Thursday, February 4, 2021

With the People’s Republic of China, Don’t Trust, Because You Can’t Verify

Therese Shaheen Thu, February 4, 2021, 3:30 AM 

 In the Time magazine list of the Top 100 Most Influential People for 2017, People’s Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping was described as “forever the iconoclast breaking the mold.” The write-up pointed out “the potential that one day we might look back and say that Xi’s time at the helm marked the inflection point for his country and his people.” 

 The essay’s author was former secretary of state John Kerry, now back in government as the Biden administration climate czar. (More on that later.) Kerry was right in his assessment of Xi, if perhaps not in the way he intended. The Xi era has been “an inflection point” in that it has ushered in a clear consensus that — contrary to the prevailing view prior to Xi — China will not become freer as it becomes richer. There is growing general acceptance in both public and elite opinion that the PRC is a competitor and adversary. 

 The hope that China, as it developed economically, would glide into democratic-capitalist norms guided the policy of every U.S. administration since President Carter granted U.S. diplomatic recognition to the PRC in 1979. The approach was based on the belief that Deng Xiaoping, who had consolidated his power by 1978, at heart was a market-driven reformer and that political liberalization would follow market liberalization. 

 That has not happened. That this approach was erroneous is now accepted by Democrats and Republicans, by elected officials on both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue, and by U.S. allies across Asia and Europe. - ADVERTISEMENT - Even more remarkable than the acknowledgement that the policy was wrong — something policy-makers and politicians don’t like to admit, even in hindsight — is the increasingly popular view that not only were assumptions about Communist China and regime intent wrong, but also that there was enough evidence for successive administrations after Carter’s to have known at the time that they were on the wrong track. 

 There were certainly American analysts and policy-makers whose service in earlier administrations reflected a more accurate assessment of Beijing’s true intentions. But the typical reaction to that minority view tended to be derision at the “failure” of those analysts to understand the more nuanced, artful statecraft of the people executing the broader policy. 

 But today, there is broader acceptance of the view that Deng and his successors prior to Xi weren’t reformers, and that we had ample evidence of this then. Of course, Deng showed this as early as 1989, in the Tiananmen massacre. But there were other signals. Over time, as China emerged from its economic and political isolation, increasingly the world observed opaqueness in defense spending, the involvement of the People’s Liberation Army in every aspect of the Chinese economy, ever more aggressive subversion of democratic Taiwan, a growing global network of propaganda and influence operations, and deliberate undermining of international institutions including the WTO, the World Health Organization, and others. These actions are not the inventions of the Xi regime; they were on display with increasing clarity over many years during previous regimes. 

 Even so, there is no time for recriminations about “who lost China?” The point is that Communist China was never “winnable.” That there is agreement about this now is sound basis for current and future policy. What is most important is that we not let the self-delusion happen again. Of course, Xi makes it easier to avoid that because his intentions are so obvious. What is hard to understand about a million Chinese Muslims in concentration camps? About the militarization of man-made islands dotting the South China Sea and violating the sovereignty of multiple neighboring countries? About military incursions into Taiwan’s internationally recognized air-defense zones? About arresting democratic politicians and journalists in Hong Kong? 

 And yet there is still a tendency to simply take the Communist regime at its word in its intentions and declarations. Media and others tend to blithely accept, for instance, China’s obviously cooked books concerning economic growth. Time reported with confidence in January that “China’s Economy Grew in 2020 Amid the Global Pandemic as U.S. and Others Floundered.” The PRC claims the economy grew 2.3 percent even as the U.S., Japan, and the major economies of Europe likely all shrank. 

 Derek Scissors, chief economist of the authoritative China Beige Book, has concluded that China’s economy also probably shrank in 2020. In a paper for the American Enterprise Institute, Scissors writes that it is China’s own data in other areas that give the lie to its fantastic claims of economic growth in a pandemic-seized global economy that was one of the worst in history. Scissors points to double-digit declines in fixed investment, retail sales, net exports, and other accounts in first-quarter 2020, yet GDP decline was a mere 3.3 percent. He concludes that the positive “GDP figure only made sense if the rest didn’t.” His analysis points to several other hard-to-reconcile apparent facts to bolster his conclusion about the full year. Despite such analysis, the financial press, Wall Street analysts, and elected officials simply repeat what the government in Beijing wants them to believe: that China grew in 2020. 

