Tuesday, January 18, 2022

唐士其:治理与国家权力的边界——理论梳理与反思

 文/唐士其

 

北京大学国际关系学院 教授

 

在对治理问题的讨论中,国家的角色与职能是一个核心问题,但问题的提法具有明确的指向。就是说,治理概念的提出意味着人们已经认识到,国家虽然握有强制力,同时也具有强大的社会和资源的提取与动员能力,但它并非无所不能。因此,对治理问题的讨论,着眼点就不是如何扩展和强化国家权力,而是在不排斥国家作用的同时,如何充分发挥国家之外各种行为主体的作用,从而形成一种两者之间协同合作的良性互动关系。因此,对治理的讨论不可避免地涉及到如何重新定义国家权力边界的问题,具体来说又包括两个方面:一是水平方向国家能管什么和不能管什么,二是垂直方向国家能够延展到什么样的社会组织层次。

自现代国家建立以来,随着经济的发展和社会的进步、以及社会复杂程度的提高,一方面国家职能及其权力体现出不断扩展的趋势,但另一方面思想界也一再十分强劲地出现要求严格限定国家权力的呼声,从而客观上对国家权力无限膨胀的冲动发挥了某种制约作用。也就是说,过去若干世纪政治实践和政治思想的传统中,始终存在着扩展国家权力与限制国家权力这两种力量的博弈与平衡。透过历史的纵深不难看出,当下对治理问题的讨论,实际上正是这一传统在新的形势与环境下的延展。因此,梳理与现代国家发展相伴随的关于国家权力边界的理论,将有助于深化学术界对治理问题的理解。

 19世纪以前关于“有限政府”的理论

“有限政府”的理论是一种伴随着现代国家产生而出现、要求严格限定国家权力边界的理论,是伴随着西欧资产阶级革命,人们对国家权力的基础重新加以定义的结果。资产阶级革命的发生,意味着资本主义生产方式战胜了封建生产方式,而这个过程在政治学上的表达,就是市民社会(城市)战胜了封建和专制国家。这样一个过程,成为后来国家与社会关系理论的历史背景。

在欧洲封建社会后期,国家体现为散落各地、自我封闭、经济凋敝、文化落后的封建城堡,而社会则体现为经济和文化生活欣欣向荣、内部往往实行民主管理的城市。城堡与城市,不仅聚集了不同的人群,而且反映的是两种不同的生产方式和生活方式,同时也是两种不同的政治秩序和价值理念——一方面是等级与强制,另一方面则是平等与自由。它们之间的斗争,同时也就是权力与财富的斗争,1640-1688年的英国革命和1789年的法国大革命都是这种斗争的典型体现。在这一斗争的过程中,一种新的关于国家权力基础的理论——社会契约论应运而生。

在此之前,标准的国家权力理论是君权神授论,即君主权力来自上帝的理论。这种理论使封建君主以及后来的专制君主视国家为自己的所有物,在压榨社会的同时不必就自己的行为向臣民负责。然而,随着封建权力结构之外城市经济的兴起,以及随之而来的国家权力与财富的分离,要让市民们接受封建和专制君主的掠夺就没有任何法理依据。对新兴的市民阶级来说,统治只能基于被统治者的同意,国家权力只能来自被统治者对自身权利的让渡,这就是“社会契约”的基本内涵。社会契约论强调,国家权力乃是社会成员为满足他们的共同需要,经由每一位参与其中的人自愿同意而产生。这种理论的出现,不仅颠覆了封建国家和专制国家在法理上的正当性,而且也形成对资产阶级革命后新型国家强有力的规范。

由于欧洲封建社会后期发展起来的城市往往都拥有各种形式的自治传统,拥有一段在国家之外、甚至是反抗国家的历史,因而契约论基础上的国家观自然也就是一种有限政府的国家观。它不仅认为国家的权力来自人民的授予,而且主张这种权力的范围也必须由授权者而非国家自身决定因而其行使必须受到严格的限制。另一方面,人们出于自治的传统,相信社会有足够的能力在绝大多数情况下安排和组织公共生活。因此如果在极少数情况下迫不得已把某些权力转让给国家,就必须对国家权力被滥用的可能性高度戒备。总之,从“有限政府”的观点来看,“管得越少的政府是越好的政府”,“什么都不管的政府是最好的政府”。这就是所谓的“守夜人的政府”的理论。

 20世纪各种反对国家干预的理论

从某种意义上说,早期的“有限政府”理论是欧洲封建社会后期国家与社会、政治与经济、权力与财富两分状态的一种历史回响。当这种分离状态因封建专制国家被推翻而不复存在,国家重新承担起对社会的管理和服务职能之后,“什么都不管的政府”就有可能被视为“最坏的政府”。因此,整个19世纪,欧洲充满了革命与抗议。不断壮大的工人阶级和其他劳动阶级,不仅要求资产阶级国家扩大选举权,而且推动着后者越来越多地介入社会经济领域,以缓解失业、贫困、疾病等社会问题。与此同时,社会主义运动也蓬勃发展,其中重要的一支,即社会民主主义运动,更是把扩大民主作为最根本的主张,强调国家的民主化乃是实现社会主义的根本途径。

这一切导致欧洲国家职能、因而也就意味着国家权力的急剧扩展,福利国家开始出现。1917年,世界上出现了第一个社会主义国家——苏联。虽然按照马克思主义的经典理论,国家应该在社会主义革命胜利之后迅速消亡,但具体的历史逻辑却让苏联走上了一条不断扩张国家权力,并且通过国家对社会的全面控制和全面动员实现工业化和经济高速发展的道路。从20世纪30年代起,西方国家为应对经济危机而采取了凯恩斯主义的经济政策,同样利用国家的权力杠杆调节供需关系,刺激经济增长,缓解社会矛盾。由此,在整个世界范围内,国家权力进入了一个全面扩张的阶段。应该说,在这个过程中,社会主义与资本主义国家在“挖掘”、利用国家权力,强化国家职能方面出现了一种相互促进的态势。

