What happens to Trump’s tariffs now that a court has knocked them down?

编者：论美国的民主。法院是一个制度最后的防线。

WASHINGTON (AP) — A federal court in New York handed President Donald Trump a big setback Wednesday, blocking his audacious plan to impose massive taxes on imports from almost every country in the world.

A three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of International Trade ruled that Trump overstepped his authority when he invoked the 1977 International Emergency Economic Powers Act to declare a national emergency and justify the sweeping tariffs.

The tariffs overturned decades of U.S. trade policy, disrupted global commerce, rattled financial markets and raised the risk of higher prices and recession in the United States and around the world.

The U.S. Court of International Trade has jurisdiction over civil cases involving trade. Its decisions can be appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in Washington and ultimately to the Supreme Court, where the legal challenges to Trump’ tariffs are widely expected to end up.

Which tariffs did the court block?

The court’s decision blocks the tariffs Trump slapped last month on almost all U.S. trading partners and levies he imposed before that on China, Mexico and Canada.

On April 2, Trump imposed so-called reciprocal tariffs of up to 50% on countries with which the United States runs a trade deficit and 10% baseline tariffs on almost everybody else. He later suspended the reciprocal tariffs for 90 days to give countries time to agree to reduce barriers to U.S. exports. But he kept the baseline tariffs in place. Claiming extraordinary power to act without congressional approval, he justified the taxes under IEEPA by declaring the United States' longstanding trade deficits “a national emergency.”

In February, he'd invoked the law to impose tariffs on Canada, Mexico and China, saying that the illegal flow of immigrants and drugs across the U.S. border amounted to a national emergency and that the three countries needed to do more to stop it.

The U.S. Constitution gives Congress the power to set taxes, including tariffs. But lawmakers have gradually let presidents assume more power over tariffs — and Trump has made the most of it.

The tariffs are being challenged in at least seven lawsuits. In the ruling Wednesday, the trade court combined two of the cases — one brought by five small businesses and another by 12 U.S. states.

The ruling does leave in place other Trump tariffs, including those on foreign steel, aluminum and autos. But those levies were invoked under a different law that required a Commerce Department investigation and could not be imposed at the president’s own discretion.

Why did the court rule against the president?

The administration had argued that courts had approved then-President Richard Nixon’s emergency use of tariffs in a 1971 economic and financial crisis that arose when the United States suddenly devalued the dollar by ending a policy that linked the U.S. currency to the price of gold. The Nixon administration successfully cited its authority under the 1917 Trading With Enemy Act, which preceded and supplied some of the legal language later used in IEPPA.

The court disagreed, deciding that Trump’s sweeping tariffs exceeded his authority to regulate imports under IEEPA. It also said the tariffs did nothing to deal with problems they were supposed to address. In their case, the states noted that America's trade deficits hardly amount of a sudden emergency. The United States has racked them up for 49 straight years in good times and bad.

So where does this leave Trump's trade agenda?

Wendy Cutler, a former U.S. trade official who is now vice president at the Asia Society Policy Institute, says the court's decision "throws the president’s trade policy into turmoil.”

“Partners negotiating hard during the 90-day day tariff pause period may be tempted to hold off making further concessions to the U.S. until there is more legal clarity," she said.

Likewise, companies will have to reassess the way they run their supply chains, perhaps speeding up shipments to the United States to offset the risk that the tariffs will be reinstated on appeal.

The trade court noted that Trump retains more limited power to impose tariffs to address trade deficits under another statute, the Trade Act of 1974. But that law restricts tariffs to 15% and only for 150 days with countries with which the United States runs big trade deficits.

For now, the trade court's ruling “destroys the Trump administration’s rationale for using federal emergency powers to impose tariffs, which oversteps congressional authority and contravenes any notion of due process,” said Eswar Prasad, professor of trade policy at Cornell University. "The ruling makes it clear that the broad tariffs imposed unilaterally by Trump represent an overreach of executive power.''

Russia’s Recent Invasion of Ukraine: the Just War Perspective

 By Hans Gutbrod - 21 March 2022

Hans Gutbrod argues that all interpretations of Russia's invasion of Ukraine point to a radical change of paradigm for international relations. 

Public and international revulsion at the recent Russian invasion of Ukraine is widespread. The Kremlin has received comprehensive international condemnation for its actions, with only few allies siding with the Russian government. Another way of examining Russia's invasion is through just war theory, a tested framework for assessing the ethical aspects of the use of force.

