China Is the Real Sick Man of Asia

The mighty Chinese juggernaut has been humbled this week, apparently by a species-hopping bat virus. While Chinese authorities struggle to control the epidemic and restart their economy, a world that has grown accustomed to contemplating China’s inexorable rise was reminded that nothing, not even Beijing’s power, can be taken for granted.

We do not know how dangerous the new coronavirus will be. There are signs that Chinese authorities are still trying to conceal the true scale of the problem, but at this point the virus appears to be more contagious but considerably less deadly than the pathogens behind diseases such as Ebola or SARS—though some experts say SARS and coronavirus are about equally contagious.

China’s initial response to the crisis was less than impressive. The Wuhan government was secretive and self-serving; national authorities responded vigorously but, it currently appears, ineffectively. China’s cities and factories are shutting down; the virus continues to spread. We can hope that authorities succeed in containing the epidemic and treating its victims, but the performance to date has shaken confidence in the Chinese Communist Party at home and abroad. Complaints in Beijing about the U.S. refusing entry to noncitizens who recently spent time in China cannot hide the reality that the decisions that allowed the epidemic to spread as far and as fast as it did were all made in Wuhan and Beijing.

The likeliest economic consequence of the coronavirus epidemic, forecasters expect, will be a short and sharp fall in Chinese economic growth rates during the first quarter, recovering as the disease fades. The most important longer-term outcome would appear to be a strengthening of a trend for global companies to “de-Sinicize” their supply chains. Add the continuing public health worries to the threat of new trade wars, and supply-chain diversification begins to look prudent.

Events like the coronavirus epidemic, and its predecessors—such as SARS, Ebola and MERS—test our systems and force us to think about the unthinkable. If there were a disease as deadly as Ebola and as fast-spreading as coronavirus, how should the U.S. respond? What national and international systems need to be in place to minimize the chance of catastrophe on this scale?

Epidemics also lead us to think about geopolitical and economic hypotheticals. We have seen financial markets shudder and commodity prices fall in the face of what hopefully will be a short-lived disturbance in China’s economic growth. What would happen if—perhaps in response to an epidemic, but more likely following a massive financial collapse—China’s economy were to suffer a long period of even slower growth? What would be the impact of such developments on China’s political stability, on its attitude toward the rest of the world, and to the global balance of power?

China’s financial markets are probably more dangerous in the long run than China’s wildlife markets. Given the accumulated costs of decades of state-driven lending, massive malfeasance by local officials in cahoots with local banks, a towering property bubble, and vast industrial overcapacity, China is as ripe as a country can be for a massive economic correction. Even a small initial shock could lead to a massive bonfire of the vanities as all the false values, inflated expectations and misallocated assets implode. If that comes, it is far from clear that China’s regulators and decision makers have the technical skills or the political authority to minimize the damage—especially since that would involve enormous losses to the wealth of the politically connected.

We cannot know when or even if a catastrophe of this scale will take place, but students of geopolitics and international affairs—not to mention business leaders and investors—need to bear in mind that China’s power, impressive as it is, remains brittle. A deadlier virus or a financial-market contagion could transform China’s economic and political outlook at any time.

Many now fear the coronavirus will become a global pandemic. The consequences of a Chinese economic meltdown would travel with the same sweeping inexorability. Commodity prices around the world would slump, supply chains would break down, and few financial institutions anywhere could escape the knock-on consequences. Recovery in China and elsewhere could be slow, and the social and political effects could be dramatic.

If Beijing’s geopolitical footprint shrank as a result, the global consequences might also be surprising. Some would expect a return of unipolarity if the only possible great-power rival to the U.S. were to withdraw from the game. Yet in the world of American politics, isolation rather than engagement might surge to the fore. If the China challenge fades, many Americans are likely to assume that the U.S. can safely reduce its global commitments.

So far, the 21st century has been an age of black swans. From 9/11 to President Trump’s election and Brexit, low-probability, high-impact events have reshaped the world order. That age isn’t over, and of the black swans still to arrive, the coronavirus epidemic is unlikely to be the last to materialize in China.

Coronavirus Proves One Thing: China's Rise Is Built on Quicksand

"We may not build hospitals in 10 days with forced labor, but we are better able to create conditions where we don’t have to."

Despite China’s incredible economic success as of late, it’s important to remember that it is still fundamentally a communist country. Recent events have been a stern reminder.

Freedom can be messy, but it’s nothing like the mess an authoritarian regime creates when it fears losing power. The disturbing outbreak of the coronavirus (2019-nCoV) in China and the communist government’s response to it should be a reminder of the consequence of a system based on state control, without rule by the people and a vibrant civil society. Many are impressed by the fact that China built a 1,000-bed hospital in 10 days—by employing about 7,000 people who worked around the clock.

However impressive that feat might be, it’s important to consider how dangerous the virus has become and the lack of communication and coordination that could have taken place to avoid having to take such extreme measures.

The virus initially broke out on Dec. 8 in China’s Wuhan province. Instead of immediately informing the public and bringing awareness to a potential outbreak of a highly contagious disease, the local governmental authorities waited three weeks to inform residents.

The Chinese government also actively attempted to suppress information about the outbreak as it escalated sharply.

“That’s clearly unacceptable, especially in light of the SARS experience, when a Chinese cover-up also occurred, and in light of the high domestic and international travel rates of the Chinese people today,” wrote Peter Brookes, a senior fellow for national security affairs at The Heritage Foundation. “To minimize the spread of any potential epidemic, a host country must not only respond rapidly, but provide full transparency to advise not only its own citizenry, but the international community as well.”

While these actions (or inactions), so far at least, have mostly affected the people of China alone, a raging pandemic could have global consequences.

