，也来自于对民意的俘虏，查韦斯的威权化背后，同样有着汹涌的民意。2002年反对派发动政变，查韦斯的支持者立刻上街声援总统，他们身穿红T恤，把委内瑞拉的大街小巷染成了红色的海洋。2004年，反对派发起“总统召回”公投，近60%的民众用他们的选票挽留了查韦斯。2009年，通过又一场修宪公投，民众赋予了查韦斯继续连任总统的权力。查韦斯不是什么一意孤行的“独夫”，他是在个人崇拜中被其拥戴者抬上了神坛。当道义成为政治强人的武器，他的感召力变得所向披靡。

马杜罗当然没有这种魅力，于是，他更多地诉诸于赤裸裸的强权。查韦斯去世后，2015年，反对党赢得议会选举，委内瑞拉终于迎来了转机，很多人以为委内瑞拉会从此走出查韦斯主义。结果，马杜罗通过最高法院剥夺了新议会的权力，另立了一个听话的议会。2016年，反对派发起总统召回公投，这次，马杜罗控制的选举委员会中止了公投。2019年初，反对党领袖Guaido宣布另立政府，但是没能争得军队的支持。核心的反对派领袖要么被抓捕，要么被迫流亡海外。

为什么马杜罗搞独裁如此得心应手？显然是因为查韦斯为他做好的权力铺垫。经常听到有人说，马杜罗是独裁者，而查韦斯则是民主英雄，这实在只是一种自欺。当马杜罗利用最高法院来剥夺新议会的立法权时，他之所以能够做到这一点，正是因为当年查韦斯对司法系统的驯服。当马杜罗面对新议会“急中生智”另立“制宪议会”时，这不过是对查韦斯1999年的做法“复刻”而已。经济灾难如此深重，为什么军队还不倒戈？同样是因为查韦斯当年在军队中安插了各种亲信。马杜罗和查韦斯之间不存在真正的断裂，他们俩只是一个栽树，一个乘凉而已。

最神奇的是，我们以为经济灾难会让政府垮台，但是马杜罗政府却神奇地把经济崩溃变成了他的政治资产。为什么？因为当经济极度短缺，而政府控制了有限供给，资源分配就成了政府控制民众的武器。从2016年开始，马杜罗政府每个月给困难家庭发一盒救济食品，尽管只是杯水车薪，但对很多家庭来说，这是唯一的救生圈。为了防止这唯一的救生圈被拿走，很多民众更加“听话”，甚至感恩戴德。我看到过一个报道，一个从委内瑞拉逃离的医生回忆道，政府明确表示，不给政府投票的，医生不许给他们看病。

所以，委内瑞拉是如何走到今天这一步的？虽然起点在查韦斯，但是，是因为查韦斯的个人贪腐吗？并非如此。查韦斯生活简朴，工作勤奋，直到去世，仍然是两袖清风。他热爱底层人民，底层人民也热爱他，如果你生活在当年的委内瑞拉，打开电视，会发现他一会儿出现在工厂，一会儿出现在农田，和底层人民打成一片，甚至和他们一起唱歌跳舞。当他说“看见饥饿的儿童，我会痛哭”时，我相信他的真诚。

委内瑞拉走到今天，不是源自于“坏人”的贪婪腐败，而恰恰是源自于“好人”的道德激情。当正义感变得不容置疑，当“平等”成为唯一的宗教，恶的大门也可以被善的手指所敲响。历史上，无数通往悲剧的道路由斩钉截铁的道德激情所铺陈，恶只是意外的结果，而不是最初的动因。遗憾的是，恶一旦被启动，会形成越来越深的漩涡，因为恶往往需要更大的恶去掩盖。所以，我们发现，委内瑞拉人似乎生活在一个无法醒来的噩梦中，至今还在下沉。

更令人悲哀的是这种道德激情的顽固。到现在，很多一贫如洗的委内瑞拉人，家里还挂着查韦斯的肖像，马杜罗组织的聚会上，还有无数人为其摇旗呐喊。拉美的民调显示，几乎所有拉美国家的多数民众都认为，自己的国家“还不够社会主义”，全球许多国家的年轻人都在急速左转，看起来，“21世纪的社会主义”方兴未艾。这让我想起一个著名的希腊神话，海妖塞伦的歌声实在太动听、太美好了，所有路过的船员都会被它魅惑，在歌声中触礁沉没，只有奥德修斯在路过那片海域时，让人把自己给死死绑住，无法偏航，才得以安全通过。某种意义上，委内瑞拉的故事就是一个当代的希腊悲剧。塞伦的歌声实在太美好了，人类一再被其魅惑，为其触礁，而海底的每一艘沉船，都是对人类理性之傲慢挥之不去的讽刺。

Xi Jinping’s misguided plan to escape economic stagnation

编者：这篇文章首次清楚的解释了什么是“新质生产力”， 即优先发展先进制造业，包括电动汽车，电池，生物制造和以无人机为依托的“低海拔经济”。

It is china’s gravest economic test since the most far-reaching of Deng Xiaoping’s reforms began in the 1990s. Last year the country achieved growth of 5%, but the pillars of its decades-long miracle are wobbling. Its famously industrious workforce is shrinking, history’s wildest property boom has turned to bust and the global system of free trade that China used to get richer is disintegrating. As our reporting explains, President Xi Jinping’s response is to double down on an audacious plan to remake China’s economy. Blending techno-utopianism, central planning and an obsession with security, this sets out China’s ambition to dominate the industries of tomorrow. But its contradictions mean it will disappoint China’s people and anger the rest of the world.