Against this standard, Russia's recent invasion does not look good even in the most generous interpretation. The first ethical test is Ius ad Bellum, whether the use of force is justified in the first place. The Kremlin's actions fail that test.

Failing – Ius ad Bellum

The invasion has a cause that is intelligible, but it is not just. It is understandable that the Kremlin would prefer Ukraine not to turn towards NATO and the EU. It is also legitimate for the Kremlin to advocate and push for Ukrainian neutrality and to declare its sphere of interest. Yet legitimate interests do not, by themselves, make a just cause for using force. A just cause presupposes the righting of a grievous wrong so that a more lasting peace can be achieved.

The stated aims of Russia's ‘special operation’ do not amount to a right intention. None of the three goals that Vladimir Putin highlighted in his original speech are a plausible intention. The ‘demilitarization’ of a state that does not pose a threat is an attempt at subjugation, not a step towards a better peace. It is implausible, at best, that a state that is governed by a president of Jewish descent requires ‘denazification’. The third goal of putting ‘to justice those that committed numerous bloody crimes against peaceful people, including Russian nationals’ remains farfetched. Whatever one makes of the events that Vladimir Putin mentioned in other contexts, including the incident in which dozens of pro-Russian protesters died when a building was set ablaze in Odessa in 2014, there are numerous international legal instruments for pursuing redress.

The supplementary claim that military action was intended to prevent ‘genocide’ seems to have come up in Russian state media only from mid-February, after close to 200,000 Russian troops had already been massed by Ukraine's borders, as Paul Goode has shown with a detailed analysis of the rhetoric in Russia's popular TV channels.

Moreover, the recent invasion fails the test of being proportional to any potential grievance. Even if there were merits to some of Russia's claims, they are not proportional to unleashing an invasion that would cost the lives of thousands of Ukrainians and Russians.

Nor is it plausible that an invasion is a last resort. Ukraine did not pose a substantial threat to Russia with its vastly larger population, economy, armed forces, and nuclear weapons, too. As German Chancellor Olaf Scholz made clear to Vladimir Putin on his February visit to Moscow, Ukraine's NATO actual membership was not a realistic prospect in the coming years. Moreover, Russia had many options to potentially negotiate with Ukraine about the country's foreign policy course – especially so after Russian forces had previously seized Crimea, against its own commitments to preserve Ukraine's territorial integrity.

Lastly, the Kremlin’s attack has legitimate authority only in the narrow sense of being a sovereign government. Given the Kremlin’s vicious repression of dissent, including the threat of jail sentences of 15 years for criticizing the war, its systematic sidelining of opposition, the murder or attempted murder of its critics, the closure of opposition media outlets, the actions are hardly ‘legitimized’ in a more inclusive sense of that term.

No plausible ethical case, therefore, can be made to justify Russia's recent invasion, even if one grants, as former Foreign Secretary David Owen and others have done, that countries will have their strategic interests. Rather, the invasion is detached from any ethical framework. In that regard, it is an aggression reminiscent of how the Melian islanders describe the arrival of the Athenians in Thucydides's Peloponnesian War: ‘we see that you have come to be judges in your own cause.’

Bleak -- Ius in Bello

Conflicts with murky justifications can still be fought with restraint. Yet here, too, Russia's actions seem to lack proportionality, with a sweeping attack throughout much the country. Residential areas have been bombed. It is unclear how the Kharkiv city council building hit by a cruise missile or the TV tower in Kyiv are military targets. (By the same standard, some Western targeting in conflicts from Iraq to Kosovo can also be held up to scrutiny.)

There are plausible reports that civilians are mass targeted especially in Mariupol, with thousands feared dead. In that way, Russian forces are targeting rather than protecting noncombatants. While it may still be too early to assess whether there has been mass-targeting of civilians throughout the country, the Guardian’s reports on summary executions of civilians are made all the more plausible by drone footage of a civilian driver shot outside Kyiv on March 7 while his arms were raised. There are ongoing investigations regarding potential Russian war crimes. That such transgressions could still get a lot worse is neither consolation nor absolution.

Many aspects of the conflict will only come to light later. It is possible that transgressions from the Ukrainian side will emerge over time. Threats that Russian artillery personnel would not be taken prisoner in revenge for the targeting of civilians have rightly been condemned as detracting from Ukraine's claim to fight the superior cause. That said, there is intrinsic asymmetry as in defending against invasion Ukraine anyway is not putting Russian civilians in harm’s way. Conversely, there are powerful instances of peaceful protests by Ukrainian civilians against Russia’s armed occupation.