当然,国家权力的这一轮扩张是在反对声中完成的,反对者的代表人物包括伯林、哈耶克和奥克肖特,等等。与传统的“有限政府”论不同,这一批国家干预的反对者几乎拥有一个共同的思想出发点,即对近代理性主义的批判性反思。在他们看来,“国家主义者”之所以试图通过国家对社会施以全面控制,其根本原因在于这些人对人类理性能力的盲目自信。依照这种过分乐观的理性主义的逻辑,如果人类理性能够在包括社会政治问题在内的一切领域内提供正确指导,那么作为理性力量体现的国家,借助其强力对社会的全面控制和干预,就如同科学家利用科学技术对自然的征服和控制一样,完全是一件自然而然的事情。在此过程中,国家行为也就不应被理解为强制,而应该像卢梭那样,将其视为强迫那些拒不服从公意的人“获得自由”。

借用哈耶克的说法,这样一种思想体现的是“知识的僭越”,是人类理性的“致命的自负”。在这一批国家权力扩张的批评者看来,以理性之名要求国家对社会进行全面控制的主张犯有双重错误。首先,它过分夸大了理性的作用。事实上理性不过是一种相对有效的人类认识能力,但并非这种能力的全部。其次,它忽视了社会问题的复杂性,因而简单地采取一种类似于对自然进行技术控制和技术改造的方法来对待人与社会。因此,他们共同呼吁慎用国家权力,而把更多的自由留给社会。正是从前一个方面出发,人们把他们称为“保守主义者”,而从后一个方面出发,人们又称他们为“自由至上论者”。

当然需要说明的是,国家干预的批评者在反对国家权力扩张的同时,并不一定都找到了国家权力的替代者。他们更真实的想法是,社会中肯定存在某些困境和难题,这些困境、难题甚至苦难个人无法解决、社会无法解决,国家同样也无法解决,这是人类真实处境的一部分。如果非要借助国家手段对此强行加以改变,那么不仅于事无补,而且必定导致对社会和个人的强制,甚至导致其他更大的灾难,因此一定要避免“国家万能”的幻想。

 20世纪80年代以后治理理论的兴起

20世纪70年代以后,随着西方国家经济出现“滞胀”现象、苏联东欧社会主义显露危机并进而导致苏联模式的失败,人们对国家权力的边界问题才再度予以普遍关注。不过,从20世纪70年代国家与社会关系理论的复兴,到90年代治理理论的兴起,中间还有一个过渡阶段。

20世纪70年代国家与社会关系理论的复兴出自两个方面互不相关的原因。一方面是纯理论的研究,即部分西方政治学者对所谓“国家自主性”的发现,另一方面则是西方对苏联东欧20世纪60-70年代持不同政见者运动的实践关注。但随后不久,人们的兴趣就很快转向了西方国家自身的现实问题,即因为国家过度干预而产生的巨额财政赤字、“福利病”、官僚主义和腐败现象,以及经济中的“滞胀”问题,由此导致了新自由主义的兴起,以及政策实践方面以美国的里根主义和英国的撒切尔主义为代表的、遍及整个西方世界的“去国家化”浪潮。

不过从整体上看,这次的“去国家化”并未导致西方国家全面回到“最小限度的国家”或者“什么都不管的国家”,因为人们在看到“国家失灵”的同时,也发现了“市场失灵”的问题,并由此引发了学术界对“第三部门”和“公共社会”的关切。在这种新的关切中,国家与社会不再像古典自由主义时期那样,被置于相互对立的两端。至此,治理理论已经呼之欲出。与此同时,随着新自由主义推动的全球化的进程,诸多跨越国界的问题也纷纷呈现出来。人们通常认为,对这些问题的处理,不仅超出了国家的边界,也超出了国家的能力,因此不仅需要国家之间的联合与合作,更需要国家与非政府部门,包括国际非政府部门的联合与合作,“全球治理”的理论也因此应运而生。

实际上,恰恰是全球性问题的出现反过来推动人们反思治理的基本逻辑。世界银行1992年发布的研究报告《治理与发展》。该报告认为,治理乃是各种政府性和非政府性组织、私人企业以及社会运动“为实现发展而在国际经济与社会资源的管理中运用权力的方式”。其中特别强调,要实现治理目标,应充分支持和培养公共社会的发展,而所谓的“公众社会”,就包括志愿性组织、非政府组织、各种社会团体等等。在此之后,“治理”概念迅速风靡全世界。这一现象实际上体现了人们对一种新的、超越国家权力逻辑的规则与秩序的渴求。

 国家权力为何需要边界

通过以上简单的理论梳理,不难发现“国家权力边界论”的一些基本逻辑。

首先是效率和成本方面的考虑。上文提到,治理理论的提出,意味着人们认识到国家并非无所不能,但对这一点应该有正确的理解。也就是说,承认国家能力的有限性,一个基本的出发点其实是就国家行为的成本和效率而言的。很多事情,也许并不一定超出了国家的能力范围,但在分权和制衡的体制下,其协商成本和时间成本却可能远远超出了人们能够接受的程度。至于在中国这样具有超强动员能力的体制下,政府行为具有国家强制力的支持,再加上官员考绩和升迁的巨大压力,要达成某项目标固然可以雷厉风行,从而大大降低协商成本和时间成本,但另一方面,集中决策和行动,出现错误的可能性也会增加,而如果国家的统一决策和行动出现错误,那么代价也会比分散决策和行动高出很多。在这里,哈耶克关于分散决策的思想非常具有借鉴意义。