 The same is true about China’s role in the pandemic itself. Much like financial reporting of dubious economic-growth statistics, China’s reported pandemic case counts deserve scrutiny. The Johns Hopkins COVID-19 tracker has the PRC, with a population of 1.4 billion, having experienced 100,000 cases, fewer than Bahrain, with 1/1,000th the population. At 4,800 deaths, the PRC — where the virus originated — reportedly has experienced fewer deaths than in the U.S. state of Connecticut (3.56 million population). Of course, the truth is impossible to know, so we simply report implausible Chinese official data. It has been well-documented by citizen-journalists and others that China seriously repressed reporting about the virus in November and December 2019, well before the world was aware of the problem. Doctors were censored in filing reports about a new and uncertain flu-like virus they were seeing in patients. It has now been established that the official statistics the country released well into 2020 were off by as much as 100 percent. 

 If the Communist government were confident in its current reporting, why has it strong-armed attempts by the World Health Organization and countries in that body to seek transparency about the origin and handling of the outbreak? Foreign journalists have limited access, and citizen-journalists continue to be harassed. In December 2020, Zhang Zahn drew a four-year prison sentence after a three-hour trial for her reporting about what was happening in Wuhan around the time of the outbreak, which was not the model of public health or virus eradication that the Communist government had presented to the rest of the world. Zhang was convicted for “picking quarrels and provoking trouble.” There obviously is ample indication that — despite the world’s apparent belief that “the China model” has dealt with the virus — the truth on the ground is quite different. 

 Which brings us back to the Biden administration, now the steward of U.S. China policy in the era of “we know what we got wrong, so let’s not repeat that.” The administration assumes office as the PRC continues to obfuscate about the global pandemic, and against a backdrop that we now understand how prevailing beliefs about the PRC were wrong for most of the past 40 years. Resisting China’s outlandish claims in every area of engagement is important in setting the right basis for the engagement the administration says it wants with the PRC. 

 The Biden team is off to a good start by recognizing the challenge, as expressed in the declarations of its foreign-policy team and as has been reported in these pages by Jimmy Quinn. In his Senate confirmation hearing, Secretary of State Antony Blinken seemed to acknowledge how wrong the foreign-policy community got the PRC over many preceding decades. He also indicated that he recognizes how China projects a façade of strength when, as he put it, “my own conviction is that there are many apparent weaknesses that China continues to hide when projecting its model.” 

 Blinken rightly believes that “China poses no doubt the most significant challenge of any nation state to the U.S.” He said it is his intention, as the chief architect of the Biden foreign policy, to approach the U.S.–China relationship from a position of strength. 

 To do so, he should proceed on the basis of the following precepts: 

 1) Xi and his Communist Party cohorts will repeat the boldest of lies for as long as the world repeats them. 

 2) Everything the foreign-policy establishment believed about China for 40 years turned out to be wrong, and that was knowable at the time. So let’s not do that again. 

 Blinken should appreciate each of these premises from firsthand experience. He was a senior Obama foreign-policy official at the National Security Council and State Department when, to take just one example, Xi Jinping was lying to President Obama about his pledge never to militarize the man-made islands in the South China Sea — which, of course, are now Chinese military installations. 