From an ethical angle, this leaves the question of NATO’s promise of membership to Ukraine. Some nuance can provide a plausible answer. Extending a prospect of membership is legitimate for a defensive alliance and hoping for it a legitimate aim for a sovereign country. The context made the offer understandable, too. In 2008 both Russia and the West were preoccupied by a similar threat. A gruesome attack in Beslan in the North Caucasus happened in 2004, and a major raid by Islamic militants in Nalchik took place a year later. Between bomb attacks in Madrid (2004) and London (2005) one of the inevitable tasks for NATO seemed to be the fight against terrorism. Baltic and several Eastern European states, including Georgia, were steadfast allies in Afghanistan.

Was the offer of membership to Ukraine (and Georgia) as wise as it was legitimate and understandable? Views on this differ. While the former Russian foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev says that ‘this argument about NATO is just propaganda’, there are representatives of the security establishment in the West, such as former Chief of MI6 John Sawers, who think that the 2008 promises ‘were unwise […] and raised expectations.’ The practical compromise, as in the case of Georgia, was to try and prevent NATO’s Article 5 from ever needing to be invoked: preventing the calamity voids the need for insurance.

Whatever one thinks of the merits of this eventual arrangement, as many observers have pointed out, NATO troops only were deployed in more forward positions in Eastern Europe after Russia’s seizure of Crimea. In that way, the Kremlin squarely bears the responsibility for increasing NATO’s presence in Eastern Europe. Moreover, even if one disagrees with Western policy in Eastern Europe, the just war tradition shows that the use of force cannot be justified in response.

Optimistic versus Pessimistic Conclusions

Different readings of this stark conclusion are possible. In an optimistic interpretation, many Russians, including in military and security structures, could conclude that whatever legitimate interests Russia has, they came nowhere close to warranting military aggression. Certainly, thousands of Russians are protesting at great risk to themselves. To those hoping to spot more dissent in Russia, there are indications that it exists and is folded into circumlocutions. The brand of authoritarian populism in the West, too, may be weakened by its associations with Vladimir Putin.

In a more pessimistic reading, the West is unlikely to return to common ground with Russia over the next decade. The ethical underpinning for such commonality has been rent. The plain dishonesty of Russian diplomacy factors in this, too. For years, it may not be possible to engage with Russia's current and future leadership to solve some of the world's pressing problems.

Such a de-facto schism would have major policy implications, including on climate change. Geoengineering may require renewed consideration. Previously, such attempts to slow or reverse climate impacts through large-scale intervention, were largely seen as the realm of technological enthusiasts. Without multilateralism, there may not be much of an alternative.

Whichever interpretation one finds plausible, the recent invasion of Ukraine marks a radical change of paradigm. The ethical assessment highlights that it is unlikely that there will be a return to normal soon.

唐士其：治理与国家权力的边界——理论梳理与反思

 文/唐士其

 

北京大学国际关系学院 教授

 

在对治理问题的讨论中，国家的角色与职能是一个核心问题，但问题的提法具有明确的指向。就是说，治理概念的提出意味着人们已经认识到，国家虽然握有强制力，同时也具有强大的社会和资源的提取与动员能力，但它并非无所不能。因此，对治理问题的讨论，着眼点就不是如何扩展和强化国家权力，而是在不排斥国家作用的同时，如何充分发挥国家之外各种行为主体的作用，从而形成一种两者之间协同合作的良性互动关系。因此，对治理的讨论不可避免地涉及到如何重新定义国家权力边界的问题，具体来说又包括两个方面:一是水平方向国家能管什么和不能管什么，二是垂直方向国家能够延展到什么样的社会组织层次。

自现代国家建立以来，随着经济的发展和社会的进步、以及社会复杂程度的提高，一方面国家职能及其权力体现出不断扩展的趋势，但另一方面思想界也一再十分强劲地出现要求严格限定国家权力的呼声，从而客观上对国家权力无限膨胀的冲动发挥了某种制约作用。也就是说，过去若干世纪政治实践和政治思想的传统中，始终存在着扩展国家权力与限制国家权力这两种力量的博弈与平衡。透过历史的纵深不难看出，当下对治理问题的讨论，实际上正是这一传统在新的形势与环境下的延展。因此，梳理与现代国家发展相伴随的关于国家权力边界的理论，将有助于深化学术界对治理问题的理解。