其次,国家权力内在地具有不断滋生繁衍和向外扩张的倾向,而这不仅是权力与利益之间相互强化的关系的结果。在过分依赖国家的情况下,一个很常见的现象是,为解决某项社会问题而创造出来的权力,在其运行的同时又制造出了其他的问题,而为了解决这些新的问题,人们又制造出新的权力。如此循环往复,权力越来越多越来越大,问题也变得越来越多、越来越复杂。

再次,国家权力还存在腐败的可能性。人们创造了各种各样的监督、制约与平衡的机制,以防止权力的滥用和误用。但是,姑且不论这些机制是否能够有效发挥作用,这些机制的创设本身就意味着又增加了新的权力,从而增加了社会成本。而且监督、制约与平衡机制本身即便有效,客观上又会造成拖拉与扯皮,从而导致成本的增加和效率的丧失。总之,国家应该尽量克制自身扩张权力的冲动,提倡精简原则——“如无必要,勿增实体”。

最后是国家行动的统一性与社会问题的复杂性之间的矛盾。在一个复杂社会,可能没有两个人或者两件事的情况是完全一致的,因而国家的统一决策与行动即一刀切,往往难以切合实际,也未必能够达到最优的结果。国家权力具有强制性,国家的法律和政策又具有整齐划一的特点,因此对于那些其个人目标与国家的政策目标并不一致或者并不完全一致的人来说就构成了强制。国家不可能避免对某些人的强制,但是,强制毕竟使其对象丧失了自由,这却是国家在施行强制时必须时刻牢记的事情。

一种真正有效的治理,需要放弃国家万能的思想,也需要放弃过度依赖国家的冲动。国家职能在必要的时候当然需要予以扩展和强化,国家的执行能力当然需要得到保障,但国家不是福利院,也不是保险公司,国家不可能解决人世间的一切苦难,相反,国家权力有其自身的危险性。正是在这个意义上,马克思才主张共产主义最终要消灭国家。国家在一切可能的情况下把权力归还给社会,依赖各种社会力量,或者与它们合作解决社会问题,这是治理的本质所在,也是增强国家的治理能力的根本路径所在。

 

 

       本文原载于《湖北行政学院学报》2018年第06期方便阅读,略去全部注释,并有删节和调整。

Wednesday, January 5, 2022

Covid-19: Why China is sticking to “zero tolerance” public health measures

 China’s covid strategy has been to identify and interrupt community transmission through swift containment measures, sometimes for whole cities. And, despite already vaccinating over 75% of the population, it seems to be sticking to this approach. Andrew Silver asks why

Maintenance of containment has greatly reduced the impact of covid-19 lives lost and socioeconomic progress, wrote researchers including George Gao, head of the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), in Nature Medicine in April.1

Covid-19 measures led to the closure of Shanghai Disneyland, and testing was required before the guests already inside were allowed to leave.2 The government has also built a 5000 room quarantine facility on the outskirts of Guangzhou to house domestic and international travellers for at least two weeks of quarantine.3

In their paper,1 Gao and colleagues wrote that public health measures for covid-19 could change with the introduction of vaccines in China and elsewhere.

“PCR testing strategies will be adjusted to fit the changing epidemiological situation in China—probably one in which few or fewer non-pharmaceutical interventions will be needed for effective epidemic control,” the authors wrote. “Throughout 2020, PCR testing served the public well, helping to make and keep China nearly free of SARS-CoV-2 and providing socioeconomic space and time for vaccine development and long term prevention and control of covid-19.”

Today, however, China has already fully vaccinated over one billion of a total population of around 1.4 billion people, and some are wondering why measures haven’t changed. “Suppression strategies are not ‘solutions’ to covid-19 but rather ways to buy time, and fairly costly ones,” says Thomas Hale, a public policy researcher at Oxford University, UK, who leads a project that tracks government responses to covid-19 worldwide. “China has now vaccinated a large share of its population, so the question is, what is the value of buying more time?”

Immunity

Reuters has reported that Ruili, a border town and international transit hub in southwestern China, has had multiple outbreaks and disruptions, leading to a rare outburst against covid-19 restrictions from a former vice mayor, who wrote on social media that “the long term closure of the town has formed a deadlock in the town’s development.”4

Some say that China—a country ranked 177th for press freedom in 2021 by Reporters Without Borders5—may be balancing a number of factors, including public perception of the government and economic effects of SARS-CoV-2. “They want people to see them as being very confident and good at governance, and containing an outbreak is a very observable thing,” says Sean Sylvia, a health and development economist at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, USA. “You’re not going to have a lot of people reporting on people facing economic hardship."

The South China Morning Post reported that in September, Zheng Zhongwei, head of medical 
science development at China’s National Health Commission, told a health forum on the 
sidelines of the China International Fair for Trade in Services in Beijing, “We will not relax 
controls until we have reached a certain level of vaccine coverage. We will not relax controls 
unless we make a judgment about the virus and how vaccination can guarantee the 
effectiveness of adjusting epidemic control measures.”

By 5 November about 76% of China’s population were fully vaccinated, said a calculation by Reuters based on data announced by China’s National Health Commission.6 Only domestically developed covid-19 vaccines are approved for emergency use in the country.7 These use more traditional and easier to deploy technology, such as an inactivated virus, rather than mRNA vaccines, which have more complex supply chains. Sylvia and others think that shortcomings with vaccines or the vaccination rate could be delaying a change in China’s covid tactics.