Compared with 12 months ago, let alone the go-go years, the mood in China is dour. Although industrial production perked up in March, consumers are depressed, deflation lurks and many entrepreneurs are disillusioned. Behind the angst lie deeper fears about China’s vulnerabilities. It is forecast to lose 20% of its workforce by 2050. A crisis in the property industry, which drives a fifth of gdp, will take years to fix. It will hurt cash-strapped local governments that relied on land sales for revenues and flourishing real estate for growth. Relations with America are steadier, as a phone call between Mr Xi and President Joe Biden this week attested. But they remain fragile. Chinese officials are convinced that America will restrict more Chinese imports and penalise more Chinese firms, whoever wins the White House in November.

China’s response is a strategy built around what officials call “new productive forces”. This eschews the conventional path of a big consumer stimulus to reflate the economy (that’s the kind of ruse the decadent West resorts to). Instead Mr Xi wants state power to accelerate advanced manufacturing industries, which will in turn create high-productivity jobs, make China self-sufficient and secure it against American aggression. China will leapfrog steel and skyscrapers to a golden era of mass production of electric cars, batteries, biomanufacturing and the drone-based “low-altitude economy”.

The scope of this plan is breathtaking. We estimate annual investment in “new productive forces” has reached $1.6trn—a fifth of all investment and double what it was five years ago in nominal terms. This is equivalent to 43% of all business investment in America in 2023. Factory capacity in some industries could rise by over 75% by 2030. Some of this will be made by world-class firms keen to create value, but much will be prompted by subsidies and implicit or explicit state direction. Foreign companies are welcome, even though many have been burned in China before. Mr Xi’s ultimate aim is to invert the balance of power in the global economy. Not only will China escape dependence on Western technology, but it will control much of the key intellectual property in new industries and charge rents accordingly. Multinationals will come to China to learn, not teach.

However, Mr Xi’s plan is fundamentally misguided. One flaw is that it neglects consumers. Although their spending dwarfs property and the new productive forces, it accounts for just 37% of gdp, much lower than global norms. To restore confidence amid the property slump and thereby boost consumer spending requires stimulus. To induce consumers to save less requires better social security and health care, and reforms that open up public services to all urban migrants. Mr Xi’s reluctance to embrace this reflects his austere mindset. He detests the idea of bailing out speculative property firms or giving handouts to citizens. Young people should be less pampered and willing to “eat bitterness”, he said last year.

Another flaw is that weak domestic demand means some new production will have to be exported. The world has, regrettably, moved on from the free-trading 2000s—partly because of China’s own mercantilism. America will surely block advanced imports from China, or those made by Chinese firms elsewhere. Europe is in a panic about fleets of Chinese vehicles wiping out its carmakers. Chinese officials say they can redirect exports to the global south. But if emerging countries’ industrial development is undermined by a new “China shock”, they, too, will grow wary. China accounts for 31% of global manufacturing. In a protectionist age, how much higher can that figure go?

The last flaw is Mr Xi’s unrealistic view of entrepreneurs, the dynamos of the past 30 years. Investment in politically favoured industries is soaring, but the underlying mechanism of capitalist risk-taking has been damaged. Many bosses complain of Mr Xi’s unpredictable rule-making and fear purges or even arrest. Relative stockmarket valuations are at a 25-year low; foreign firms are wary; there are signs of capital flight and tycoons emigrating. Unless entrepreneurs are unshackled, innovation will suffer and resources will be wasted.

China could become like Japan in the 1990s, trapped by deflation and a property crash. Worse, its lopsided growth model could wreck international trade. If so, that could ratchet geopolitical tensions even higher. America and its allies should not cheer that scenario. If China was stagnating and discontented, it could be even more bellicose than if it were thriving.

Old reductive forces

If these flaws are obvious, why doesn’t China change course? One reason is that Mr Xi is not listening. For much of the past 30 years, China has been open to outside views on economic reform. Its technocrats studied global best practice and welcomed vigorous technical debates. Under Mr Xi’s centralising rule, economic experts have been marginalised and the feedback leaders used to receive has turned into flattery. The other reason Mr Xi charges on is that national security now takes precedence over prosperity. China must be prepared for the struggle ahead with America, even if there is a price to pay. It is a profound change from the 1990s and its ill-effects will be felt in China and around the world.■

刘劲——钱都去哪里了？房地产泡沫中的货币供给

 中国房地产泡沫来自土地供应的不平衡，控制货币供应并无法精准地抑制地产泡沫，反而会影响到很多和地产毫无关系的产业。解决问题的关键是用财政和行政政策直接调节其中的不平衡

截至2022年底，中国广义货币总量M2的规模已经达到266万亿人民币，是同期GDP（国内生产总值）的2.2倍；22年前（2000年），M2规模只有13.8万亿元，是GDP的1.3倍。在2000年至2022年的大部分时间里，M2的增速都超过了名义GDP，这期间，中国M2年均增速约14.4%，名义GDP只有12%。

一般认为，当货币供应增速超过实体经济增速，一定会带来通胀。但是，从2000年至2022年，中国CPI（居民消费价格指数）年均增速只有2.2%。可能有人会说，CPI衡量的只是与居民日常生活有关的商品和服务的价格，经济生活中还有很多项目，比如投资的价格并不在这里反映，它们的价格可能很高。GDP平减指数与GDP统计范围一致，包括居民消费、政府消费、投资支出以及出口商品和服务四大部分，其中，居民消费部分与CPI的统计范围基本一致，二者的差异仅体现在进出口的商品和服务上。从2000年至2022年，中国GDP平减指数的年均增速约3.3%，比CPI略高一些，但远远算不上高通胀。