 Still, the administration will want much from China. Whether it is the most immediate priority, it is clear that climate change will be a first-tier platform for China engagement in the Biden administration. John Kerry will work hard for China’s cooperation in helping move the world toward the Paris Climate Accord target of net-zero greenhouse-gas emissions by 2050. Here, too, we see on full display the PRC tendency to promise everything because the West will believe anything. The green world swooned last September when Xi declared at the U.N. General Assembly that the PRC would be “carbon-neutral” by 2060. In an analysis by The Economist, the claim seems to be of a piece with China’s claims about GDP growth, about COVID eradication, and much else. Beijing seems to believe that it can get by with its customary mix of opacity, Western gullibility, lack of verifiable data, and outright falsehoods 

 When it comes to emissions reductions, The Economist compares the experience in the EU, which is on path to nearly halving its emissions by 2030 from their peak level in 1990. China would have to double that rate of reduction in just 30 years to meet its declared goal — though the PRC last year built 60 percent of the world’s coal-fired power plants. Just like Beijing’s economic-growth statistics, the numbers don’t add up, and they never will. If Kerry and his team think they will be getting honesty and straight talk from the PRC, particularly if it involves trade-offs in other areas — U.S. support for Taiwan or ignoring the PRCs human-rights atrocities — then we will soon find ourselves on the path to repeating our mistake of believing China when we know in real time that we should not. 

 The Biden team seems to believe that it can maintain a relatively hard line on China and at the same time “engage” Beijing to reach mutually agreeable goals. It remains to be seen if that can be done. Ronald Reagan, when faced with a determined adversary that declared it was going to reform according to market forces, said that the United States would “trust but verify” Gorbachav’s perestroika policies. 

 But the Cold War was quite different from what we face today. Much of U.S.–USSR interactions were based on state-to-state treaties that codified the standoff and permitted intrusive verification. Those mechanisms are unavailable to Biden and his team as they seek to engage the Communist government in Beijing. To sift through Beijing’s bogus claims in everything from economic growth to pandemic response and climate talks, the Biden mantra should be “distrust, because you can’t verify.” Doing so will help prevent analysts 40 years from now from concluding that not only were the policies of today wrong, but also that those making the policies knew they were wrong the whole time.

Tuesday, February 2, 2021

Containing China is not a feasible option

Comment by the editor: Is containing China a feasible option? The author of this article argues it is not, simply because China is too big, too powerful and too important. The editor does not agree, and just on the contrary, it is exactly because it is too big and too powerful, now is more important than ever before to start to contain it. It is not an option, it is a necessity. If we still want our way of living, there is no choice. Communism, just like Nazism, is a cancer. It is growing big, it is growing powerful, but it just means it will cause more trouble down the road, you can not choose to live with cancer, can you? So when it is still not too late, let us get united and get rid of the cancer. Just like in the Lord of the Rings, the dark lord Sauron is surely big, powerful, with great strength no one can match, but when united,  the Elves, the Dwarves, and Men did defeat him, didn't they? United, there is nothing we can not achieve. 

How should the United States react to the rise of China? This is one of the biggest questions facing the new American administration. Many Americans say some form of containment is possible. Indeed, this is one of the few points on which the administration of Joe Biden and his predecessor tend to agree. We can also see the political advantage: common enemies can unify a divided country. But is this really an achievable policy? I believe the answer is: no.

Such an essentially null vision of the US-China relationship is contained in The world upside down by Clyde Prestowitz. He insists that: “There is no dispute between the Chinese people and the people of the United States.” His objection is directed rather to the Communist Party. A similar vision infuses The longer telegram: towards a new American strategy for China, written by an anonymous “former senior government official” (referring to George Kennan’s long telegram of February 1946, which proposed to contain the Soviet Union). It also states that: “The most important challenge facing the United States in the 21st century is the rise of an increasingly authoritarian China under the presidency. . . Xi Jinping. “The challenge, he asserts, is not China but its despotic state.

I sympathize with the anxiety that pervades these posts. China’s actions in Xinjiang and Hong Kong underscore its disregard for human rights and international agreements. Beijing threatens Taiwan’s de facto autonomy and extends its hold over the South China Sea. In short, China is behaving more and more like a great rising power led by a ruthless and efficient despot.

The Longer telegram argues that the threat of China’s attempt to achieve world domination must be met by defending a long list of vital US interests: the maintenance of collective economic and technological superiority; protect the global status of the US dollar; maintain overwhelming military deterrence; prevent Chinese territorial expansion, especially forced reunification with Taiwan; consolidate and expand alliances and partnerships; and defend (and, if necessary, reform) the liberal rules-based international order. Yet simultaneously, the document calls for addressing common global threats, including climate change.