A century ago, a flu epidemic killed more people than died on all the battlefields of World War I combined. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention noted that some estimates suggest about one-third of the entire world population was infected at some point.

We may be better at treating and containing disease these days, but this is still serious stuff. The Chinese government in Beijing was clearly more focused on saving face for the regime than efforts to successfully contain the virus. Even now, it’s hard to tell exactly what’s happening in China as the economy is being roiled by shutdowns and infection and death rate numbers seem untrustworthy.

That’s not to mention the smattering of images and videos coming out of the country, some of which may be fake or misinformation, but it’s hard to trust any official pronouncements, given Beijing’s clear attempts to suppress news from shining a light on the situation.

It’s notable—given China’s clear economic advancements of the past few decades, thanks to its abandoning communist economic theories—that the regime has not let go of its absolute power over society.

China is still communist, and communism, as it’s practiced in the real world, is about absolute control. If anything, the economic advancements are now working alongside an authoritarian retrenchment as President Xi Jinping seizes more power and the Chinese Communist Party uses its increased technological prowess to create more tools for tyranny.

So, while China has more economic and technological ability to treat a disease, it’s more tightly controlled system makes Chinese society less able to counter a controllable outbreak. That factor distinguishes Chinese society under communism from the American system, in which free speech is a protected right and a vibrant civil society allows information to spread quickly. 

“The government has tightened its grip on the internet, the media, and civil society. It has deeper pockets and a greater ability to control the flow of information across the country,” wrote Li Yuan in The New York Times, comparing China of today to how it was during the SARS outbreak. “As a result, many of the media outlets, advocacy groups, activists and others who held the government accountable in 2003 have been silenced or sidelined.”

We may not build hospitals in 10 days with forced labor, but we are better able to create conditions where we don’t have to.

As with the repression of likely millions of Muslim Uighurs and the crackdown on Hong Kong protesters, the coronavirus outbreak is a reminder—especially for those around the globe who are indifferent to the threat of China—of just how different a free society is from the Chinese communist one.

Jarrett Stepman is a contributor to The Daily Signal and co-host of The Right Side of History podcast. Send an email to Jarrett. He is also the author of the new book, "The War on History: The Conspiracy to Rewrite America's Past."

ABCs of trade

The annual 2019 trade figures for the United States came out last week, heralding some encouraging news. America’s enormous international trade deficit actually declined slightly from 2018. This was the first decrease in six years, with the deficit in goods and services dropping 1.7%, to $616.8 billion.

Better yet, America’s bilateral trade deficit with China fell for the first time in four years, dropping a hefty 17.6%, to $345.6 billion.

These are promising numbers and they show that tariffs on Chinese products are successfully moving the needle on U.S. trade flows. In fact, America’s 2019 imports from China actually fell $87.4 billion from the all-time high set in 2018.

At the same time, America’s trade deficits with other competitors did increase in 2019. The U.S. goods deficit with the EU rose 5.4%. The deficit with Mexico climbed 26.2%. And the deficit with Canada increased 41.9%.

Overvalued dollar

Companies like mine — that manufacture goods in America’s industrial heartland—would like to see these trade deficits begin to decline as well. But that will require more than just tariff action, since America’s overvalued dollar BUXX, +0.04%   continues to make U.S. exports more expensive overseas.

Clearly, though, economists were wrong in predicting that tariffs would kill global trade, increase inflation, or cause a recession. My company, which competes directly with China in fabricated metal parts and assemblies, has seen firsthand that the tariffs are helping domestic industry.

There are two key justifications for the tariffs.

First, they’re providing relief for domestic companies like mine that have suffered from subsidized import competition. America’s steel companies are currently investing some $13 billion in new steelmaking across the nation. That investment is creating higher-paying jobs in rural areas.

Advanced industries are seeing benefits as well. Roughly a dozen solar manufacturers are now investing in U.S.-based production. First Solar, FSLR, +1.19%   for example, has announced a $1 billion facility in Ohio that’s expected to create 500 jobs.

Geopolitical strategy

Second, the tariffs underpin an important geopolitical strategy. Now that Beijing has become a major strategic competitor—and is making a bid for global hegemony—the tariffs can help to reduce the trade profit that keeps driving China’s rise.

With the tariffs underway, the United States should pursue an “ABC” strategy: “Anywhere But China.” The tariffs are already helping to drive production out of China and into other countries. That’s a good thing. But in order to constrain China’s rise, the United States should continue to encourage manufacturing to move away from mainland China.

Since 2001, the United States has suffered trillions of dollars in cumulative trade debt with Beijing. That has cost an estimated 3.7 million U.S. jobs and reduced the quality of employment in America’s workforce.

At the same time, the United States has become progressively more reliant on China for prescription drugs, key industrial metals, and military hardware. And Chinese companies brazenly hack U.S. steel companies and wind turbine manufacturers while Chinese agents steal America’s research in biomedical science, wireless technology, and aerospace engineering.

Predatory trade

China happily uses this predatory trade to fund a brutal regime that persecutes religious and ethnic minorities. It also uses forced labor to boost manufacturing output. It rarely enforces weak labor standards. And lax environmental regulations have allowed Chinese factories to continue releasing ozone-depleting carbon tetrachloride into the atmosphere, in violation of international agreement.

In the face of such wanton behavior, the United States should do everything possible to limit China’s rise. That in itself would justify tariffs on Chinese exports. “Anywhere but China” should be the overriding approach as the United States reduces its dependence on China and encourages increased production at home.

If something can’t be manufactured in the United States, it should be made somewhere other than in China. That common-sense approach should be the “ABC” of future U.S. geopolitical strategy.