为什么高速的货币增长没有带来很高的通胀？一种常见的解释是，央行超发了货币，为了避免引起通胀，我们通过发展房地产，把它作为蓄水池，将多余的资金引向房地产，所以虽然没有很高的通胀，但房地产业却产生了很大的泡沫。这种解释的核心要点是货币超发是个政策失误，而房地产泡沫的起因来自这个政策失误。

但仔细推敲，以上说法产生至少两个疑点。首先，管理经济是个非常复杂的事情，但货币供应相对比较简单。像美国用的是市场机制，通过对债券的买卖来提供或者收回流动性；咱们中国行政机制用的多一些，往往直接对货币供应量以及信贷进行行政指导。如果货币超发是个政策失误，央行为什么会犯如此简单的错误？其次，货币超发如果能引起房地产泡沫，为什么没有引起其它种类资产的泡沫？中国股市为什么年回报率大大低于GDP的名义增长？大城市的住宅用地价格确实有很高的增长率，但为什么工业用地价格不增反跌？

为什么印这么多钱？

要理解货币政策、实体经济、资产泡沫之间的三角关系，我们不妨先看看货币政策是怎样形成的。一般来说，国家的货币政策有两个目的：促进经济增长（其中包括保就业），保持价格稳定。所以货币政策是宏观经济政策的衍生和配套，是国家定了增长目标、价格目标后在货币方面的配套政策，而不是反过来，先定下货币增长目标，然后再看经济怎样增长、价格怎样变动。人们往往把货币政策和农田的浇灌联系起来做比方：浇水是为了长庄稼，少了不行多了也不行，一切都得看庄稼长得怎么样。是庄稼的生长驱动浇水的量，而不是先定下浇水的量，再看庄稼怎么长。

所以，货币供应最重要的驱动因素是经济，高经济增长必然需要高货币增长。M2高速增长的现象并不是中国独有，日本、韩国在其经济的高速增长时期，都发生过类似的事情：从1960年至1998年，韩国实际GDP年均增长10.5%，CPI年均增长11%， M2年均增速达到30.8%，M2占GDP比重从10%提高至95%。日本在1947年至1988年期间，实际GDP年均增长7.3%，CPI年均增长6.9%，M2年均增长17.3%，M2/GDP的比例从35%提高至1倍。目前日韩的M2与GDP的比例也都在2左右。

货币增长的另一个重要原因是资产的货币化，即资产从低流动性、非交易状态向高流动性、经常交易状态的转变。就中国而言，有两类重要资产在快速货币化，一类是企业所有的资产，另一类是土地，当然两者也有交叉（企业资产包括一部分土地）。企业的债权和股权融资，土地的商品开发，都是资产货币化的过程。

2000年初，中国A股市场市值总和只有约4万亿元，每年产生的股权融资总额(含IPO和再融资)在800亿元左右；2023年，A股市值总和已经达到94万亿元，加上港股和中概股的38万亿，总共有132万亿，是GDP的一倍以上；每年的融资总额A股有1.6万亿元，海外超过1000亿。融资本身并不产生GDP，但却需要货币供给才能满足融资的需求。2000年初，A股市场每年的成交量约3万亿元，相当于名义GDP的30%；目前，A股年成交量达到224万亿元，接近名义GDP的两倍。资产的交易本身也不产生GDP（除去中介服务的部分），但也需要流动性才能完成交易。

另一个重要的被货币化的资产是土地。2000年初，中国每年新房销售额（即商品房）在4000亿左右，相当于当时GDP规模的4%；2021年全国新房销售额为16万亿元，另外，据贝壳研究院的测算，2021年全国二手房的销售规模在7万亿元左右，两者合计23万亿元，占2021年GDP的20%。2005年至今，中国每年新增的房地产开发贷和个人按揭贷款（以下合称房地产贷款）占当年全部新增贷款的比重约30%。由于中国不允许将来自信托、银行贷款的资金用于缴纳土地保证金及土地出让款，因此房地产开发贷并不包括企业购买的土地，如果把卖地收入也加进去，这个比重平均达到65%。

由此可见，房地产业对货币供给的需求巨大。如果房地产的价格上升过快，必然带来更大的货币需求。中国房地产有很大的泡沫是有目共睹的事实。根据NUMBEO数据库提供的全球主要城市房价收入比，2022年在全球排名最高的前十个城市中，中国有四个城市上榜：上海、北京、香港分别以46.6、45.8、44.9位居前三，深圳以40位居第六。像纽约、洛杉矶这样的国际大都市，房价收入比都在10以下。

这里核心的问题是到底过量的货币供给催生了房地产泡沫，还是房地产泡沫增加了货币供给的需求。我们前面已经否定了第一种说法。那么，如果是先有房地产泡沫，再有高的货币供给，房地产泡沫就一定得有非货币的产生机制。

土地供需不平衡导致地产泡沫

经济学常识告诉我们，价格由供需关系决定，当需求大供给小，价格就高，反之就低。改革开放这40年来，中国的城镇化速度很快，1978年城镇人口只占总人口的18%，到今天已经是65%。 进入城市的人们需要住房，再加上原有居民的改善需求，所以对住宅用地的需求就很大。其中，像北上广深这些一线城市，以及东部、南部沿海地区，由于经济资源禀赋优越，就吸引了最大的人口净流入。而东北、西北、中部、西南的城市，由于经济发展滞后，人口增长就慢。但我们如果审视住宅用地的供给，不难发现，在人口流入快速的地区，土地的供给并没有相应的增速，有的地方甚至非常保守。这样，在发达地区，由于需求大供给少，自然而然就会使住宅用地和住房的价格飙升；而在欠发达地区，由于需求小供给多，在价格低的情况下仍然有很多供给消化不了。由于中国的人口主要集中在东部、南部，发达地区的地产泡沫就形成了中国的主要矛盾。