 19世纪以前关于“有限政府”的理论

“有限政府”的理论是一种伴随着现代国家产生而出现、要求严格限定国家权力边界的理论，是伴随着西欧资产阶级革命，人们对国家权力的基础重新加以定义的结果。资产阶级革命的发生，意味着资本主义生产方式战胜了封建生产方式，而这个过程在政治学上的表达，就是市民社会(城市)战胜了封建和专制国家。这样一个过程，成为后来国家与社会关系理论的历史背景。

在欧洲封建社会后期，国家体现为散落各地、自我封闭、经济凋敝、文化落后的封建城堡，而社会则体现为经济和文化生活欣欣向荣、内部往往实行民主管理的城市。城堡与城市，不仅聚集了不同的人群，而且反映的是两种不同的生产方式和生活方式，同时也是两种不同的政治秩序和价值理念——一方面是等级与强制，另一方面则是平等与自由。它们之间的斗争，同时也就是权力与财富的斗争，1640-1688年的英国革命和1789年的法国大革命都是这种斗争的典型体现。在这一斗争的过程中，一种新的关于国家权力基础的理论——社会契约论应运而生。

在此之前，标准的国家权力理论是君权神授论，即君主权力来自上帝的理论。这种理论使封建君主以及后来的专制君主视国家为自己的所有物，在压榨社会的同时不必就自己的行为向臣民负责。然而，随着封建权力结构之外城市经济的兴起，以及随之而来的国家权力与财富的分离，要让市民们接受封建和专制君主的掠夺就没有任何法理依据。对新兴的市民阶级来说，统治只能基于被统治者的同意，国家权力只能来自被统治者对自身权利的让渡，这就是“社会契约”的基本内涵。社会契约论强调，国家权力乃是社会成员为满足他们的共同需要，经由每一位参与其中的人自愿同意而产生。这种理论的出现，不仅颠覆了封建国家和专制国家在法理上的正当性，而且也形成对资产阶级革命后新型国家强有力的规范。

由于欧洲封建社会后期发展起来的城市往往都拥有各种形式的自治传统，拥有一段在国家之外、甚至是反抗国家的历史，因而契约论基础上的国家观自然也就是一种有限政府的国家观。它不仅认为国家的权力来自人民的授予，而且主张这种权力的范围也必须由授权者而非国家自身决定，因而其行使必须受到严格的限制。另一方面，人们出于自治的传统，相信社会有足够的能力在绝大多数情况下安排和组织公共生活。因此如果在极少数情况下迫不得已把某些权力转让给国家，就必须对国家权力被滥用的可能性高度戒备。总之，从“有限政府”的观点来看，“管得越少的政府是越好的政府”，“什么都不管的政府是最好的政府”。这就是所谓的“守夜人的政府”的理论。

 20世纪各种反对国家干预的理论

从某种意义上说，早期的“有限政府”理论是欧洲封建社会后期国家与社会、政治与经济、权力与财富两分状态的一种历史回响。当这种分离状态因封建专制国家被推翻而不复存在，国家重新承担起对社会的管理和服务职能之后，“什么都不管的政府”就有可能被视为“最坏的政府”。因此，整个19世纪，欧洲充满了革命与抗议。不断壮大的工人阶级和其他劳动阶级，不仅要求资产阶级国家扩大选举权，而且推动着后者越来越多地介入社会经济领域，以缓解失业、贫困、疾病等社会问题。与此同时，社会主义运动也蓬勃发展，其中重要的一支，即社会民主主义运动，更是把扩大民主作为最根本的主张，强调国家的民主化乃是实现社会主义的根本途径。

这一切导致欧洲国家职能、因而也就意味着国家权力的急剧扩展，福利国家开始出现。1917年，世界上出现了第一个社会主义国家——苏联。虽然按照马克思主义的经典理论，国家应该在社会主义革命胜利之后迅速消亡，但具体的历史逻辑却让苏联走上了一条不断扩张国家权力，并且通过国家对社会的全面控制和全面动员实现工业化和经济高速发展的道路。从20世纪30年代起，西方国家为应对经济危机而采取了凯恩斯主义的经济政策，同样利用国家的权力杠杆调节供需关系，刺激经济增长，缓解社会矛盾。由此，在整个世界范围内，国家权力进入了一个全面扩张的阶段。应该说，在这个过程中，社会主义与资本主义国家在“挖掘”、利用国家权力，强化国家职能方面出现了一种相互促进的态势。