Few publicly available studies have reported the efficacy of China’s vaccines, including those from two leading brands, Sinopharm and Sinovac, which are also exported abroad and which, alongside Pfizer-BioNtech, are the most widely used covid-19 vaccines in the world in terms of doses delivered.8 The available studies indicate lower efficacy levels than those of mRNA vaccines such as Pfizer-BioNtech’s (World Health Organization data suggested 51% effectiveness at preventing symptomatic disease with Sinovac’s CoronaVac and 79% with Sinopharm, compared with over 90% with Pfizer) and antibody levels that last three to six months.8

Wang Weibing, an epidemiologist at Fudan University in Shanghai, says that the main reasons people in China haven’t been vaccinated are concerns about efficacy or safety. Some others can’t be vaccinated because of underlying conditions.

The Sinovac and Sinopharm vaccines are approved by the European Medicines Agency and WHO, which emphasise that the drugs provide protection against severe disease and hospital admission. “The demand to get vaccinated is rather strong at our centres,” says Charles Poon, medical director of Raffles Medical China North Zone in Beijing. But he adds that “there is also quite a lot of interest and a waiting queue” for the Pfizer-BioNTech vaccine. The Wall Street Journal has reported9 that health officials delayed approval of the Pfizer-BioNTech vaccine because of concerns that it would hurt confidence in locally developed vaccines.

Sylvia says, “The Chinese government realises that there’s a lot of hesitancy in China and that the vaccine is not particularly effective or is [not] as effective as they hoped, which is why the other containment policies become more important.”

Although Sylvia is not privy to deliberations, he adds that if the vaccines available were considered effective enough and the vaccination coverage was higher, it would be rational for China’s policy to change. “Say you had maximum take-up of the vaccine and it was effective and everything—it would make less sense to invest as much in strict containment,” he said.

An epidemiologist at a university in Beijing has told The BMJ under anonymity that they think some public health measures could change once 80-85% of people have been fully vaccinated and have received a booster shot. The CDC’s Gao has said in a TV interview that China may reach 85% by early next year.2 Gao had also accepted an interview request from The BMJ, but his personal assistant at the Chinese Academy of Sciences’ Institute of Microbiology asked to reschedule a phone interview set for 30 September and did not offer an alternative arrangement or reply to follow-up requests for alternative dates. Gao had not responded to an emailed list of questions for this article by the time of publication.

Chinese authorities currently recommend booster shots to select groups six months after vaccination because of waning protection, and 37.97 million people in China had received a booster shot as of 5 November, the National Health Commission said.6 But Nancy Qian, a professor studying China at Northwestern University’s Kellogg School of Management, USA, says that rolling out an annual booster to the population is not a simple task.10

Qian wrote on Bloomberg, “Most countries, including China, are not accustomed to offering annual flu vaccinations. Administering a round of new boosters every year is much more expensive and logistically difficult than delivering basic vaccines—say, for measles—that only need to be injected a few times during a person’s life.”

Outbreak risk

China is the fourth largest country in the world—behind Russia, Canada, and the US—and has a higher population density than all three: 153 people per km2 in China, compared with 9 per km2 in Russia, 4 per km2 in Canada, and 36 per km2 in the US.11 “The denser the population, the higher the likelihood of transmission to potential hosts,” says Ian Lipkin, an epidemiologist at Columbia University in New York, who was a special adviser to China’s science and technology minister during the 2003 SARS outbreak.

Outbreaks could stem from cases arriving from outside the country, similarly to what happened in countries entirely surrounded by water such as Australia and New Zealand. Earlier this year researchers estimated that of every 100 000 travellers to Australia and New Zealand, five would transmit SARS-CoV-2 to a border or health worker or to someone in the community with a link to quarantine and isolation systems.12

“If we look at Australia and New Zealand, their geography helped their covid control measures, but nothing is foolproof,” says Bonny Ling, an independent researcher in the UK who studies human rights and migration in the Asia-Pacific region.

There may also be non-human risks from inside China’s borders. The origins of SARS-CoV-2 remain a controversial enigma, but David Hayman, an epidemiologist at Massey University in New Zealand and member of WHO’s original SARS-CoV-2 origins investigation team, says that because we don’t know how the people in Wuhan were infected, it’s not known whether the virus is still circulating in a wild bat or other animal host. “It is not possible to say that another SARS-CoV-2 outbreak from an animal source couldn’t happen again, including inside China,” he says.

China claims that it’s able to extinguish outbreaks, but not all public health experts are sure. “I have no reason to believe in their reports on epidemics,” says Vasily Vlassov, an epidemiologist at National Research University’s Higher School of Economics in Moscow. He says that if waterlocked Australia and New Zealand couldn’t do it, why would China, with its long land borders?

One problem with controlling covid-19 is that regular surveillance would be needed, as even people with no or mild symptoms can transmit SARS-CoV-2. Chen Chien-jen, an epidemiologist at Academia Sinica’s Genomics Research Center in Taipei, served as health minister for Taiwan during the 2003 SARS outbreak and says that China would need to test everyone for covid-19 every week if it wanted to identify all cases. “Otherwise, how can you identify a virus in the population?” says Chen. This could be particularly challenging in rural areas.13

Oxford University’s Hale says that governments should continuously evaluate the costs and benefits of covid-19 approaches and should not be inflexible. He adds, “If China waits until covid-19 is widely suppressed around the world to relax its stance, it may—sadly—be waiting a very long time indeed.”