Is all this achievable? No, I do not think so.

First, China is a much more powerful adversary than the Soviet Union. It has a much more prosperous economy, a more vibrant technological sector, a much larger population, a more cohesive political system, and a much more competent government. China’s relative economic performance is astounding.

More importantly is its potential. China faces enormous economic challenges. But you don’t have to manage them well to have the largest economy in the world. At present, China’s per capita output (at purchasing power parity) is one-third that of the United States (up from 8 percent in 2000) and half that of the EU. Suppose this is only half of the US level by 2050. China’s economy would then be as large as those of the US and the EU together.

Second, the Chinese economy is highly integrated internationally. While this is a source of vulnerability for China, it is also a source of influence. The Chinese market exerts a magnetic attraction on a multitude of countries around the world. As Singaporean researcher Kishore Mahbubani points out, most countries want good relations with the United States and China. They will not be happy to choose the United States over China.

Finally, over the past two decades, and especially the past four years, the United States has devastated its reputation for common sense, decency, reliability, and even adherence to basic democratic standards. This matters, because his allies will be crucial in the envisaged combat. As Jonathan Kirshner states in Foreign Affairs, “The world cannot ignore the Trump presidency,” especially its shameful end. Worse yet, this aspect of the United States is clearly still alive. The United States used to talk about the need for China to be a “responsible stakeholder”. But after the pride of the “unipolar moment”, the war in Iraq, the financial crisis and the presidency of Donald Trump, is the United States a responsible actor?

This is not intended to advise despair. It is recognizing reality. So what can we do?

First, the United States and its allies must revitalize their democracies and economies. On the latter, they must indeed protect their technological autonomy. But the most important way to do this is to revitalize their scientific and technological infrastructure, including by renovating education and encouraging the immigration of talented people.

Second, they must defend the core values ​​of adherence to the truth and freedom of expression against all enemies, domestic and foreign (including China). They must also unite to do this. China should not be allowed to go after small countries and intimidate them one by one.

Third, they must renovate the institutions of the world economy they have created and come up with new multilateral rules that bind China’s behavior and by which they too will be bound.

Fourth, the United States and its allies must clarify which fundamental interests they will defend, if necessary by force.

Last but not least, they must focus their attention, as Mr. Biden has now done, on the common project of protecting the global commons for all of us.

The relationship of the United States with China is not like that with the Soviet Union. Yes, there will be a lot of competition, but there must also be deep cooperation. To the extent that there is a war of ideologies, the freedom and democracy of the West remain more attractive. The real challenge they face is not China, but the restoration of these values ​​at home.

Monday, February 1, 2021

Trump's trade war on China was a failure in every possible way

comment by Iforg: trade war may not achieve its economic goal, but politically, it did make people aware of the unfair trading reality caused by the Chinese government, subsidy, IP theft, trading barrier, etc...

 

The Biden administration plans to review the phase one U.S.-China trade deal, White House press secretary Jen Psaki said on Friday. Based on publicly available data, it's hard to imagine they'll find anything other than a debacle.

Driving the news: China isn't even close to fulfilling its end of the deal — having come up 42% short of its commitment, Chad Bown, a fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, reported late last week.

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  • The phase one deal was meant to be the Trump administration's reward for U.S. farmers, manufacturers and other business owners who had been bludgeoned by Trump's tax on American businesses via the trade war's tariffs.

What was supposed to happen: The trade war was billed as a plan to bring China to its knees by choking off the all-important American market with 25% tariffs on many imports that would rein in the U.S. trade deficit, boost American exports and slow China's rise as a global superpower.

What really happened: "The trade war with China hurt the US economy and failed to achieve major policy goals," a recent study commissioned by the U.S.-China Business Council argues, finding that the trade war reduced economic growth and cost the U.S. 245,000 jobs.

  • Last year, the U.S. trade deficit widened to its largest on record. In the fourth quarter, the U.S. goods trade deficit hit its highest share of GDP since 2012 and the U.S. current account deficit jumped to its highest level in more than 12 years in the third quarter.