当然，国家权力的这一轮扩张是在反对声中完成的，反对者的代表人物包括伯林、哈耶克和奥克肖特，等等。与传统的“有限政府”论不同，这一批国家干预的反对者几乎拥有一个共同的思想出发点，即对近代理性主义的批判性反思。在他们看来，“国家主义者”之所以试图通过国家对社会施以全面控制，其根本原因在于这些人对人类理性能力的盲目自信。依照这种过分乐观的理性主义的逻辑，如果人类理性能够在包括社会政治问题在内的一切领域内提供正确指导，那么作为理性力量体现的国家，借助其强力对社会的全面控制和干预，就如同科学家利用科学技术对自然的征服和控制一样，完全是一件自然而然的事情。在此过程中，国家行为也就不应被理解为强制，而应该像卢梭那样，将其视为强迫那些拒不服从公意的人“获得自由”。

借用哈耶克的说法，这样一种思想体现的是“知识的僭越”，是人类理性的“致命的自负”。在这一批国家权力扩张的批评者看来，以理性之名要求国家对社会进行全面控制的主张犯有双重错误。首先，它过分夸大了理性的作用。事实上理性不过是一种相对有效的人类认识能力，但并非这种能力的全部。其次，它忽视了社会问题的复杂性，因而简单地采取一种类似于对自然进行技术控制和技术改造的方法来对待人与社会。因此，他们共同呼吁慎用国家权力，而把更多的自由留给社会。正是从前一个方面出发，人们把他们称为“保守主义者”，而从后一个方面出发，人们又称他们为“自由至上论者”。

当然需要说明的是，国家干预的批评者在反对国家权力扩张的同时，并不一定都找到了国家权力的替代者。他们更真实的想法是，社会中肯定存在某些困境和难题，这些困境、难题甚至苦难个人无法解决、社会无法解决，国家同样也无法解决，这是人类真实处境的一部分。如果非要借助国家手段对此强行加以改变，那么不仅于事无补，而且必定导致对社会和个人的强制，甚至导致其他更大的灾难，因此一定要避免“国家万能”的幻想。

 20世纪80年代以后治理理论的兴起

20世纪70年代以后，随着西方国家经济出现“滞胀”现象、苏联东欧社会主义显露危机并进而导致苏联模式的失败，人们对国家权力的边界问题才再度予以普遍关注。不过，从20世纪70年代国家与社会关系理论的复兴，到90年代治理理论的兴起，中间还有一个过渡阶段。

20世纪70年代国家与社会关系理论的复兴出自两个方面互不相关的原因。一方面是纯理论的研究，即部分西方政治学者对所谓“国家自主性”的发现，另一方面则是西方对苏联东欧20世纪60-70年代持不同政见者运动的实践关注。但随后不久，人们的兴趣就很快转向了西方国家自身的现实问题，即因为国家过度干预而产生的巨额财政赤字、“福利病”、官僚主义和腐败现象，以及经济中的“滞胀”问题，由此导致了新自由主义的兴起，以及政策实践方面以美国的里根主义和英国的撒切尔主义为代表的、遍及整个西方世界的“去国家化”浪潮。

不过从整体上看，这次的“去国家化”并未导致西方国家全面回到“最小限度的国家”或者“什么都不管的国家”，因为人们在看到“国家失灵”的同时，也发现了“市场失灵”的问题，并由此引发了学术界对“第三部门”和“公共社会”的关切。在这种新的关切中，国家与社会不再像古典自由主义时期那样，被置于相互对立的两端。至此，治理理论已经呼之欲出。与此同时，随着新自由主义推动的全球化的进程，诸多跨越国界的问题也纷纷呈现出来。人们通常认为，对这些问题的处理，不仅超出了国家的边界，也超出了国家的能力，因此不仅需要国家之间的联合与合作，更需要国家与非政府部门，包括国际非政府部门的联合与合作，“全球治理”的理论也因此应运而生。