Zach Mottl is chief alignment officer of Atlas Tool Works, in Lyons, Ill. He serves on the board of directors of the Coalition for a Prosperous America (CPA) and is a past chairman of the Technology and Manufacturing Association of Illinois.

Not Your Father's Cold War

Key point: Beijing and Washington seem to be set on a path of confrontation that will only be heightened by social media and new technologies. The question is who can out compete who?

The United States and China are locked in a rivalry over trade, technology, military control of the South and East China seas, and increasingly over ideology and human rights. The two countries have been in a cyberwar for years already, featuring Chinese attacks on the Pentagon’s personnel system and the U. S. Navy’s ship maintenance records. There is a military build-up on both sides in the direction of great power conflict. Yet, neither side sees it remotely in its self-interest to initiate a violent clash. In short, this is a cold war, but vastly different from the cold war between the United States and the Soviet Union.

China’s cultural genius and geographical capacity surpass that of the Soviet Union. Whereas the northern coastline of the Soviet Union was ice-blocked for much of the year, and historic Russia has been a frigid and insecure land power with few natural frontiers, infusing an all-encompassing and debilitating “cynicism” into its national spirit, as Joseph Conrad observed, China, with a shoreline in the temperate zone extending 9,000 miles along one of the world’s major shipping lanes, constitutes a mineral-rich continent, able to be both a land and sea power. Moreover, China’s 3,500-year-old succession of dynasties, of which Mao Zedong’s is only the most recent, has bequeathed it with a legacy of institutional order and self-confidence appreciably greater than Russia’s. Russia produces few exportable consumer goods, even as China’s fifth-generation mobile network, led by Huawei Technologies, constitutes stiff competition for our own, with a revenue of $122 billion in 2019. There is, too, China’s key role in supply chains for the world’s most desired electronic products; famously the Apple iPhone. There is not the old Soviet Union that could produce hydrogen bombs and little else.

Whereas the original Cold War was principally about gaining an advantage in the game of nuclear annihilation, this cold war will be principally about cyber and computer dominance, ranging from a plethora of consumer products to naval warfare, since naval engagements of the future will be about which side’s intelligent battle system can incapacitate the other’s first. The first Cold War was about bigness: tank battalions and nuclear warheads. This second one will be about microscopic smallness: silicon chips and electronic circuitry.

While the original cold war signaled the apex of the Industrial Age, the U. S.-China cold war heralds the second phase of post-industrial globalization. The globalization which lasted for three decades following the fall of the Berlin Wall had the effect of unifying the globe and creating new middle classes through free trade and the exchange of ideas - from management practices to scientific knowledge. This second phase, more friendly to pessimists, will be about dividing the globe into different political, trade, consumer, and technological domains. After all, globalization was never a conflict-free security order, as originally advertised, but merely a value-neutral, temporary stage of economic development.

In the original Cold War, President Richard Nixon and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger moved closer to Communist China in order to balance against the Soviet Union. This time there is less hope of moving closer to Russia to balance against China, since China and Russia are now allying, rather than on the brink of military conflict with each other as in 1969, two years before Kissinger’s secret trip to Beijing.

But not everything is different than during the first cold war and not everything is harder. Some things are eternal. Diplomacy remains paramount and human rights remain a critical, underappreciated tool of leverage.

Indeed, the original Cold War featured summit meetings, nuclear weapons treaties, hotlines, and the Helsinki human rights process. Precisely because the United States and the Soviet Union could not agree on the question of which side history itself was on, they decided to draw rules and boundaries around their struggle, to keep it from literally going nuclear. However, President Donald Trump has thus far eschewed traditional diplomacy with China in favor of a narrow dialogue over trade. Because Trump has obsessively reduced the U. S.-China cold war to one contentious topic, he has exchanged general confidence building across a range of issues for a zero-sum stare-down on just one issue, thus undermining progress on the South China Sea, the oppression of the Muslim Uighur Turks in western China, and so forth.

The plight of millions of Muslims in Xinjiang Province is instructive. The U. S. Congress is uniting across partisan lines to condemn the Chinese regime’s treatment of this minority. But while a laudable action, it may also be a sterile one, since it will only encourage Beijing to dig in its heels. Given an on-again, off-again trade war coupled with the absence thus far of a general, continuous dialogue between the two adversaries, Congress’s action will appear to President Xi Jinping as just another American assault on China’s legitimacy. After all, while the Muslims in western China represent a human rights issue to us, to the Chinese they represent a strategic issue: because for centuries western China was the weakest and most unstable part of China’s internal empire, and stabilizing it along with China’s other border regions is what gives China the luxury, rare in its history, to concentrate on sea power. Thus, China’s brutal clampdown in Xinjiang and its aggressive naval expansion in the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean are integrally linked.

The benefit of a wide-ranging and confidence-building dialogue with China, of the kind pursued by Washington throughout the middle and latter parts of the Cold War with both Beijing and Moscow, is that a human rights issue like the treatment of the Uigurs can be brought up and discussed, with the possibility of some improvement in the situation that will not be seen as a concession by the Chinese, and not trumpeted as such by us.

Moreover, absent such a sustained, wide-ranging dialogue with Beijing – which to its credit, the Trump Administration is now poised to establish - our posture toward China will gradually assume a purely military aura. This could alienate liberal elites which largely bought into the original Cold War. But an emphasis on human rights and personal freedoms – given  China’s high-tech Orwellian system - will rescue us from this fate. It will also provide an edge in a struggle that will be more difficult than the one against the Soviets - since as technology dominates the new cold war, and, as supply chains decouple, China’s ability to satisfy global consumers will likely be equal to ours.