例如，从2009年至2021年，北京、上海、广东常住人口年均增速分别为1.9%、1.4%和1%，住宅类用地平均增速分别为2.3%、1.5%和1.3%，看起来正好匹配。但如果加上每年大约每人一平米的改善需求（大约每年3%左右增速），这些地方的供给增速就远远低于需求的增速，于是房地产价格就快速上升。反之，以贵州和湖北为例，二者常住人口年均增速只有0.7%和0.2%，但是住宅类用地的增速则高得多，分别为7.6%和7.3%；更极端的是东三省，黑龙江、吉林和辽宁常住人口分别年均下降1.7%、1.2%和0.2%，但是它们的住宅用地供应量却比北京、上海、广东要大，年均增速分别为2.4%、3.4%和4.2%。所以这些经济欠发达地区的房子往往过剩。

以上是中国土地供需关系中的一个在空间地理位置上的不平衡。

土地供需关系中的第二个不平衡来自中国发展的特有模式：地方政府的土地财政。从政府的角度来看，中国国家经济发展的主要责任在地方政府，而地方政府在财政收入上又严重依赖土地收入。1994年分税制改革大幅降低了地方政府可以享有的流转税和所得税收入，但却把所有与土地有关的税收，包括城镇土地使用税、耕地占用税、土地增值税、契税、房产税，以及当时规模还很少的土地出让收益全部划给了地方政府。2000年，土地出让收入仅占地方财政总收入的5.9%，2021年这一比重已经提高至44%，如果再算上其他与土地相关的税收，地方政府财政收入中一半以上（54%）来自土地。

为了发展经济，地方政府最常用、最主要的方法就是招商引资。地方政府主要靠两种方式吸引资本，一是给予各类税收优惠，二是把工业用地以非常便宜的价格出让。企业进来了，带来了就业机会，就业机会吸引人口流入，人口流入产生住房需求。然而，由于大量土地已经用作工业用地，农业用地又有总量的限制，留给住宅的就自然会少，于是地方政府就拿出相对少量的土地进行住宅建设。这少量的土地可以卖个高价钱，因为需求大供给少。反过来，来自住宅用地的高收入又可以反哺低价工业用地给地方政府带来的损失。于是，土地财政就形成一个闭环，经济得到发展，农村人口可以进城工作，日益高企的住宅用地价格给地方政府带来源源不断的融资……

2022年，中国工业用地、商业用地和住宅类用地的挂牌均价分别为235元/平方米、1354元/平方米和3104元/平方米，住宅用地价格是工业用地的13倍。对比日本，从1975年至2021年，日本全国住宅用地价格与工业用地价格比基本稳定在2倍左右，这表明在日本两类用地的价格涨跌基本一致。从2008年至2022年，在土地出让总面积中，工业用地占53%，住宅类用地占31%，而在土地出让总收入中，工业用地只贡献了7.5%，住宅类用地则贡献了75%。

土地财政这种模式在改革开放初期是个相当完美的闭环，吸引了大量来自港澳台地区以及欧美、日本、韩国的企业，这些外资带来了技术和先进的管理经验，给经济注入巨大活力。但由于中国经济体量巨大，不可能长期靠吸引外资来发展经济，内生性增长必然成为主力军。但以土地财政为核心的招商引资政策对内生性增长却并没有多大帮助：无论是上海把深圳的企业吸引过去，还是苏州把广州的企业吸引过去，对中国经济的整体来说都没有多大意义，因为整体来说没有增量，是个零和游戏。从2008年至2022年，住宅类用地的价格每年增长9.4%，商业用地价格每年增长了1.6%，工业用地不仅没涨，还以每年1.9%的速度下降，已经反映出这种模式的困境——土地财政走到了尽头，一方面吸引企业越来越难，另一方面住宅用地的泡沫已经大到了系统性风险的地步。

我们把土地财政带来的这种不平衡叫做两个泡沫——工业用地的负泡沫和住宅用地的正泡沫。在《中国房地产有两大泡沫，但背后原因只有一个》一文中（发表在《经济观察报》），我们对这种经济现象有更为详细的分析。土地财政的失效，说明地方政府的发展模式、融资方式都出了结构性问题。必须解决这些结构性问题，才能支持中国经济的进一步发展。

房地产泡沫背景下去杠杆的后果

我们得病了去看医生，医生在开药前必须找到病因才可能根治。没有找到病因而开些治表的药物只能掩盖问题的严重性，而让病情持续恶化。同样，如果我们认为房地产泡沫来自货币超发，而不是反过来的因果关系，我们自然会试图通过控制货币的增加来控制资产泡沫。但如果像我们在前面分析，房地产泡沫来自土地供应的不平衡，控制货币供应并无法精准地抑制地产泡沫。而如果一定想用控制货币供给来对地产泡沫产生效应，就肯定会对整个经济产生很大的副作用，会影响到经济中很多和地产毫无关系的产业。

过去几年，中国经济一直处在去杠杆状态。2015年和2016年，中国社会融资规模存量年均增速尚在30%左右，2017年开始迅速下降，到2018年末已经下降至10%，此后一直保持在这个水平。

在整体社会融资中，贷款增速相对稳定，仅从13%略下降至10%左右；受影响最大的是表外融资，包括信托贷款、委托贷款和银行承兑汇票三项。表外融资在2008年金融危机后发展迅猛，增速一度高达30%以上，2015年和2016年，随着全国发生多起金额巨大的银行票据案件，政府收紧了银行承兑汇票业务，表外融资增速明显下降，信托和委托贷款暂时未受影响，2017年表外融资的增速仍有18%，2018年开始资急剧收缩，到2018年下半年已经是负增长并一直持续至今，2017年，表外融资存量占社会融资存量的比重约13%，目前只有5%。