Wednesday, December 22, 2021

警惕玄武之流打着爱国主义的大旗 做流量生意

 文|凤凰网特约体育评论员张宾

  中国拳手玄武

  玄武这下子真的出名了。他的目的可能达到了。

  日前,在武汉举行的一场拳击比赛中,中国选手玄武在对阵日本前WBO(世界拳击组织)蝇量级世界拳王木村翔使用了抱摔的动作。在拳击规则下,抱摔是违规动作。玄武违规在先,却成了胜利者,理由是木村翔一方宣布退赛。

  事情到此已经十分明了,玄武不讲武德,场裁没有严格执法。场裁张旭解释称开赛前被口头告知比赛方式变更为“中国功夫VS日本拳击”,允许使用抱摔的动作。这显然不合乎常识,一场正式比赛,即便没那么正规,规则也不可能在比赛前临时变更。何况,玄武的对手还是一个货真价实的拳王,曾经击败过邹市明而在中国名声大噪。

  这就是一出彻头彻尾的闹剧。如果事情到此结束,还不至于酿成国际事件。在比赛之后,玄武继续挑衅,他在网上留言称:“中国打日本还需要规则吗?他不死我睡不着觉啊!”

  而木村翔的回应则有礼有节,“世界上任何一个国家,都有坏人、好人、真诚的人和狡猾的人,希望大家不要因为这件事讨厌中国人。”与玄武的姿态比起来,品格高下立判。

  玄武明显在偷换概念,将普普通通的一场拳击比赛,演绎成“中日对决”,试图挑起民族仇恨,为自己脸上贴金。

  地缘政治的冲突让中日之间的关系变得紧张,这是客观事实。在当下,民众的爱国热情普遍高涨。“国家公祭日”刚刚过去不久,大多数国人还沉浸在对历史的缅怀中。不得不说,玄武很会利用时机,在这样一个敏感的历史当口,想通过挑起中日对立,将自己置于道德的高位。

  可是,他的算盘打错了。反对体育政治化,一直都是各方秉承的态度。诚然,体育不可能完全与政治无关,但在竞赛场上,还是应该让体育保持纯粹。尊重对手,尊重规则,尊重裁判,这才是体育的精神内核。

  当然,任何国际性赛事,不可能不掺杂民族情感。中国选手与国外选手之间的对决,国人为中国选手加油助阵,这是人之常情,但这与复杂的政治背景没有多大关系。中国选手与日本选手同场竞争,并不应该被为国复仇的复杂情感所羁绊。他可以为国而战,但只是为了朴素的爱国情感,没有任何道德的绑架和束缚。

  玄武将他与木村翔一场普普通通的拳击比赛,上升成中日民族对决,属于典型的偷梁换柱。幸运的是,这一次无论是中国民众,还是日本民众,都没有被玄武忽悠。两国网民都在互联网上声讨玄武,他成为了“风箱里的老鼠”。玄武的行为,不仅仅是对体育精神赤裸裸的亵渎,更是试图通过与爱国主义相捆绑实现不可告人之目的。

  针对玄武跳梁小丑的行为,其实没有必要长篇大论进行口诛笔伐,因为他不配。但是,我们必须还是要承认,他这一波“骚操作”的目的可能达到了。通过违反规则的举动,以及捆绑爱国主义的行为,他让自己获得了不菲的流量和名气。

  恕我孤陋寡闻,在这一事件之前,我丝毫不知道玄武究竟是何方神圣,只知道玄武湖(现在,我感觉玄武对玄武湖都构成了某种程度的玷污)。百度百科显示,他的身份是武术散打运动员、拳手,最辉煌的履历是2004年中国VS日本真功夫争霸赛中获得52kg级冠军。

  他的对手木村翔在中国赫赫有名,不仅仅是因为他曾经击败过邹市明,还有一个很重要的原因是他“外卖拳王”的身份。如果不是因为生活所迫,很难想象他会来到武汉和这么一个不知名的选手(玄武)进行一场小小的表演赛。

  这场比赛对外宣传的主办方是:WBU世界拳击联盟、WKF世界自由搏击联合会以及中国国际综合格斗联合会。不过,比赛当天,WKF中国区与WBU大中华区就发布联合声明,表示该比赛未获得口头承认或者官方书面授权。中国国际综合格斗联合会也发表了声明,否认是该比赛的主办方。

  在这样一个不入流的小比赛中,赛前口头更改规则,赛后挑动网友情绪,我有理由猜测这是玄武提前布好的局,就是为了哗众取宠,博取流量,从而在未来以此谋利。在这样一个互联网时代,“审丑模式”大为流行,很多跳梁小丑收获了足够的流量,从而赚得盆满钵盈。

  这是我们尤为要警觉的,也是我在开篇为什么说他的目的可能达到了。他就是想要通过裹挟爱国主义情绪,从而实现暴得大名的目的,最终去变现。

      有时候聪明反被聪明误。当下确实爱国主义情绪高涨,但在他这个事件上,民众还是保持了足够的清醒,反而集中火力炮轰他不讲武德的举动,以及绑架爱国主义的行为。他的狼子野心被识破了,并且遭到了反噬。这足以让他被钉在体育历史的耻辱柱上。

  “耗子尾汁”的那位马大师,已经被历史的尘埃湮灭。玄武的行径,同样令人不齿。舆论应该对他这样的人弃之如敝屣,让他无法从中渔利,最终被历史所抛弃。

  我们同样需要警惕的是,在体育界,会不会有越来越多的玄武披着爱国主义的大旗,绑架民意,表面上看起来是为了民族大义,实则无非为了个人的名与利。爱国是一种崇高的情感,表现在行动上,并不表现在嘴皮子上。很多口口声声爱国的人,实际上却是做着爱国主义的生意,满口仁义道德,满肚子蝇营狗苟。

  这不仅让我想起了周星驰的经典电影《九品芝麻官》里的一句台词:“老佛爷是要放在心里尊重的,像你这样整天挂在嘴边讲,只有贬低她的身份。”