  • Foreign direct investment to the U.S. fell 49% in 2020 — outpacing the overall global decrease of 42%.

  • These trends had all been moving in this direction since 2017, and were accelerated by the coronavirus pandemic as Trump refused to remove tariffs despite their strain on businesses.

The big picture: "The tariffs forced American companies to accept lower profit margins, cut wages and jobs for U.S. workers, defer potential wage hikes or expansions, and raise prices for American consumers or companies," analysts at Brookings noted in August.

The other side: China's trade surplus last year hit a record $535 billion, up 27% from 2019. Exports rose 21.1% in dollar terms in November year over year and 18.1% in December from a year earlier, touching an all-time high.

  • For the full year, the trade surplus with the U.S. was $317 billion, 7% higher than in 2019.

  • Foreign direct investment to China rose 4% to $163 billion.

Reproduced from Peterson Institute for International Economics; Chart: Axios Visuals

Most economists agree that trade deficits don't actually hurt an economy. And while the U.S. trade deficit with China did decrease somewhat during Trump's time in office, the deficit increased with other countries and overall.

  • Meanwhile, China's trade surplus and its trade with other countries increased.

The bottom line: In addition to hurting U.S. businesses and workers, tariffs also drive up prices, and inflation expectations are starting to rise.

  • The U.S. current account deficit also is helping further weigh down the value of the dollar, economists say, another factor that could boost inflation.

  • Manufacturers, including Whirlpool and Polaris, have recently said they are struggling to meet consumer demand due to supply-chain constraints and coronavirus-related safety measures — both of which are pushing up costs.

被指玩毛泽东的老把戏 中国抗疫绝招与文明的反差

 在世界各国正在跟一百年来未见的瘟疫苦斗之际,中国的新型冠状病毒疫情防控在世界各国各地区别具一格。中国是全世界唯一的一个为了防疫而禁止本国公民返国并禁止疫区的人外出寻求治疗的国家。批评者表示,中国的这种防疫措施给许多中国人带来极大的痛苦,中国也由此向全世界呈现出以习近平为首的中国共产党治下的中国与人类文明格格不入。


中共主导的防疫抗疫是否值得称赞?

大约2019年12月开始在中国武汉发生的新型冠状病毒疫情(又称武汉肺炎疫情)随着以习近平为首的中共当局的严密信息封锁和误导性宣传在武汉大爆发,并随后扩散到全世界,酿成了百年未见的公共卫生大灾难。

美国约翰斯霍普金斯大学发表的全球疫情动态报告说,截至2021年1月30日美国东部时间晚上八点半,世界各国总共有将近二百二十万人死于疫情,一亿二百五十二万多人感染病毒。

在中国国内外一些观察家和批评者看来,在这场全球百年不遇的大疫情中,中共当局所扮演的角色堪称令人惊讶,令人惊恐。

在这些观察家和批评者看来,从疫情出现之初,也就是最有可能将疫情控制在当地并进而将疫情消灭于萌芽之中的最佳时段,中共当局隐瞒疫情并散布误导性信息酿成疫情大爆发,进而导致至今不见尽头的世界性大灾难,到疫情爆发之后采取人类历史上规模空前的封城措施,到最近疫情再度反弹之后采取的封城措施,中共当局对待中国人生命和尊严的做法不但令文明世界感到震惊,而且也让中国公众苦不堪言。

然而,中共当局及其控制的媒体、网络水军以及听信中共当局宣传的人说,尽管中共当局的防疫抗疫措施有种种缺点,但无人可以否认中国在中共领导下取得的举世瞩目的抗疫成就,无人可以否认这种巨大的成功使中国这个世界第二大经济体再度活力回归,这不但给中国人民带来了好处,而且也给世界经济带来了福音,因此,中共当局应当为成功地控制疫情得到称赞。