由于中国金融体系的特殊性，不同的企业在金融体系中有不同的地位、不同的风险指数。其中，政府和国有企业（尤其央企）地位最高、风险最低，而民营企业、中小企业的地位低、风险大。所以，成本最低的银行贷款主要优先给了国有企业、大型企业，有剩下的才可能是民营企业和中小企业，而成本更高的表外融资是很多民营企业重要的融资渠道。从控制金融风险的角度讲，将表外纳入表内管理是合理的，从理论上讲，当表外融资缩减后，应该看到其他融资渠道，比如银行贷款、债券发行等出现相应的增长，但实际上并没有发生，贷款增速是下降的，企业债券增速在2015年和2016年期间约30%，到2022年已经不到10%。因此，从总体来看，在去杠杆的过程中，不同性质的企业受到的影响不同，民营企业、中小企业受到最大的冲击。而房地产泡沫受到的影响并不大。

融资受到限制投资必然会下降。通过比较A股上市公司国有企业和民营企业投资支出占营业收入的相对规模，可以看到：国有企业投资支出较为稳定，2015年至2019年间，投资支出占营业收入的比重基本保持在11%左右，2020年开始略有下降，目前保持在9%左右。民营企业投资下降非常明显，2015年至2017年间，其投资支出占营业收入的比重在20%左右，2018年开始下降，目前只有10%左右，下降了50%。

2021年秋天的房地产行业去杠杆是对地产的更加精准的打击。但如果房地产泡沫主要由土地供需的不平衡导致，对房地产企业去杠杆也不会实质性地解决房地产泡沫问题，因为房企只是土地供需关系中的一个中间体，最终的供给方是政府，需求方是老百姓。如果对房地产企业去杠杆太宽松，地产泡沫依旧在；如果对房地产企业去杠杆太严厉，会使地产企业破产但并不能从根本上改变土地的供需关系。再者，由于土地财政的真正推手是地方政府，主要受益者也是地方政府，如果卖不出去地，地方政府会成为最大的受害者。

总结和建议

理解供需关系是理解经济的核心。当经济体系中出现泡沫，无论是正的还是负的，都说明供需关系有不平衡的成分。货币供给是系统性的，货币供给的多少会影响到经济整体的增长以及各类资产、货物、服务的价格高低。中国的发达地区房价过高，有巨大的泡沫，这是不争的事实。但同时中国股市长期回报低于经济增速，而且估值较低；CPI相对于高速增长的经济来说也是相对较低。说明房地产的资产泡沫是局部性的，来自土地的供需不平衡。在本文中我们指出土地的供需不平衡来自两个因素：土地供给和经济增长在地理位置上的不平衡，以及土地财政带来的对工业用地的过渡供给和对住宅用地的过少供给。

解决土地供需问题的关键是用财政和行政政策直接调节其中的不平衡。比如为了缓解发达地区的地产泡沫，或者我们需要提高发达地区的住宅用地供给，或者我们可以把更多的经济资源向欠发达地区调配，用以进行人口的引流。其次，由于土地财政和地方政府的发展策略高度相关，要调节土地的供需关系就必须调整地方政府的发展定位以及融资方式。很明显，如果地方财政高度依赖出让土地带来的收益，土地财政就很难改变。所以，一个可能的改革方向是进行一次新的分税改革，给地方政府更多的流转税、所得税分成，而把大部分土地出让收入回归中央政府。这样，地方政府在发展经济时，就不会有巨大的动机使住宅用地持续升值。另一方面，由于和土地财政联动的地方政府招商引资政策已经日益乏力，应该重新思考地方政府在经济发展中的作用。一个简单的做法是把地方政府调配的资源以降低税收的方式转移给老百姓，用以提高消费需求，这样既可以提振内需又可以缓解产能过剩。

在过去几年去杠杆的过程中，一个不可忽视的事实是民营企业在整个金融体系中的地位过低，因此去杠杆在很大程度上变成了去民营经济的杠杆。但民营经济又是中国经济中效率最高、创新能力最强的一部分，因此也是未来经济高质量发展的主力军。让民营企业和其他性质的企业在经济中有同等的地位是下一步改革亟需解决的问题。

The West hasn’t grasped the scale of the disaster facing China

 China’s Spring Festival has huge demographic and political significance.

It’s the last surviving relic of a past world, where extended families gathered at their home villages to share respectful greetings to the old, wishes for prosperity (“Gong xi fa cai” in Mandarin) among the younger generation, and joy at the births of new heirs and descendants.

Nearly 40 years of the coercive One Child Policy, not to speak of uncounted deaths from Covid-19 among the elderly last Spring Festival, has taken an irreversible demographic toll on festival jollity.

This year it is snow, not the pandemic, that is disrupting travel and spoiling the party. But this too is a starkly apt metaphor for the wintry grip of Xi Jinping’s authoritarian power. “Good wishes, get rich” rings hollow in these days of economic stagnation and decline.

At home and abroad, much attention was paid on February 6 to an extraordinary Chinese stock market rally, apparently based largely on news that Xi Jinping was in conclave with market regulators over new measures to revive market confidence.

No doubt the timing of this characteristically command economy intervention was carefully chosen to evoke festive cheer. Anyone in the West buying into it, however, needs to take a step back and think again. After all, the rise was led by recognisably state-directed investors.

For years Xi has made much of his achievements in “lifting millions out of poverty”, quietly ignoring the point that this was more about removing Communist ideological blockers to prosperity than it was implementing a better-balanced economic model.