实际上，恰恰是全球性问题的出现反过来推动人们反思治理的基本逻辑。世界银行1992年发布的研究报告《治理与发展》。该报告认为，治理乃是各种政府性和非政府性组织、私人企业以及社会运动“为实现发展而在国际经济与社会资源的管理中运用权力的方式”。其中特别强调，要实现治理目标，应充分支持和培养公共社会的发展，而所谓的“公众社会”，就包括志愿性组织、非政府组织、各种社会团体等等。在此之后，“治理”概念迅速风靡全世界。这一现象实际上体现了人们对一种新的、超越国家权力逻辑的规则与秩序的渴求。

 国家权力为何需要边界

通过以上简单的理论梳理，不难发现“国家权力边界论”的一些基本逻辑。

首先是效率和成本方面的考虑。上文提到，治理理论的提出，意味着人们认识到国家并非无所不能，但对这一点应该有正确的理解。也就是说，承认国家能力的有限性，一个基本的出发点其实是就国家行为的成本和效率而言的。很多事情，也许并不一定超出了国家的能力范围，但在分权和制衡的体制下，其协商成本和时间成本却可能远远超出了人们能够接受的程度。至于在中国这样具有超强动员能力的体制下，政府行为具有国家强制力的支持，再加上官员考绩和升迁的巨大压力，要达成某项目标固然可以雷厉风行，从而大大降低协商成本和时间成本，但另一方面，集中决策和行动，出现错误的可能性也会增加，而如果国家的统一决策和行动出现错误，那么代价也会比分散决策和行动高出很多。在这里，哈耶克关于分散决策的思想非常具有借鉴意义。

其次，国家权力内在地具有不断滋生繁衍和向外扩张的倾向，而这不仅是权力与利益之间相互强化的关系的结果。在过分依赖国家的情况下，一个很常见的现象是，为解决某项社会问题而创造出来的权力，在其运行的同时又制造出了其他的问题，而为了解决这些新的问题，人们又制造出新的权力。如此循环往复，权力越来越多越来越大，问题也变得越来越多、越来越复杂。

再次，国家权力还存在腐败的可能性。人们创造了各种各样的监督、制约与平衡的机制，以防止权力的滥用和误用。但是，姑且不论这些机制是否能够有效发挥作用，这些机制的创设本身就意味着又增加了新的权力，从而增加了社会成本。而且监督、制约与平衡机制本身即便有效，客观上又会造成拖拉与扯皮，从而导致成本的增加和效率的丧失。总之，国家应该尽量克制自身扩张权力的冲动，提倡精简原则——“如无必要，勿增实体”。

最后是国家行动的统一性与社会问题的复杂性之间的矛盾。在一个复杂社会，可能没有两个人或者两件事的情况是完全一致的，因而国家的统一决策与行动即一刀切，往往难以切合实际，也未必能够达到最优的结果。国家权力具有强制性，国家的法律和政策又具有整齐划一的特点，因此对于那些其个人目标与国家的政策目标并不一致或者并不完全一致的人来说就构成了强制。国家不可能避免对某些人的强制，但是，强制毕竟使其对象丧失了自由，这却是国家在施行强制时必须时刻牢记的事情。

一种真正有效的治理，需要放弃国家万能的思想，也需要放弃过度依赖国家的冲动。国家职能在必要的时候当然需要予以扩展和强化，国家的执行能力当然需要得到保障，但国家不是福利院，也不是保险公司，国家不可能解决人世间的一切苦难，相反，国家权力有其自身的危险性。正是在这个意义上，马克思才主张共产主义最终要消灭国家。国家在一切可能的情况下把权力归还给社会，依赖各种社会力量，或者与它们合作解决社会问题，这是治理的本质所在，也是增强国家的治理能力的根本路径所在。

 

 

       本文原载于《湖北行政学院学报》2018年第06期。为方便阅读，略去全部注释，并有删节和调整。

这世间，总要有人出来讲理

文 | 许章润

人世熙攘，人性隐曲，人生仿佛一团乱麻，总有讲理的和不讲理的，也总是有能说会道的和刚毅却木讷的。那时节，虽说有理走遍天下，无理寸步难行，可事实并非总是如此。

人要讲理，不讲理便是禽兽。世间要有讲理的地方，否则顿成地狱。人生是一个讲理的长旅，所以生而为人却要学着做人。可是，古往今来，就是有人不讲理；人间朗朗，常常就是找不到讲理的地方；漫长一辈子里，总会遭遇蛮不讲理的人和事。有人不讲理，有理没处讲，于是，芸芸众生，愁肠百结，一不小心，便辗转于沟壑。它们如同黑云压城，让绚烂人世黯然失色，叫我们这个号曰人类的物种忍垢蒙羞。