This second cold war, conducted on a teeming planet whose anxiety is intensified by the passions and rages of social media, is only in its beginning stages. The aim, like in the first Cold War, is negative victory: not defeating the Chinese, but waiting them out, just as we waited the Soviets out: because at some point, as its middle class matures and continues to expand, mainland China may face its own equivalent of the internal upheavals that have roiled Hong Kong, Latin America, and the Middle East.

There are fundamental differences between the two cold wars. But in order to prevail we must concentrate on the similarities: the need for open-ended dialogue and focusing on our strong suit - liberal values in the face of increasingly intrusive technologies. For this cold war could end with echoes of 1989: with one side’s domestic order proving more resilient than the other’s.

Robert D. Kaplan is a managing director for global macro at Eurasia Group. His most recent book is The Return of Marco Polo’s World: War, Strategy, and American Interests in the Twenty-first Century. This first appeared earlier in January 2020.

转：李文亮被训诫书曝光 为众人抱薪者已冻毙于风雨

北京时间，2 月 6 日，因感染新型肺炎，武汉市中心医院医生李文亮抢救无效去世。

李文亮这个名字出现在公众的视野不足一个月。2019年12月30号，李文亮在同学群里提到，“华南水果海鲜市场确诊了7例SARS”“最新消息是冠状病毒感染确定了，正在进行病毒分型”。

2020年1月1日，武汉警方发布通报称，一些网民在不经核实的情况下，在网上发布、转发不实信息，造成不良社会影响。公安机关经调查核实，传唤8名违法人员，并依法进行了处理。两天后，李文亮收到警方的训诫书，警方认定“华南水果海鲜市场确诊了7例SARS”的言论，不属实。

 

湖北，武汉，市中心医院，李文亮医生，已经确认去世了。下图这是他的病房前……他的妻子，在湖北老家，健康没有问题。（记者 李微敖）

1月12日，李文亮因发烧、咳嗽在武汉中心医院呼吸与重症医学科监护室接受隔离治疗。直到2020年的2月 1 日，李文亮才在个人微博公布了确诊感染的消息，“今天核酸检测结果阳性，尘埃落定，终于确诊了”。

这则确诊的消息何尝不是李文亮对自己吹哨人身份的一个自证。

可如今他去世了，身后还有一个也不幸感染的妻子和一个还没出生的孩子。

“那美好的仗我已经打完了，应行的路我已行尽了，当守的道我守住了。 从此以后，有公义的冠冕为你留存。”

蛾摩拉城配不上义人。

再见英雄，为众人抱薪者，已冻毙于风雨。

开心一刻

一青年找禅师诉求：我爱上一个女孩儿， 她有很多优点，也有很多缺点。我希望您能给我指点，让她只有优点没有缺点。

    禅师说：“你能给我找一张只有正面而没有反面的纸吗？”

    青年默默地从兜里掏出一张《人民日报》

    禅师无言以对。

-------------------

不查都是天灾，一查全是人祸； 不查处处鲜花，一查全是豆腐渣； 不查都是中国人，一查全是外国籍； 不查都是孔繁森，一查全是王宝森；不查个个人模人样，一查全都男盗女娼；不查问题都在后三排，一查根子在主席台；不查都为人民服务，一查全被人民服务；

中国人，了不起，汽油—用不起，桥梁—走不起，学校—上不起，生病—看不起，住房—买不起，猪肉—吃不起，房贷—还不起，状子—告不起，官员—惹不起，娃娃—养不起，爱心—伤不起，死了—葬不起。

1、取消交通管制，让官员感受堵车之苦才能真正治堵；2、取消食品特供，让官员品尝有毒食品才有食品安全；3、取消公务员福利分房，让官员体会买房难，民众才能安居乐业；4、取消公车消费，官员才知油价之高养车之难；5、取消高干特护病房，官员才知看病难、看病贵.

检查+罚款=管理；扯皮+刁难=服务；实干+技术=白忙；跳舞+喝酒 =业务；听话+奉承=可靠； 大话+做秀=政绩；送礼+关系=提拔；工龄+造假=职称；文凭+拼爹=招聘；和谐 +赞成=民主；联播+歌声=幸福；卖地+盖楼=财政；套话+瞌睡=开会；造假+蒙骗=经营；截访+维稳=安定；贿赂 +人情=法制…

1.贪官不是群众选举出来的，是上级领导选拔出来的；2.贪官不是反贪局捉出来的，是内部互掐抖出来的；3.贪官不是人民监督出来的，是小偷不慎偷出来的；4.贪官不是纪检审查出来的，是小三争风吃醋闹出来的；5.贪官不是百姓举报出来的，是网上日记不慎自爆出来的。

“组织”就是在你遇到困难时，他说无能为力；在你遇到不公时，他说要正确对待；在你合法权益受到侵害时，他说要顾全大局；在你受到诬陷时，他说你要相信组织；在需要有人做出牺牲时，他说组织考验你的时候到了；当需要有人冲锋陷阵时，他说是你坚强后盾；在你取得成功时，他说是组织培养的。

-----------------------------

《论十大关系》
1、一下台就断了的，是工作关系。
2、死了也断不了的，是亲戚关系。
3、有事才想起的是利用关系。
4、有事没事约吃饭的是朋友关系。
5、有快乐让分享的是患难关系。
6肉包子砸狗的是爷孙关系。
7、蒙蒙胧胧的是初恋关系。
8、担惊受怕的是情人关系。
9、粗茶淡饭的是夫妻关系。
10、经常联系的那可不是一般关系

-------------------------

美国人说：我们上午投票，下午就能公布总统的选举结果了。 

 

中国人说：我们5年前就知道谁是下届主席了。

 

朝鲜人说：我打小就知道我们下届委员长还姓“金”。

 