  透过这个事件,我认为,防止不轨之人做爱国主义的生意,人人有责。尤其是在体育领域,各级机构三令五申反对体育政治化,还有宵小之徒铤而走险,更是人人得而诛之。


Sunday, December 19, 2021

世上本是有路的 走的2B多了 也就没了路…

 王五四|炮弹要在天上飞多少次,才能被永远禁止


我深深地感觉到,这个社会太惯着这些傻逼了。以前的社会风气再不堪,这些傻逼也不敢轻易冒头,因为有羞耻心。现在倒好了,羞耻心全无,反而还顶着光鲜亮丽的爱国帽子出来丢人现眼,以前还有句话来形容这些人,“别以为你爱国了,祖国就看不出你是个傻逼”,现在这话也失效了,这些人肆无忌惮,横行霸道。这是什么道理,这是不讲道理,明明是他们丢人现眼的言行,损害了同胞的形象和祖国的利益,不仅无人敢管,反而大家都躲着走,躲恶臭可以理解,但长此以往,国将不国。难怪司马南说自己住在南锣鼓巷八号,有人现场查看完之后说是公共厕所,这有什么问题吗?有些物种就喜欢在厕所里咕咏,特别是以公共面目示人的,就喜欢在公共厕所翻滚。

《环球时报》的中肯胡退休了,据说他退休后还将以环球时报特约评论员身份继续发言,有人是退而不休,老胡这叫退而喋喋不休,是挺烦人的,关键是十几年过去了,一点长进都没有,他当总编的环球时报,所有言论一句话就可以形容,那就是“全世界都想害我们,因为全世界都不如我们。”这是什么思想,这是小农思想,这与改革开放背道而行,这与共同富裕公然作对,以胡锡进为首的文人用看似爱国的笔触损害祖国的利益,用看似为国争光的腔调随时给祖国脸上抹黑,从未真正树立理想信念,从未对人民忠诚老实。

《环球时报》总编辑胡锡进近日宣布退休

庙小妖风大,池浅王八多”,当前的舆论氛围可以说是乌烟瘴气,好人不敢作声,恶人指鹿为马,凡事不讲道理,凡事不讲法律,一句“你不爱国”就能引来千夫所指,自己百口莫辩。你们哪来那么多“不爱国”的帽子,义乌小商品批发市场批发来的吗?中国人是内敛的,他们的爱深藏心底,反而是那些动不动张嘴就是爱国的人,像极了社会上的渣男,爱国成了这些无赖手里的投枪,可他们在精神上爱国无脑,在情感上爱国无心,在行动时爱国无胆,在前行时爱国无力,只有在安全的时候,在他们的小算盘上,爱国无价,一不需要付出代价,二能捞着不可估价的利益。还是《霸王别姬》里段小楼的那句话,“一个个都他妈忠臣良将的摸样,这日本兵就在城外头,打去呀,敢情欺负的还是中国人!

我现在写文章基本已经放弃跟人讲人话了,常识更是不敢奢求的谈话内容,想骗人的请继续,愿意受骗的请自便,我只是想抬升一点做人的底线,让眼前的生活不至于过于荒诞和可笑,以后后辈研究起我们生活的时代时不至于说“那样的环境下你们是怎么苟活下来的”“那样的时代,你们居然还赚到了钱”“那样的日子,一定是不要脸才会过得那么心安理得吧?”“那种垃圾人,你们怎么容忍他胡说八道的”“那样的情况,你们做出过什么努力吗?”以前我总觉得“逼良为娼”是很坏的结果,其实那也是一条路,一种选择,现在我发现很多时候我们把“娼”都逼的无路可走了,鲁迅说,世界上本没有路,走的人多了,变成了路,可他妈现在走的人太多了,一条路上挤满了傻逼,一条路上挤满了坏逼,二逼相乘,逼得人走投无路,世上本有路,走的二逼多了,也就没了路。

1962年,毛泽东说过,“不要给人乱戴帽子。我们有些同志惯于拿帽子压人,一张口就是帽子满天飞,吓得人不敢讲话。”他还说“让人讲话,天不会塌下来,自己也不会垮台。不让人讲话呢?那就难免有一天要垮台。”1996年,陆定一留下了两句遗言,“要让孩子上学,要让人民说话”,可见总有人试图不让人民说话,现在孩子是可以上学了,教师却不敢讲话了。

上海震旦职业学院女教师宋庚一,对南京大屠杀的人数表达了一下不同的意见,不仅仅被开除,还被央媒点名批评,被一些自媒体踏上了一万只脚,还有众多狂欢咒骂的网民,当然,他们都是不值得一提只会蚕食国家利益和败坏祖国形象的乌合之众,在我眼里,他们除了嘴里爱国,所言所行,于国于民,肯定不如他们咒骂的“日本走狗”宋庚一。有什么问题是不能拿来讨论的吗?有什么话是不能说错的吗?说错了就要经受这般惊涛骇浪,一个普通人经受不起这些,你们如此热爱历史上死去的同胞,连个数字都不能说错,却又如此冷酷残忍的对待眼前活着的同胞,你们算什么东西。你们是不是要带着红袖章,去街头拦住每一个人问,南京大屠杀死了多少人,那些回答不出的人,是不是要被你们拿着皮带扣抽得头破血流才行。