但在《中国战略分析》杂志社社长李伟东看来,中共当局主导的防疫抗疫并不值得称赞;中共当局最初的隐瞒和误导性宣传导致疫情在中国大爆发祸害全世界,当局最初的一刀切的防疫措施非常不人道,其中包括不准疫区的人外出就医,包括报道疫区情况的公民记者张展最近被判重刑,包括为了防疫封堵染病或被怀疑染病的人家的门窗,甚至把患病的孩子封在房间里活活饿死。

李伟东表示,撇开上述这些惊人的所谓防疫抗疫做法不谈,仅仅就所谓的防疫效果、成果、成效来看,中共主导的防疫也没有什么好称赞的。他说:“这个没有什么好称赞的。它的有效不在于这么残酷的一个都不许进,一个都不许出。有效不在于这个地方。有效在于和台湾和新西兰一样的方法。”

李伟东在这里所提到的台湾和新西兰的有效的防疫抗疫是指这这两个民主政体的防疫抗疫措施取得了世界各国公认的成功。在世界各国穷于应对疫情之际,所有的国家都承认这两个民主政体是通过政府基于专家意见采取的有效应措施对和全体国民积极配合而取得了防疫抗疫的令人羡慕的成就。

然而,中国国内外一些观察家和批评者指出,中共当局由于种种原因显然对台湾和新西兰的防疫成功感到不舒服。他们指出,在全世界急需参考和推广台湾的成功经验之际,中国当局操控世界卫生组织极力打压台湾在世界卫生组织的活动参与。在新西兰防疫成功受到世界各国钦佩羡慕之际,中共当局宣扬从新西兰进口的冷冻牛肉中发现新冠病毒。

截至目前,世界其他国家的专家的共识是,所谓的冷冻食品可以携带并传播新冠病毒的说法没有科学的证据证明。

与此同时,一些中国问题观察家则指出,中共当局在疫情问题上是非常讲政治的。为了讲政治,以习近平为首的中共当局可以不理会世界各国的专家的见解悍然宣扬进口冷冻食品携带并传播疫情病毒,也可以不理会世界各国专家的见解悍然从有非洲猪瘟疫情发生的俄罗斯进口猪肉,从而引进非洲猪瘟,给世界头号养猪大国和猪肉消费国中国的养猪业带来毁灭性的灾难。

别具一格的防疫措施

为了应对百年不遇的致命性疫情,世界各国推出了各种各样的防疫措施。在世界各国推出的严厉程度不一的防疫措施和居家令中都有成文或不成文的规定,这就是,需要外出寻求医疗的人不在居家令的限制范围之内。

然而,中国却在世界各国当中别具一格,中国各地当局推出的封城令多是一刀切,其成文或不成文的规定使疫区的人几乎不能到外地寻求医疗,即使是他们病情危急也不能。此外,中国政府还是全世界唯一的公开阻拦在外国的公民返回中国以避免病例输入的国家。

为此,中共当局在先前采取的严厉限制海外公民回国的五个一政策(即中国国内每家航空公司经营至任一国家的航线只能保留1条,且每条航线每周运营班次不得超过1班;外国每家航空公司经营至中国的航线只能保留1条,且每周运营班次不得超过1班)基础上再推出由驻外使领馆掌握决定公民归国资格的健康码的做法,即没有中国驻外使领馆的特别批准,中国公民就不能返回中国,即使是他们在国外生活无着,即使他们在外国生病但没有医疗保险导致他们倾家荡产也不能回国。

早些时候,中国一位老年的公民的家人在中国社交媒体豆瓣上报告说,那位老者在中国发布限制公民返回中国的五个一政策之前到美国夏威夷探亲,在那里生病,因为没有美国的医疗保险又不能回国,导致该他和他家在美国积累的医疗费足以使他家倾家荡产,尽管如此,他还是有家归不得,继续在美国积累医疗费账单,导致老者本人和家人陷入绝望。

在另外一方面,在英国的一个年轻留学生报告则报告她本人的幸运经历说,她因为中国实行五个一政策而不能如期返回中国,因此,她在英国的留学生签证过期,她在英国逗留失去了合法身份,也失去了她在英国的医疗保险,但她的胳膊因为意外事故烫伤,她不得不求助英国的医疗保险系统并向他们承认自己在英国逗留签证过期,令她感到意外和欣喜的是,英国的公共卫生医疗机构仍是给她迅速安排了免费的专业救治。