This year, the other shoe has fallen. Bad loans, rent-seeking by inept local government and state-owned enterprises overproducing led to a disastrous property bubble that has now burst. The 30pc share that the property sector held in the economy is now a millstone dragging it into the mire, with other sectors falling into disarray around it.

Beyond the immediate crisis, things aren’t much better in the longer term. China’s workforce is ageing and shrinking, creating a headwind for growth. Younger generations, meanwhile, are increasingly disaffected. Youth unemployment hit a record high of over 21pc in June 2023. The Government’s response was to stop publishing the figures. Small wonder then that market sentiment is so cautious.

While Western media outlets are increasingly willing to publish harsh criticisms of the Chinese leadership’s economic ineptitude, international institutions are still treading cautiously. In December, the World Bank published a readable, elegant China Economic Update which outlined in meticulous detail the quantitative evidence for a slew of ills currently afflicting the Chinese economy.

As befits the organisation’s expertise and credibility, the report also offers a series of suggestions as to what it would be “appropriate” for China to do to revive its fortunes. Given the degree to which Xi Jinping has taken personal control of the levers of state power, he is unquestionably the sole arbiter of high-level economic policy. It’s accordingly of note that there is nowhere in the entire 58-page document a single reference to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), let alone Xi Jinping.

Diplomatic niceties and corporate nerves mean that this failure to name names is replicated in much heavy-weight Western assessment and analysis. The result is a widespread, misguided impression that China has an economy run much like any Western free market, with issues that might “appropriately” be dealt with in a relatively conventional manner.

It is probably true that a well-planned and executed programme of coordinated reforms could lessen a number of China’s current economic headwinds. But they will not be so dealt with, because that is not what Xi Jinping does.

An artificial, short-term surge in market optimism whipped up by the February 6 buying spree does not amount to a credible policy for fixing the mess that the CCP has made of its post-Covid revival, or for liberal economic reforms.

Xi Jinping has a completely different agenda, which includes such economically risky aims as annexing Taiwan, and continuing his support for Putin’s Russia. All his intervention in the stock market has done is highlight how irrelevant conventional market forces are in China.

China’s national strategy under Xi is driven by a political, military and economic contest with the West - ANDREW CABALLERO-REYNOLDS/AFP

Most rational Western analysis agrees that economic engagement with the PRC is unavoidable. China’s economy is locked in a population doom spiral, loaded with bad debts. But as bad as the economic situation is, the political risks should weigh even heavier.

China’s national strategy under Xi is driven by a political, military and economic contest with the West. The autocrat has staked his reputation on hard, exclusive Chinese nationalism and independence from the Western-led rules-based order. He has already shown in Hong Kong something of his intentions for Taiwan.

Last year, it was reported that 68pc of major corporations bought political risk insurance in 2022, compared with 25pc in 2019. China, where firms are subject to sudden expropriation, and operate at the whim of political overlords, was seen as a particular risk factor, and one it was increasingly hard to insure.

The US investment bank chief executive who last September said he was “highly cautious” about Chinese risk in late November stated bluntly that if there was war in Taiwan, all bets would be off; his bank would exit China if the US government ordered him to.

Economists and business analysts focusing on the prospects for a rise in GDP or a fall in unemployment are focusing on entirely the wrong issues. Our understanding of the Chinese economy was flawed, failing to see how much was built on debt and thin air.

The next thing to unravel could be our last, treasured illusions about how Xi will react to his country sinking into an economic mire, with a falling population. It’s time to prepare for a new cold war.

China’s economy is about to implode. We will all feel the aftershocks

 Evergrande, the embattled Chinese real estate giant with debts of $300 billion, has just been ordered to liquidate by a court in Hong Kong. What effect will this have, both within China and across the global economy?

This latest twist is no surprise. Evergrande has long been dead in the water. The point to grasp is that Evergrande’s latest setback will not trigger a financial crisis in China; it is rather the result of the financial crisis which has been deepening for at least four years.

For far too long, up to 30 per cent of the Chinese economy had depended on a grossly inflated domestic property bubble. By 2020, when the government finally took urgent measures to limit this debt, its corrosive effects had distorted and disabled both the formal banking sector and also the much less accountable and manageable Shadow Banking system. Both are now in serious disarray as a result.

Ramifications of this unregulated borrowing and lending crisis have spread across the economy at large. The collapse of the property and construction bubble has weakened domestic economic confidence, deepening the unemployment crisis and posing major challenges to local government budgets. These domestic concerns have led to the current implosion of the Chinese stock market. In turn this has compelled foreign investors to take a more realistic position on China risk than believing the golden goose fables still being peddled by Beijing. Meanwhile, with some notable exceptions such as EVs, contraction of markets abroad for Chinese products has highlighted how much China remains export-dependent in a cooling global economy.

All of this calls into question the capacity of the Chinese leadership to halt and reverse the decline of the wider economy. Western commentators have been saying for years that China still has significant potential to revitalise its stagnant economy. Provided swift and deep-rooted reform policies are driven through, China could still pull itself out of the current downward spiral.

But this prospect is rapidly vanishing. The piecemeal efforts Beijing has made to prop up failing property giants like Evergrande and their backers, including the likes of Zhongzhi and Wanxiang, have had no fundamental impact. The CCP needs to devolve more economic powers to the private sector, and reverse the trend to ever-tightening centralisation. Yet Xi Jinping, seemingly unable to relinquish the self-defeating Marxist-Leninist ideology of strengthened Party and personal control, has abandoned the former and doubled down on the latter.