宋庚一老师说三十万的数字缺乏确证,她也说了,有人说是几千,几万,也有人说是比三十万还多的五十万,这样的探讨有什么问题,记住南京大屠杀的历史,并不是因为死亡了三十万人,难道死了三千死了三百,你们他妈就记不住了?的确,有很多这样的情况,都被你们遗忘了,于是这种灾难一次又一次的发生,对于你们而言,死亡人数不够多,不够悲惨,不值得记住,你们不仅记不住,反而一言一行像极了那些凶手。宋老师说“不应当永远去恨,而是反思战争如何而来”,这话怎么了?不去恨就是忘记历史了吗?你又是如何去恨的?中日友好医院,中日友好饭店,中日友好城市,各种日本品牌,你要如何恨他们?反战难道不是人类共同的目标吗?居然有人拿着这一点来痛批宋庚一老师。在第二次世界大战结束之后,国际社会和许多国家,不断举行各种纪念活动,为的就是祭奠战争死难者,反思战争历史,怎么到了我们这,就变成了人人喊打。在我看来,这些挑动群众情绪煽动民族主义的人的诉求很简单,流量,接下来就是流量变现,以前他们还披着民族大义的外衣,现在批这件衣服的人多了,他们光着腚也上了,毕竟错过这波韭菜,就损失了实打实的利润,他们为了获取那点利益,不惜损害的是整个社会的利益,战争是一将功成万骨枯,而到了他们眼里却是万骨枯了好带货。

鲍勃·迪伦有首著名的反战歌曲《blowin’ in the wind》,是美国民谣史上最重要的作品之一,这首歌的歌词于2016年获得诺贝尔文学奖。这首歌写于1962年,当时美国在越战的形势并不乐观,政府不顾本国人民的意愿将更多士兵送入越南,目睹自己同胞满怀爱国热情却为了不必要的战争断送了性命,鲍勃·迪伦用他的歌声表达了他对和平的思考,希望世人能以和平而理性的态度来解决争端,当时的美国政府没有禁止他歌唱,美国也没有人站出来指责他忘记了“莱克星顿的枪声”,也没有人问他会不会背诵林肯的葛底斯堡演讲全文,不会背就滚出美国。

How many ears must one man have

一个人有多少耳朵

Before he can hear people cry

才能听见身后人的哭泣

How many deaths will it take

要牺牲多少条生命

Till he knows that too many people have died

才能知道太多的人已经死去

How many times must the cannon balls fly

炮弹要多少次掠过天空

Before they‘re forever banned

才能被永远禁止

有些人永远听不懂这首歌表达的意思,即便翻译成了中文。但有一点是确认的,他们知道这是一首美国歌曲,他们会大声训斥你,“你怎么能拿一首美国歌曲来诋毁我们的爱国热情,你究竟有什么不可告人的阴谋。”我只能回答,我去你妈的!

Monday, November 22, 2021

To Paramilitary Groups, Rittenhouse Verdict Means Vindication

 On Friday, as Kyle Rittenhouse stood in a courtroom in Kenosha, Wisconsin, awaiting the verdict in his trial, a large bald man with mutton-chop sideburns sat in a pew several rows behind him. As a court clerk announced Rittenhouse’s acquittal on all charges, a faint smile passed across the man’s lips.

“I’m walking on sunshine,” the man, Kevin Mathewson, said the next day. A local private investigator and former city alderman, he had attended every day of the trial, in which he had more than a passing interest.

Mathewson had become a prominent and divisive figure in Kenosha. Days after George Floyd was killed by a police officer in Minneapolis, Mathewson had created an organization called the Kenosha Guard, an armed group that declared its intent in a Facebook post “to deter rioting/looting” amid racial justice demonstrations in Kenosha. In August 2020, after the police shooting of a Black man named Jacob Blake brought a wave of protests and rioting to the city, Mathewson had written on the Kenosha Guard’s Facebook page urging Kenoshans to take to the streets with guns to defend the city. His Aug. 25 post went viral, drawing thousands of RSVPs and comments threatening violence.

Mathewson’s call to arms was one of several in Kenosha that day, which collectively brought dozens of mostly white armed paramilitaries into the streets of the city’s small downtown, creating a heavily armed confrontation with demonstrators that came to a head with the Rittenhouse shootings. Mathewson went home hours before the shootings, and no evidence ever connected Rittenhouse — whom Mathewson said he had never met — to his Facebook post. But his proximity to the incident led to him being banned from Facebook, where his Aug. 25 post had been flagged repeatedly for violating the platform’s ban on militia activity and had left an aura of suspicion around him.

Now that Rittenhouse had been acquitted, Mathewson felt cleared by association. “It vindicates Kyle,” Mathewson said. “I felt vindicated by it.” And, he said, “It vindicates people that say, ‘Look, no one’s coming to help, we have to help ourselves.’”

The Rittenhouse shootings, and the clash between paramilitaries and demonstrators in which they occurred, represented the lethal culmination of this idea: that the United States had reached a point of crisis in which citizens were required to take up arms to defend it from their fellow citizens. It was an idea with deep roots in American history, and also one deeply entangled with the country’s legacy of racial conflict.

White vigilante groups, some of them openly white supremacist, responded violently to unrest in Black communities in multiple cities in the late 1960s, often with the acquiescence or active support of local police. Photographs of armed Korean American business owners in Los Angeles defending their properties during the 1992 riots have been touchstones for Second Amendment advocates for years, and they were circulated again as social media memes after the Rittenhouse verdict.

In 2020, this strain of armed vigilantism was reactivated by the struggles of mostly Democratic state and local governments and law enforcement in responding to rioting and prolonged unrest in several major cities after Floyd’s death. And it was fanned by conservative media figures and Republican politicians, who encouraged their audiences and supporters to see the failure to preserve order as part and parcel of the Democratic agenda.

“I’m really concerned about the gun fetish, and those who really buy into the ‘good guy with a gun’ scenario,” Anthony Kennedy, an alderman in Kenosha, said after the verdict. “Those people who see the breakdown of society, think they need to be armed — this just validates their worldview. And that’s bad for all of us.”