俄罗斯人笑了：我们的总统当累了当总理，总理当烦了又当总统。

---------------------------------

1.让领导开心，做假！2.让同级开心，做哑！ 3.让群众开心，做秀！4.让老婆开心，做饭！5.让朋友开心，做东！6.让儿女开心，做牛！7.让全家开心，做官！8.让自己开心，做梦！ 

---------------------------------------

美国：富人喜欢到中国领养小孩；
中国：富人喜欢到美国去生小孩。
美国：高工资、低物价;
中国：低工资、高物价。
美国：三亿人口有两亿人口有枪，社会稳定连政府门前都不设岗；
中国：十三亿人口只限军警有枪，老百姓买一把菜刀都要实名制。
美国：在向中国的传统学习；
中国：在向美国的现代学习。
美国：少年运动员业余时间运动；
中国：少年运动员业余时间学习。
美国：市长见了谁都要讨好;
中国：谁见了市长都要讨好。
美国：老百姓可以搞婚外情，当官的不可以；
中国：当官的可以搞婚外情，老百姓搞不起。
美国：公共知识分子以批判政府为使命;
中国：公共知识分子以歌颂政府为使命。
美国：批判政府最厉害的知识分子得大奖;
中国：歌颂政府最厉害的知识分子得大奖。
美国：学校没有政治教育，而精英都很爱国;
中国：学校强调政治教育，但精英纷纷移民。
美国：电台报纸书刊都是民办的，说啥写啥都由人民做主；
中国：电台报纸书刊都是党办的，说啥写啥都由党来审定。
美国：国穷民富，政府宁愿借中国的巨款，也要去保民生的福利;
中国：国富民穷，政府宁愿牺牲民生，也要去买美国的贬值国债！
美国政府：外悍内善，对哪个国家都不怕得罪，只是怕得罪本国人民;
中国政府：外善内悍，对哪个国家都不想得罪，就不怕得罪本国百姓！！
中美的区别——剖析的真是精辟！

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赵本山：请听题，世界上毕业生犯罪率最高的学校是哪一所?
范伟：职业技术学校
高秀敏：错！ 中央党校.
赵本山：请听题，中国当官要精通哪四种语言？
范伟：英语、法语、俄语和日语。
高秀敏：错！假话、空话、大话和套话。
赵本山：请听题，什么东西要藏起来暗地里用，用完之后再暗地里交给别人?
范伟：照相底片。
高秀敏：错，是潜规则。
赵本山：听题，边做假药广告、边说假药效果、边痛斥假药危害的是什么？
范伟：江湖骗子。
高秀敏：错，是CCTV。
赵本山：请听题，你只有10平米的房屋，邻居从0平米换到100平米，你的居住面积有没有增加？
范伟：没有。
高秀敏：错，你在平均住房面积里被增加了45平米。
赵本山：请听题，一个永远要你对她负责而她却不对你负责的是谁？
范伟：二奶。
高秀敏：错！是银行。
赵本山：请听题，从小就听说有，但你现在一直没有见过的是什么？
范伟：鬼。
高秀敏：错！是共产主义社会。
赵本山：请听题，外面看着豪华、干净 ，实则是宽衣解带、藏污纳垢的地方，这是哪里？
范伟：公厕。
高秀敏：错！是演艺圈。
赵本山：请听题，刚被人打了一棒，马上潜入水中，过一会在不远处穿着马甲又探出头来的是什么？
范伟：乌龟。
高秀敏：错！是免职官员。
赵本山：请听题，“中国城市环境污染不是由汽车造成的，而是由自行车造成的。自行车的污染比汽车更大”。这句话谁说的？
范伟：精神病人。
高秀敏：错！是中国专家。
赵本山：请听题，有一个人经常要代表你说话，但你从来没有见过面，为什么？
范伟：是私生子他亲爹。
高秀敏：错！是人大代表，不认识你也要代表你

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转：许章润教授发文：愤怒的人民已不再恐惧

二月。墨水足够用来痛哭，

大放悲声抒写二月，

一直到轰响的泥泞，

燃起黑色的春天。

——帕斯捷尔纳克

豕鼠交替之际，九衢首疫，举国大疫，一时间神州肃杀，人心惶惶。公权进退失据，致使小民遭殃，疫疠散布全球，中国渐成世界孤岛。此前三十多年“改革开放”辛苦积攒的开放性状态，至此几乎毁于一旦，一巴掌把中国尤其是它的国家治理打回前现代状态。而断路封门，夹杂着不断发生的野蛮人道灾难，迹近中世纪。原因则在于当轴上下，起则钳口而瞒骗，继则诿责却邀功，眼睁睁错过防治窗口。垄断一切、定于一尊的“组织性失序”和只对上负责的“制度性无能”，特别是孜孜于“保江山”的一己之私而置亿万国民于水火的政体“道德性败坏”，致使人祸大于天灾，在将政体的德性窳败暴露无遗之际，抖露了前所未有的体制性虚弱。至此，人祸之灾，于当今中国伦理、政治、社会与经济，甚于一场全面战争。再说一遍，甚于一场全面战争。此可谓外寇未逞其志，而家贼先祸其国。老美或有打击中国经济之思，不料当轴急先锋也。尤其是疫疠猖獗当口，所谓“亲自”云云，心口不一，无耻之尤，更令国人愤慨，民心丧尽。