譬如，今天下午的会址早已约定，可商家悍然背信弃约，致使我们被迫跼蹙于斗方，大家自神州四方惶惶奔至，只好“济济一堂”。这便是不讲理，无理可讲，无处可讲。因为，商家和官家联手，权钱勾搭成奸，便是那上空的黑云，理路消歇无踪之际，人间不再是安全和安宁的居所，也就是我们备受欺凌之时。

可是，天下总有理在，人间不可或缺一个理字！要过日子，过好日子，好好过日子，一刻都离不开讲理。黑云如墨，让人世黯淡，但却无法将真理的天光笼罩殆尽。相反，天行有常，天理自在人心。这理儿如同澎湃的春水，可受阻于一时，却终将冲决冻冰，奔流蹈海。——朋友，人活一口气，讲的就是个理儿，你力气再大，能将她们永远藏于自家肘腋！？

毕竟，凡事皆有事理，是人就会有情理，人间总归不可或缺道理，一如它们必将体现为某种法理。而无论是事理、情理、道理与法理，它们无一不是天理之昭昭。天大地大，海啸山风，夏雷冬雪，是一个理字儿支撑着我们活了下来，也是一个理字儿鼓荡着我们必须活下来！

找地方讲理，把理儿讲清，是人的秉性，除非你不是人，除非这个人世堕落成为地狱。

在此，“个案正义”与“人民出场”，是两种主要的讲理方式。

如同江平教授所言，法庭是讲理的地方，或者，应当是一个讲理的地方，个案正义是讲理的一种方式。依恃法权程序安排，首先让事实铺陈于目前，从而让事理袒露于人间，道理和情理可望联袂排闼而出，流淌于心间。经由法理的精致梳理，最终讨得一个是非。可能，也终会明白仁忍高于是非，就是最高的是非。

可法律不是万能的，法庭更且常常难免为强权所辱弄。于是，人民出场，或许有助于实现正义，遂成一种讲理的方式。可能，也是一种没有办法的办法。当今之世，人民的出场不外三种方式。一是革命，可不到万不得已，没人会走此绝路。拈出此项，正在于努力避免革命，以政治改良取代玉石俱焚的山呼海啸。二是选举。人民具体化为公民，公民换身为选民。万千选民，劳生息死，养家糊口之余，手拿选票，在挑选自家代言人的博弈中，表明自己的立场和诉求，实现自己的组织化生存。各以组织化阵势陈竭己意，于容忍各自的选择中表达自己的选择，其实是代价最小的政治存在方式。而这便也就是在讲理，一个讲理的过程，并终究给出讲理的结果。三是游行示威、集会结社。借由凡此方式，公民彰显自己的存在，表达着自己的选择，于讨要公道中可能促进公道。至少，它给予弱者以号哭的自由，哭声震天之时，可能就是石砌的大墙轰然坍塌之际。

人世熙攘，人性隐曲，人生仿佛一团乱麻，总有讲理的和不讲理的，也总是有能说会道的和刚毅却木讷的。那时节，虽说有理走遍天下，无理寸步难行，可事实并非总是如此。因而，好人与好人讲理，各拥理据，各秉德性，尽管其理轩轾，但终究保有沟通的善意，也总有沟通的可能，事情大致不会太难办。坏人与坏人讲理——如果讲理的话，至多讲究的是盗亦有道，可能也能沟通。江湖上刀光剑影，自有一套拚搏之道。难办的是，好人与坏人讲理，哪里有理讲呢！特别是，当坏人权高位重，一手遮天之时，你到哪里去讲理呢！又特别是，当不讲理的就是政府或者国家本身，天哪，还怎么讲理呢？！小民百姓，又当何如呢？！

因而，总要有人出来讲理，这世间才为人间，也方才适于人类居住。当今之世，律师之为一业，职业所系，志业所在，就是专门替人讲理的，也可能是最会讲理的。既秉其心志，复禀其心智，他们挺身而出专门讲理，是现代的巫，而恰恰是正义的祭司！

再说一遍，这世间，总要有人出来讲理。谁来讲理，大家一起来讲理，而首先是特具禀赋的法律人出来讲理。社会之有律师一业，众生之养育了法律人，就在于指盼着他们出来讲理呢！

为了讲理，法律人，站起来；为了过上讲理的顺畅安宁的日子，亿万同胞，站起来！

Police act like laws don't apply to them because of 'qualified immunity.' They're right

编者：这几天的抗议示威清楚的表明，人们对警察这个所谓的“资格豁免”的反对。他们抗议的并不只是这个案例，而是一直以来的司法的不公。

On May 25, Minneapolis police killed George Floyd. While two officers pinned the handcuffed Floyd on a city street, another fended off would-be intervenors as a fourth knelt on Floyd’s neck until — and well after — he lost consciousness.