但无论如何,中共统治下的中国截至目前在疫情防控问题上的所谓成就还是明显的,不可否认的。中国经济和社会生活一度基本回复正正常,中国的新出现的病例也一度几近清零。这就使世界各国包括中国很多的人陷入迷惑,并感到难以评价中共的非人道的防疫抗疫措施。

多年研究哲学、伦理学和政治学的学者、政论杂志《北京之春》荣誉主编胡平自疫情从中国爆发并酿成百年不遇的世界大灾难起,就一直在密切追踪疫情的发展以及各国政府疫情的局举措所引起的哲学、伦理学、政治学的问题。

胡平对美国之音表示,确实,有些人会对中共的野蛮的防疫措施取得的所谓成功感到难以评价,感觉不好说好,但也不好说坏,但对全世界大多人包括多大都数中国人来说,问题其实是很清楚的,大家都不糊涂。

胡平说:“毫无疑问,朝鲜的确诊病例和死亡病例数目确实是相当低。这里就有一个问题很简单:我们有多少人羡慕(几乎完全不讲基本人权的)朝鲜?有多少人认为应该学习朝鲜?我想,这种人一定是非常少。可见大家在如何抗疫的问题上对中共的这种不惜一切代价的做法肯定是不以为然的。否则大家就要向朝鲜学习,把朝鲜当作榜样了。”

胡平指出,全世界大多人,包括多大都数中国人之所以在防疫的大是大非问题不糊涂,是因为他们对什么是文明、什么是野蛮这样的根本问题不糊涂。

什么是野蛮,什么是文明

胡平举出法国已故的学者福柯在其名著《规训与惩戒》中简述的历史为例。十七世纪末法国颁布的一道命令,规定一个地方发生瘟疫的时候应当采取什么措施,其中包括要实行严格的空间隔离,封闭城市和郊区,严禁离开疫区,违者处死。

《规训与惩戒》一书中还提到三百多年前的法国为控制疫情把疫情城市分成若干区,每个区由区长负责,每条街道由里长负责,严密监视街道居民行动,谁离开自己的街区就要处死;所有人都必须在家里,吃喝由当局安排,总之每个人都要在一个规定的位置,任何微小的活动都要受到监视,一切都要在当局的掌控之中。

胡平说:中共的支持者和中共的宣传机关声言别的国家应当抄中国疫情防控成功的作业,但人家法国早在三百多年前作业就做好了,至今摆在那里。今天的法国人为什么没有那么做?

中共当局不断强调要讲大局,抓大事,防疫抗疫眼下就是中共当局大讲的大局和狠抓的大事。在批评者和观察家们看来,中共当局为此采取了令世界各国公众感到匪夷所思的不惜一切代价的防疫做法,确实取得了令人难以言说的“成就”。

但在胡平看来,不怕不识货,就怕货比货。他说,“这种对照,一个是跟北朝鲜的对照,一个是把三百年前的法国跟三百年后的今天的法国的对照,我觉得就可以得出一个很明白的结论,这就是,大家对所谓的不惜一切代价的抗疫防疫的做法是不以为然的。”

封城封省的严苛做法引争议

在最新一波疫情出现之后,中国当局为防疫而采取的种种封城封省的措施在中国公众当中引起了强烈的批评。吉林通化突然封城,导致30万居民陷入断粮断药的困境。河北封省,一个得急病的河北孩子被北京医院拒绝救治。

这些严酷的防疫举措导致一些观察家提出,中共的这种做法做所依据的思路跟养猪业对付猪瘟的思路类似,这就是,遇到猪瘟,不管猪的死活,先控制住疫情再说,中共的做法也是不管疫区人民的死活,先控制住疫情再说。

《中国战略分析》杂志社社长李伟东对这种将中共的防疫跟养猪业对付猪瘟的做法相提并论的说法表示非常不以为然。李伟东表示,这种说法过于极端,过于片面,因为众所周知,中共当局根本就没有像养猪业遇到猪瘟就大规模宰杀猪一样宰杀人