Evergrande had effectively defaulted by late 2021. It lost around 66.3 billion that year. Its founder sold $343 million of shares that November. Losses in 2022 were around 14.6 billion. Complex efforts since to manage debt down have all failed, which is reflected in Monday’s Hong Kong ruling. Evergrande’s operation in the US applied for bankruptcy in August last year. The chances are minimal that Evergrande creditors, whether in China or abroad, will see any of their money back.

The Hong Kong ruling may not in itself deliver the death-blow to Evergrande; the chances of full PRC co-operation in the process of liquidation in mainland China are slim. Some other formula will probably be adopted to disperse its toxic fragments more discreetly. But this too symbolises the issue of credibility the CCP is facing. Beijing remains astride the obsolete economic tiger on which Party power and authority has long depended. Now the tiger’s days are plainly numbered, the Chinese leadership still lacks both the vision and courage to dismount.

But the risks of clinging to this misguided orthodoxy are growing. The new generation of Chinese workers, who should drive forward the revival of their nation, no longer enjoys the growth which brought their parents out of poverty and into the now disintegrating housing market. Their inheritance has been frittered away buying millions of properties that will never be completed. Local government, in default of any more realistic strategy, has become largely dependent for its budgets on questionable land sales to developers who are now going under in their tens of thousands. Public resentment and disaffection with the CCP is on the rise. Xi and his henchmen, as yet safe in their Party citadel, may have fewer and fewer choices to make.

China's rapidly dwindling future will shape the world for decades to come

 2024 is the year of the incredible shrinking China.

The country's growth has been treated like an inevitability for decades. Everything was getting bigger — its cultural influence, geopolitical ambition, population — and seemed poised to continue until the world was remade in China's image. The foundation for this inexorable rise was its booming economy, which allowed Beijing to throw its might around in other areas. But now China's economy is withering, and the future Beijing imagined is being cut down to size along with it.

The clearest sign of this diminishment is China's worsening deflation problem. While Americans are worried about inflation, or prices rising too fast, policymakers in Beijing are fretting because prices are falling. The consumer price index has declined for the past three months, the longest deflationary streak since 2009. In the race for global economic supremacy, deflation is an albatross around Beijing's neck. It's a sign that the Chinese economic model has well and truly run out of juice and that a painful restructuring is required. But beyond the financial problems, the sinking prices are a sign of a deeper malaise gripping the Chinese people.

"China's deflation is the deflation of hope, the deflation of optimism. It's a psychological funk," Minxin Pei, a professor of political science at Claremont McKenna College, told me.

The fallout won't be contained to China's shores. Because the country's growth sent money stampeding around the globe over the past few decades, its contractions are creating a seesaw effect in global markets. The foreign investors who helped to power China's rise are running to avoid catching the funk on their balance sheets, and governments the world over are starting to question the narrative of China, the dauphin. What Beijing does — or fails to do — to fight this malaise will determine the course of humanity for decades to come.

Flirting with disaster

It may seem counterintuitive, especially given the Western experience of the past few years, but deflation is in many ways scarier than inflation. Inflation occurs when there's too much demand for too few products — people want to buy things, but there simply isn't enough stuff to go around. By contrast, deflation happens when there are plenty of goods and services available but not enough demand. Businesses are then forced to slash prices to entice consumers to come out and spend. Every economy sees recessions or downturns — periods of declining demand and sinking confidence that force companies to put their wares on sale — but sustained deflation is what happens when those maladies make themselves at home and decide to stay.

China's deflation worries started in earnest in the summer. Consumer prices contracted 0.3% in July compared with the same month a year before — something that hadn't happened since the depths of the pandemic. While other advanced economies were taking off too fast, China was showing signs that it might be getting stuck. Prices seemed to stabilize in August — until pork prices started to decline dramatically, pushing down the aggregate price index in October, November, and December. There was some hope for policymakers, though, since much of the deflation was driven by pork prices, which are extremely volatile in China. But recent data shows that core inflation, which excludes more volatile categories such as food and energy, is similarly anemic, rising just 0.6% year over year in December.

Charlene Chu, senior analyst at Autonomous Research

Charlene Chu, a director and senior analyst at Autonomous Research, said the major question for Beijing was whether the price declines would continue into 2024 or whether the country could reignite some demand. She wasn't hopeful for the latter.

"I lean toward deflationary pressures continuing to build, but the data continuing to go back and forth through the year," Chu told me via email.

China's primary problem, though, is debt, particularly in the real-estate sector, which makes up 25% to 35% of the country's GDP. Years of overbuilding — by about double the population, according to some estimates — and slowing population growth caused prices to collapse. The real-estate trouble has ravaged the balance sheets of Chinese households — many of which have sunk a massive proportion of their savings into property — and cast a pall on the rest of the economy.

"Chinese people have 70% of assets in housing, so you can imagine the effect on confidence," Wei Yao, the chief economist at Société Générale, told me. "This is the factor why this deflation could be long-lasting."

Seeing their investments tank has led many people to stop spending. Fifteen years ago, Wall Street assumed that the Chinese consumer would ultimately become the dictator of the global economy. Now they're in hiding. Even as the country emerged from the deep freeze of its "Zero COVID" policy, retail sales growth was disappointing compared with some analysts' projections.

"I think it is unrealistic to believe that deflationary pressure will disappear when there is still so much pressure on property prices and consumers are in savings mode," Chu said.

Now I'm trapped

In 2002, Ben Bernanke, who went on the chair the Federal Reserve, gave a seminal speech about how to combat deflation. As an economic historian, he spent his academic career studying the Great Depression — the mother of all deflationary events — and based on his research, he had come to a few conclusions. I'll give you a few that are relevant to China's current situation:

1. Deflationary events are rare, but even moderate deflation — "a decline in consumer prices of about 1% per year," as Bernanke put it — can zap growth out of an economy for years.