是的，国民的愤怒已如火山喷发，而愤怒的人民将不再恐惧。至此，放眼世界体系，揆诸全球政治周期，综理戊戌以来的国情进展，概略下述九项，兹此敬呈国人。

首先，政治败坏，政体德性罄尽。保家业、坐江山，构成了这一政体及其层峰思维的核心，开口闭口的“人民群众”不过是搜刮的税收单位，数目字管理下的维稳对象和“必要代价”，供养着维续这个极权政体的大小无数蝗虫。公权上下隐瞒疫情，一再延宕，只为了那个围绕着“核心”的灯红酒绿、歌舞升平，说明心中根本就无生民无辜、而人命关天之理念，亦无全球体系中休戚相关之概念。待到事发，既丢人现眼，更天良丧尽，遭殃的是小民百姓。权力核心仍在，而低效与乱象并生，尤其是网警效命恶政，动如鹰犬，加班加点封锁信息，而信息不胫而走，说明特务政治临朝，国安委变成最具强力部门，虽无以复加，却已然前现代，有用复无用矣。其实，老祖宗早已明言，防民之口甚于防川，哪怕网信办再有能耐，也对付不了十四万万张嘴，古人岂余欺哉!盖因一切围绕江山打转，自以为权力无所不能，沉迷于所谓“领袖”之自欺，而终究欺瞒不住。大疫当前，却又毫无领袖德识，捉襟见肘，累死前方将士，祸殃亿万民众，却还在那里空喊政治口号，这个那个，煞有介事，令国人齿冷，让万方见笑。此亦非他，乃政体之“道德性败坏”也。若说七十年里连绵灾难早已晓瑜万众极权之恶，则此番大疫，更将此昭显无遗。惟盼吾族亿万同胞，老少爷们，长记性，少奴性，在一切公共事务上运用自己的理性，不要再为极权殉葬。否则，韭菜们，永难得救。

其次，僭主政治下，政制溃败，三十多年的技术官僚体系终结。曾几何时，在道德动机和利益动机双重驱动下，一大批技术官僚型干才上阵，而终究形成了一种虽不理想、弊端重重、但却于特定时段顶事儿的技术官僚体系。其间一大原因，就在于挂钩于职位升迁的政绩追求，激发了贫寒子弟入第后的献身冲动。至于乘势而上的红二们，从来尸位素餐，酒囊饭袋，成事不足败事有余，在此不论。可惜，随着最近几年的不断整肃，红色江山老调重弹，只用听话的，自家的，其结果，技术官僚体系的德性与干才，其基于政绩升迁的那点儿冲动，不知不觉，乃消失殆尽。尤其是所谓“红色基因”的自家人判准及其圈定，让天下寒心而灰心，进而，离德离心。于是，这便出现了官场上普遍平庸而萎顿委琐之态。鄂省乱象，群魔乱舞，不过一隅，其实省省如此，举朝如此矣。其间原因，就在于这个后领袖时代，领袖制本身就在摧毁治理结构，口言现代治理却使整个国家治理陷入无结构性之窘境。此间症状，正为“组织性失序”和“制度性无能”。君不见，惟一人马首是瞻，而一人暝朦，治国无道，为政无方，却弄权有术，遂举国遭罪。百官无所适从，善者只堪支应，想做事而不敢做事，恶者混水摸鱼，不做事却还搅事，甚而火中取栗，遂劣胜优汰，一团乱象矣。

再次，内政治理全面隳颓。由此急转直下，遂表现为下述两方面。一方面，经济下滑已成定势，今年势必雪上加霜，为“风波”以来所未有，将“组织性失序”和“制度性无能”推展至极。至于举国信心下跌、产权恐惧、政学愤懑、社会萎缩、文化出版萧条，惟剩狗屁红歌红剧，以及无耻文痞歌功颂德之肉麻兮兮，早成事实。而最为扼腕之处，则为对于港台形势之误判，尤其是拒不兑现基本法的普选承诺，着着臭棋，致使政治公信力跌至谷底，导致中国最为富庶文明之地的民众之离心离德，令世界看清这一政体的无赖嘴脸。那边厢，中美关系失序，而基于超级大国没有纯粹内政的定律，这是关乎国运之荦荦大端。恰恰在此，当轴颟顸，再加上碰到个大洋国的特没谱，遂一塌糊涂。网议“帝国主义亡我之心不死”，想做而没做成的事，却让他做成了，岂只调侃，而实锥心疼痛也哉。另一方面，几年来公权加紧限制与摧毁社会发育，钳口日甚，导致社会预警机制疲弱乃至于丧失，遇有大疫，便从封口而封城，死心复死人矣。因而，不难理解的是，与此相伴而来的，便是政治市侩主义与庸俗实用主义蔓延政治，无以复加，表明作为特殊时段的特殊现象登场的“知青政治”，早已德识俱亡。可以说，上上下下，他们是四十年来最为不堪的一届领导。因而，此时此刻，兑现《宪法》第35条，解除报禁，解除对于网络的特务式管控，实现公民言论自由和良心自由，坐实公民游行示威和包括结社在内的各项自组织权利，尊重全体国民的普遍人权，特别是政治普选的权利，而且，对于病毒的来源、隐瞒疫情的责任人及其体制性根源，启动独立追责机制，才是“战后重建”之大道，也是当务之急也。