But when Floyd’s family goes to court to hold the officers liable for their actions, a judge in Minnesota may very well dismiss their claims. Not because the officers didn’t do anything wrong, but because there isn’t a case from the 8th Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court specifically holding that it is unconstitutional for police to kneel on the neck of a handcuffed man for nearly nine minutes until he loses consciousness and then dies.

And such a specific case is what Floyd’s family must provide to overcome a legal doctrine called “qualified immunity” that shields police and all other government officials from accountability for their illegal and unconstitutional acts.

The Supreme Court created qualified immunity in 1982. With that novel invention, the court granted all government officials immunity for violating constitutional and civil rights unless the victims of those violations can show that the rights were “clearly established.”

A virtually unlimited protection

Although innocuous sounding, the clearly established test is a legal obstacle nearly impossible to overcome. It requires a victim to identify an earlier decision by the Supreme Court, or a federal appeals court in the same jurisdiction holding that precisely the same conduct under the same circumstances is illegal or unconstitutional. If none exists, the official is immune. Whether the official’s actions are unconstitutional, intentional or malicious is irrelevant to the test.

Surveillance video from the early moments of George Floyd's fatal Minneapolis police encounter in May 2020.

We are not being hyperbolic. Outrageous examples abound.

For instance, last November the 6th Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals held that Tennessee cops who allowed their police dog to bite a surrendered suspect did not violate clearly established law. There, the victim cited a case where the same court earlier held that it was unconstitutional for officers to sic their dog on a suspect who had surrendered by lying on the ground with his hands to the side. That was not sufficient, the court reasoned, because the victim had not surrendered by lying down: He had surrendered by sitting on the ground and raising his hands.

Screaming into the void: Video of George Floyd pinned by Minneapolis cops is shocking but not surprising

And in February, the 5th Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals held that a Texas prison guard who pepper sprayed an inmate in his locked cell “for no reason” did not violate clearly established law because similar cited cases involved guards who had hit and tased inmates for no reason, rather than pepper spraying them for no reason.

In both cases, the officers were granted qualified immunity.

When the Supreme Court conceived qualified immunity, it promised that the rule would not provide a “license to lawless conduct” for government officials. Plainly, it has.

Supreme Court can right their wrong

Four decades on, qualified immunity routinely shields both the incompetent and those who knowingly violate the law. In the past year alone — along with the two cases above — courts have granted qualified immunity to:

►Officers who stole $225,000.

►A cop who shot a 10-year-old while trying to shoot a nonthreatening family dog.

►Prison officials who locked an inmate in a sewage-flooded cell for days.

►SWAT team members who fired gas grenades into an innocent woman’s empty home.

►Medical board officials who rifled through a doctor’s client files without a warrant.

►County officials who held a 14-year-old in pretrial solitary confinement for over a month.

►A cop who body-slammed a 5-foot-tall woman for walking away from him.

►Police who picked up a mentally infirmed man, drove him to the county line and dropped him off at dusk along the highway, where he was later struck and killed by a motorist.

On Monday, the Supreme Court will announce whether it will hear some of those cases and reconsider the doctrine of qualified immunity. If it does, there is hope that the court will revoke the license to lawless conduct it granted government officials in 1982. If it does not, lack of accountability will continue to rule the day and the promises of the Bill of Rights will be a matter of judicial grace, rather than constitutional right.

In that world — the one we live in right now — police officers and all other government officials will continue to behave as if the law doesn’t apply to them. Because, thanks to qualified immunity, it doesn’t.

Patrick Jaicomo and Anya Bidwell are attorneys at the Institute for Justice, and Bidwell is IJ’s Elfie Gallun Fellow in Liberty and the Constitution. Follow Jaicomo on Twitter: @pjaicomo  

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This article originally appeared on USA TODAY: Qualified immunity: Police act like laws don't apply. They're right.