2. In a deflationary economy, debt becomes more onerous to pay back because money is scarcer, a situation known as "debt deflation."

3. The "prevention of deflation is preferable to having to cure it."

   

   Xi Jinping refuses to try the policies that could help pull Chinse out of its national economic malaise.Xie Huanchi/Xinhua via Getty Images

Japan is a more-recent example of the deflation trap. Japan is maybe, just maybe, getting out of a 25-year dance with the deflation demon. After decades of supercharged growth, the country's economy collapsed in the 1990s because of heavy debt and an aging population. Together, those forces pushed the country into deflation, kept wages suppressed, and dampened consumer spending. Sound familiar?

What we learned from Japan's years of stagnation is that once deflation sets in, the only way out is through a painful restructuring of debt. Société Générale's Yao told me that if Beijing quickly embarked on such an anti-debt campaign, it could prevent the funk from setting in. The problem is we have yet to see evidence that the Chinese Communist Party is willing to do that.

Fire? What fire?

Of course, if the Chinese Communist Party asked Bernanke what to do about deflation, he'd probably tell them to take dramatic action yesterday. Spray the money gun, start dropping cash from helicopters, get people spending again. Deflation can only be slayed by boosting demand. But the CCP's unwillingness to directly help Chinese households, even in the depth of the COVID-19 crisis, makes this kind of support unlikely.

"China gave no fiscal support during the pandemic," Yao reminded me during our talk. "Every other large economy gave some kind of stimulus."

Sure, Beijing has taken measures over the past year to loosen financial conditions for banks and state-owned businesses. It has also cut interest rates a little bit and given a $140 billion lifeline to struggling local governments. But wonky supply-side mechanisms take time to make their way into the lives of normal people and spur demand — if it happens at all. At best, they can keep deflation from taking hold, but they can't turn it around to growth.

"Any true acceleration next year will require either a major global upside surprise or more active government policy," analysts at China Beige Book, a surveyor of the Chinese economy, said in a recent note to clients.

It's not as if the CCP is in the dark about the economy's struggles. China's leader, Xi Jinping, even made mention of the reality that Chinese people were suffering financially during his New Year's speech — a first for him. And while the party's apparatchiks may seem stoic as they announce that China's GDP growth is meeting expectations, their softer tone and more aggressive courting of international business belies their concern. The question is, if Beijing knows how bad things are getting, why aren't they doing more?

Analysts are split on why there's been no fiscal support to households. In a research note published in August, Logan Wright, an analyst at Rhodium Group, argued that China's ability to deliver fiscal stimulus was greatly overestimated. Beijing's levers "are far more impaired than commonly understood," Wright told me in a recent phone interview. "The problem is that China doesn't collect much tax outside of its investment-led growth model," he added. Up to its eyeballs in debt obligations and without a robust fundraising mechanism, Beijing doesn't have the cash bazooka it once did.

But there's another, perhaps bleaker, possibility. It's not that Beijing can't deliver stimulus, it's that it simply won't do it. Xi doesn't believe in direct cash payments to people. And now, since all of China is run by a one-man band, that's all that matters.

"I reached the conclusion that there is a bit of ideology," Yao told me. "In a sense, Xi Jinping wants to develop his own economic order. He's trying to avoid making the same mistake as the West, which is wasting money and spending things that don't generate long-term returns. In that perspective, sending checks to households doesn't generate long-term returns."

Maybe it's a little of both. There have been times in the history of the Chinese Communist Party when different factions — reform vs. anti-reform — had the space to debate and change the government's course on policy. In Xi's China, that space is gone, shrunk into whatever can fit in the palm of his hand.

It's not just the economy

Under Xi, all kinds of spaces in China have gotten smaller. (OK, it's not his fault that the population is shrinking.) But his government has led to the narrowing of any space beyond the reach of the CCP. That includes the arts and intellectual life, a variety of forms of individual expression, and private business. China before Xi was a place learning to handle a plurality of voices — as long as they weren't brazenly attacking the country. China during Xi is a place where people online speak in code to express even their minor dissatisfaction, only to watch CCP censors rub their words away.

"Chinese people have to shrink their ambitions," Claremont's Pei told me. "People in the government should have their ambitions scaled dramatically."

This ideological shrinking is taking many forms: Beijing's nominally anti-corruption drive is back in full swing, ensnaring officials from all over the government who strayed from the Xi line. Billionaire businesspeople are on notice that their wealth will no longer protect them from the CCP's harsh gaze. Foreign investors are running for the hills. Even China's flagship One Belt One Road infrastructure loan program has been pared down. "They're not bestriding the world anymore," one former US diplomat posted in East Asia told me.

This doesn't necessarily mean China poses no adversarial challenge to the US. It just means Beijing is prioritizing where it invests in that competition. Xi will not back off from investing in the military because reunification with Taiwan remains his paramount goal. The central government will continue to invest in technology and in advancing industries where it thinks it can press any first-mover advantages. Think: electric cars, batteries, and solar panels.

"We don't think the US faces a growth challenge from China anymore at this stage," Rhodium Group's Wright said. "The concern from the US and Europe are the spillovers from excess capacity." In other words, China will pick its fights more selectively and defend its economic advantages more fiercely. A world built larger through global financial connections will disconnect and disperse into smaller nodes.

Do not expect a shrinking China to be a shrinking violet. Outside loaning money, magnanimity has never been Beijing's strong suit. The slights that smarted when it was a growing superpower will only hurt more in shrunken stature. Xi will never let go of saving face. That's the nature of a one-man reign.