复次，内廷政治登场。几年来的集权行动，党政一体之加剧，特别是以党代政，如前所述，几乎将官僚体制瘫痪。动机既靡，尾大不掉，遂以纪检监察为鞭，抽打这个机体卖命，维续其等因奉此，逶迤着拖下去。而因言论自由和现代文官体制阙如，更无所谓“国王忠诚的反对者”在场，鞭子本身亦且不受督约，复以国安委一统辖制下更为严厉之铁腕统领，最后层层归属，上统于一人。而一人肉身凡胎，不敷其用，党国体制下又无分权制衡体制来分责合力，遂聚亲信合议。于是，内廷生焉。说句大白话，就是 “集体领导”分解为“九龙治水”式寡头政制失效、相权衰落之际，领袖之小圈子成为“国中之国”，一个类似于老美感喟的隐形结构。揆诸既往，“1949政体”常态之下，官僚体系负责行政，纵便毛时代亦且容忍周相一亩三分地。“革委会”与“人保组”之出现，打散这一结构，终至不可维持。晚近四十年里，多数时候“君相”大致平衡，党政一体而借行政落实党旨。只是到了这几年，方始出现这一最为封闭无能、阴鸷森森之内廷政治，而彻底堵塞了重建常态政治之可能性也。一旦进路闭锁，彼此皆无退路，则形势紧绷，大家都做不了事，只能眼睁睁看着情形恶化，终至不可收拾之境。置此情形下，经济社会早已遭受重创，风雨飘摇于世俗化进程中的伦理社会不堪托付，市民社会羸弱兮兮，公民社会根本就不存在，至于最高境界的政治社会连个影子都没有，则一旦风吹草动，大灾来临，自救无力，他救受阻，必致祸殃。此番江夏之乱，现象在下，而根子在上，在于这个孜孜于“保江山，坐江山”，而非立定于人民主权、“以文明立国，以自由立国”的体制本身。结果，其情其形，恰如网议之“集中力量办大事”，顿时变成了“集中力量惹大事”。江夏大疫，再次佐证而已矣。

第五，以“大数据极权主义”及其“微信恐怖主义”治国驭民。过往三十多年，在底色不变的前提下，官方意识形态口径经历了从“振兴中华”的民族主义和“四化”的富强追求，到“三个代表”和“新三民主义”，再至“新时代”云云的第次转折。就其品质而言，总体趋势是先升后降，到达“三个代表”抛物线顶端后一路下走，直至走到此刻一意赤裸裸“保江山”的“大数据极权主义”。相应的，看似自毛式极权向威权过渡的趋势，在“奥运”后亦且止住，而反转向毛氏极权回归，尤以晚近六年之加速为甚。因其动用奠立于无度财政汲取的科技手段，这便形成了“1984”式“大数据极权主义”。缘此而来，其“微信恐怖主义”直接针对亿万国民，用纳税人的血汗豢养着海量网警，监控国民的一言一行，堪为这个体制直接对付国民的毒瘤。而动辄停号封号，大面积封群，甚至动用治安武力，导致人人自危，在被迫自我审查之际，为可能降临的莫名处罚担忧。由此窒息了一切公共讨论的思想生机，也扼杀了原本应当存在的社会传播与预警机制。由此，“基于法西斯主义的军功僭主政治”渐次成型，却又日益表现出“组织性失序”和“制度性无能”，其非结构性与解结构性。职是之故，不难理解，面对大疫，无所不能的极权统治在赳赳君临一切的同时，恰恰于国家治理方面居然捉襟见肘，制造大国一时间口罩难求。那江夏城内，鄂省全境，至今尚有无数未曾收治、求医无门、辗转哀嚎的患者，还不知有多少因此而命丧黄泉者，将此无所不能与一无所能，暴露得淋漓尽致。盖因排除社会与民间，斩断一切信息来源，只允许党媒宣传，这个国家永远是跛脚巨人，如果确为巨人的话。

第六，底牌亮出，锁闭一切改良的可能性。换言之，所谓的“改革开放”死翘翘了。从2018年底之“该改的”、“不该改的”与“坚决不改”云云，至去秋十九届四中全会公报之诸般宣示，可得断言者，中国近代史上的第三波“改革开放”，终于寿终正寝。其实，这一死亡过程至少起自六年前，只不过至此算是明示无误而已。回头一望，二十世纪全球史上，但凡右翼极权政治，迫于压力，皆有自我转型的可能性，而无需诉诸大规模流血。纵便是“苏东波”，尤其是东欧共产诸国等红色极权政体，居然亦且和平过渡，令人诧异而欣慰。但吾国刻下，当局既将路径锁闭，则和平过渡是否可能，顿成疑问。若果如此，则“兴，百姓苦;亡，百姓苦”，夫复何言!但愿此番大疫过后，全民反省，举国自觉，看看尚能重启“第四波改革开放”否!?

第七，由此顺流直下，中国再度孤立于世界体系，已成定局。百多年里，对于这个起自近代地中海文明、盛极于大西洋文明的现代世界体系，中国上演了多场“抗拒”与“顺从”的拉锯战，反反复复，跌跌撞撞。晚近三十多年里，痛定思痛，“低头致意”以及“迎头赶上”，乃至于“别开生面”，蔚为主流。惜乎近年再度犯二，犯横，表明“改开”走到头了，左翼极权“退无可退”，无法于和平过渡中完成自我转型，因而，也就怪异于现代世界体系。虽则如此，总体而言，几番拉锯下来，中国以其浩瀚体量与开放性态度，终于再度跻身现代世界体系，成为这个体系的重要博弈者，重新诠释着所谓“中心—边缘”的地缘叙事，也是事实。但是，与国力和时势不相匹配、太过张扬的外向型国策，尤其是内政回头，日益“法西斯化”，引发这个体系中的其他博弈者对于红色帝国崛起的戒慎戒惧，导致在高喊“人类命运共同体”之际却为共同体所实际拒斥的悲剧，而日呈孤立之势，更是眼面前的事实。事情很复杂而道理却很简单，一个不能善待自己国民的政权，怎能善待世界;一个不肯融入现代政治文明体系中的国族，你让人怎么跟你共同体嘛!故尔，经济层面的交通互存还将继续存在，而文明共同体意义上的孤立却已成事实。此非文化战争，亦非通常所谓“文明冲突”一词所能打发，更非迄今一时间数十个国家对中国实施旅行禁限，以及世界范围的厌华、拒华与贬华氛围之悄悄潮涨这么简单。——在此可得提示者，隐蔽的“黄祸”意识势必顺势冒头，而买单承受歧视与隔离之痛的只会是我华族同胞，而非权贵——毋宁，关乎对于历经磨难方始凝练而成的现代世界普世价值的顺逆从违，而牵扯到置身列国体系的条约秩序之中，吾国吾族如何生存的生命意志及其国族哲学，其取舍，其从违。在此，顺昌逆亡，则所谓孤立者，全球现代政治文明版图上之形单影只、孤家寡人也。扭转这一局面，重建负责任大国形象，担负起应担之责，而首先自良善内政起始，必然且只能皈依人类普世文明大道，特别是要坐实“主权在民”这一立国之本。在此，内政，还是内政，一种“立宪民主，人民共和”的良善政体及其有效治理，才是摆脱孤立、自立于世界体系的大经大法，而为国族生存与昌盛之康庄大道也。那时节，顺时应势，中国加入G7 而成G8，亦且并非不可想象者也。