Rittenhouse’s trial was an important test of how the legal system would address one of the signature developments that emerged amid the violent fracturing of American politics in 2020: the presence of armed counterprotesters at racial justice demonstrations, both peaceful and otherwise. In some cases, the armed groups and individuals were openly opposed to, and antagonistic toward, demonstrators. In others, they presented themselves as a volunteer security presence for private or government buildings, or even as neutral peacekeepers, although they were rarely welcomed as such by demonstrators.

Their actions were not without precedent. Members of the Oath Keepers militia were present in Ferguson, Missouri, after the police shooting of Michael Brown there in 2014. Elizabeth Neumann, a former assistant secretary for counterterrorism and threat prevention at the Department of Homeland Security, where she tracked domestic extremism, argued that such groups represented a particularly elusive kind of security threat, in part because the armed groups themselves did not necessarily see themselves that way.

“An Oath Keeper, they see themselves as being there for protecting,” she said. Their mindset, she added, is that “they’re there in case there’s a bad day — and if the government keeps violating our rights, there might come a day when they need to launch a revolution.”

The armed groups that materialized in Kenosha appeared to span a range of motivations. Some were highly ideological, including members of the anarchic far-right Boogaloo movement, who could be seen in footage from several nights placing themselves between demonstrators and police and guarding private property. Others saw themselves as simply defending local businesses or providing a sort of heavily armed neighborhood watch in the absence of an overstretched police department.

Doug Flucke, who stood watch as part of a group outside a restaurant in another part of Kenosha the night of the Rittenhouse shootings, said in a Facebook message last month that his group was “ready to help and stand next to our Blue to show them that they had support from their community and they weren’t alone.”

Prominent media and political personalities on the right in Wisconsin and elsewhere had discussed throughout the summer the need for this kind of community-level response to what they depicted as Democratic failure in the face of rioting. Appearing on a talk-radio program the day after the Rittenhouse shootings, David Clarke, the former Milwaukee County sheriff and a right-wing political celebrity, said that he did not advocate “some of the stuff that’s starting to happen” but that he would not condemn it either, and he advised listeners to have a plausible argument for their actions in such cases.

“Think about it, have a plan,” he said. “You have to act reasonably. Then you’re going to have to articulate what you did afterwards.” After the Rittenhouse verdict Friday, Clarke told Newsmax that he had to “hold back tears” after the verdict was read. “I’ve talked to this young man,” he said. “He’s been under a lot.”

A 2013 Urban Institute study found marked disparities in how often homicides were deemed justifiable by juries based on the race of the parties involved. And “stand your ground” laws, which codify a particularly expansive right to self-defense, have played a role in the acquittal of defendants accused of killing Black people who were unarmed in several high-profile cases, most notably in George Zimmerman’s shooting of Trayvon Martin, a Black teenager, in 2012. Three white men currently on trial in Georgia for the murder of Ahmaud Arbery — a 25-year-old Black man who was unarmed and whom the men pursued through their neighborhood — have similarly claimed self-defense.

Rittenhouse’s detractors rushed to cast his acquittal as part of this pattern. “This system isn’t built to hold white supremacists accountable,” U.S. Rep. Cori Bush, D-Mo., a Black Lives Matter activist elected to Congress last year, wrote on Twitter shortly after the decision.

But the Rittenhouse shootings — which happened after he brought an assault-style rifle to the aftermath of a racial justice protest — diverged in significant ways from that template. The three men Rittenhouse shot, two of them fatally, were all white, and the shootings occurred in a genuinely chaotic and violent situation, with deadly weapons present on all sides.

His acquittal was considered a likely outcome by legal analysts, who had regarded the prosecution’s path to conviction on homicide charges as exceptionally steep because it would have required demonstrating beyond reasonable doubt that Rittenhouse had not acted in self-defense. “I think this is not a terribly surprising verdict,” said Michael O’Hear, a professor at Marquette University Law School in Milwaukee.

“I don’t think the kid was a Klan member,” Raymond Roberts, a local data analyst and activist, said of Rittenhouse. “It was just the privilege of it: ‘Because I’m white, I can walk around in tac gear with a rifle, and the police will say thank you.’”

In June 2020, Roberts, who is Black and an Army veteran, had organized an armed demonstration to counter Mathewson’s Kenosha Guard, calling on fellow veterans to openly carry firearms in solidarity with racial justice demonstrators. But at the event, Roberts had chosen to carry a permitted concealed handgun rather than a rifle — a common choice among local racial justice activists who armed themselves at demonstrations in Kenosha that summer.

To Roberts, the Rittenhouse verdict was a stark reminder of who was likely to be seen by the police and jury members as “helping” in a situation such as the one Rittenhouse placed himself in, and who was not.

“I have to be honest and say I’m angry because I’m jealous,” Roberts said. “That 17-year-old white boy, this country belongs to him more than it’ll ever belong to me. It doesn’t matter how many years I did in the Army, how much taxes I pay. I can’t do what he did. I can’t walk around in the middle of the night open carrying.

Kennedy, the alderman, who is also Black and an Army veteran, agreed. If he had been in Rittenhouse’s situation, “My ass would’ve been dead on the street,” he said. “I wouldn’t have been arrested.”

© 2021 The New York Times Company

404文:委内瑞拉,这个上天眷顾的国家是如何毁掉的?

编者注:读这篇文章,想起了王莽。伟大的理想,高尚的品质,如果加诸于自我,大概可以成为半个圣人。但是如果想加诸于整个社会, 则往往会带来巨大的灾难。何也?人性。 按:原文发表于2023年12月15日,目前已遭到屏蔽。(近期,委内瑞拉总统选举投票后,选委会宣布卸任总统马杜罗赢得第三个...