第八，人民已不再恐惧。而说一千道一万，就在于生计多艰、历经忧患的亿万民众，多少年里被折腾得一佛升天二佛出世的“我们人民”，早已不再相信权力的神话，更不会将好不容易获得的那一丝丝市民自由与三餐温饱的底线生计，俯首帖耳地交还给僭主政制，任凭他们生杀予夺。毋宁，尤其是经此大疫，人民怒了，不干了。他们目睹了欺瞒疫情不顾生民安危的刻薄寡恩，他们身受着为了歌舞升平而视民众为刍狗的深重代价，他们更亲历了无数生命在分分钟倒下，却还在封号钳口、开发感动、歌功颂德的无耻荒唐。一句话，“我不相信”，老子不干了。若说人心看不见摸不着，最最无用，似乎经验世界早已对此佐证再三，也不无道理。这不，万民皆曰可杀，他却坐享天年，如那个人人唾骂之李大鸟者，令人感慨天不长眼，天道不公，可实际上，天是苦难本身，与我们一同受罪。但是，假如说人之为人，就在于人人胸腔里跳动着一颗人心，而非狼心狗肺，其因生老病死而悲欣交集，其因祸福义利而恨爱交加，其因落花而落泪、流水而伤怀，则人心所向，披荆斩棘，摧枯拉朽矣!人心丧尽之际，便是末日到来之时!至于脑残与岁月静好婊们，一群乌合之众，历史从来不是他们抒写的，更不因他们而改变奔流的航道，同样证之于史，不予欺也。

第九，败象已现，倒计时开始，立宪时刻将至。戊戌修宪，开启邪恶之门，集权登顶之际，恰恰是情势反转之时。自此一路狂奔倒退，终至败象连连。撇开人心已丧不论，则前文叙及之港台应对失策与中美关系失序，以及经济下滑之不可遏止、全球孤立，表明治理失败，违忤现代政治常识的强人政治事与愿违。大家面对闷局而恐惧其已成僵局，苦思焦虑其开局与再布局，期期于内部生变式与自下而上式之破局犹如水中捞月之时，港台形势发展实已自边缘捅破铁桶，而开辟出一线生机。此种自边缘破局、而渐进于中心的和平过渡之道，或许，将成为中国式大转型的收束进路。此时，吾友所说之“难城”，或为华夏旧邦新命之耶路撒冷。换言之，边缘突破意味着现代中国的立宪时刻再度即将降临。当此关口，天欲晓，将明未明，强权抱残守缺，不肯服膺民意，则崇高之门既已打开，可得预言者，必有大量身影倒毙于黎明前矣。

以上九点，呈诸国民，均为常识。而一再申说，就在于国家治理未入常态政治轨道，国族政治文明有待现代转型，而于积善前行中，期期以“立宪民主，人民共和”收束这波已然延续一个半世纪的文明大转型。正是在此，我们，“我们人民”，岂能“豬一般的苟且，狗一樣的奴媚，蛆蟲似的卑污”?!

行文至此，回瞰身后，戊戌以来，在下因言获罪，降级停职，留校察看，行止困限。此番作文，预感必有新罚降身，抑或竟为笔者此生最后一文，亦未可知。但大疫当前，前有沟壑，则言责在身，不可推诿，无所逃遁。否则，不如杀猪卖肉。是的，义愤，如西哲所言，正是义愤，惟义与愤所在，惟吾土先贤揭橥之仁与义这一 “人心人路”之激荡，令书斋学者成为知识分子，直至把性命搭进去。毕竟，自由，一种超验存在和行动指归，一种最具神性的世界现象，是人之为人的禀赋，华夏儿女不能例外。而世界精神，那个地上的神，不是别的，就是自由理念的绚烂展开。如此，朋友，我的亿万同胞，纵然火湖在前，何所惧哉!

脚下的这片大地啊，你深情而寡恩，少福却多难。你一点点耗尽我们的耐心，你一寸寸斫丧我们的尊严。我不知道该诅咒你，还是必须礼赞你，但我知道，我分明痛切地知道，一提起你，我就止不住泪溢双眼，心揪得痛。是啊，是啊，如诗人所咏，“我不要温和地走进那个良夜，老年应当在日暮时燃烧咆哮;怒斥，怒斥那光明的消逝。”因而，书生无用，一声长叹，只能执笔为剑，讨公道，求正义。置此大疫，睹此乱象，愿我同胞，十四万万兄弟姐妹，我们这些永远无法逃离这片大地的亿万生民，人人向不义咆哮，个个为正义将生命怒燃，刺破夜瘴迎接黎明，齐齐用力、用心、用命，拥抱那终将降临这片大地的自由的太阳!

庚子正月初四初稿，初九定稿，窗外突降大雪