李伟东说,此外,中国疫区的人有医疗需要,也不是不能在疫区得到治疗,河北那样的疫区有充足的医疗资源;即使是有人需要疫区之外需求治疗被阻挡,那也是个别现象,并不是当局有意要让人死在疫区。

胡平认为,在控制疫情的时候,中共当局确实是没有像养猪业大规模屠宰猪以控制疫情一样大规模杀人,毕竟中共当局也会算经济账,大规模杀人经济上不合算,而且中共政权确实需要有人干活,有人缴税才能继续维持生存和运转。

胡平认为,从另一个方面来看,中共应对疫情的思路跟养猪业应对猪瘟的思路是高度相似乃至高度雷同的。他说:“(中共管理人和管理猪)这两件事情一样的地方就是都不把对方当作有尊严的生物来看。回到人的问题上,现在他防疫的办法不是把老百姓都杀掉,只是采取不近人情的隔离措施。”

胡平说,中共当局采取的严酷防疫措施只是适用于普通民众,不适用于高官及其家属,中共权贵可以得到最好的保护,也有最大的自由;西方国家的总统、首相、部长都有感染的,但中共的高官没有感染的,他们即使是给病毒感染,也会得到最好的治疗,而且不会受到封城令的限制。

中共中央机关报《人民日报》旗下的小报《环球时报》主编胡锡进的把中国当局采取的严酷防疫措施比作“壮士断腕”。胡平说,从各种意义上说,这种“壮士断腕”的防疫思路跟养猪业扑杀猪来控制猪瘟的思路别无二致,其思想基础是不把每一个人的生命当作独一无二的生命,而是当作可以任意取舍的数字。

疫情引发的伦理道德问题

截至目前,面对百年不遇的、到现在还看不到尽头的新型冠状病毒疫情,世界各国政府的作为和不作为取得了各不相同的结果,究竟是哪种做法,哪种政策更为有效,更令公众感觉好,各国疫情死亡人数和死亡率到底怎样,各国政府乃至公共卫生专家和传染病专家、统计学专家对这些问题还在摸索。

一些观察人士认为,中国的防疫措施最为严苛,最不讲人道的。中国地方当局为了防疫,仅是封堵被认为是感染病病毒的人家的门就有铁链锁门,木板钉门,焊枪焊门,沙石堵门等多种在观察家看来是骇人听闻的做法。这种防疫措施也给各国主政者和各国人民带来道德难题,这就是,是否可以用非人道的方式来追求人道主义的目标?

中国政府以及中国政府的支持者一直在以公开和私下的方式暗示或宣示:中国的做法虽然引起非议,但中国取得的防疫成就是不可否认的;人权首先就是生存权,看看美国,空喊人权,疫情死亡超过四十万,而且死亡人数还在继续快速上升,这是明摆着的无可争议的事实,其他国家无权对中国说三道四,中国国内外的人也无权为中共为中国人民谋利益(保障人民最大的利益)说三道四。

一些观察家指出,中共当局之所以在一年前推出非人道的封城措施,在一年之后疫情反弹之际重新祭出非人道的封城措施,就是因为中国国内外对中共当局的这种做法没有多少严厉的谴责,许多中国人甚至也以公开的和私下的方式表示认同中共的这种不人道做法,认为这种做法毕竟行之有效,无可厚非,因此中共才会一再有恃无恐地、甚至是骄傲地采取这种残暴做法。

哥伦比亚大学政治学博士、中国民主党主席王军涛对美国之音表示,不幸的是上述观察家们的看法大概是不错的。在他看来,七十多年来中共政权为了维护自己的统治,对关心公共利益的人、关心基本人权的人进行无情的打压,这就造成了一个对中国人来说是十分明显也十分切身的恶果。

王军涛说:“中国公众养成了一个心态,即对公众利益漠不关心,对别人的死活也漠不关心,因为关心这个实际上上会影响自己的存在和发展。我就这么想,看到那个(在河北生命垂危但不能进北京治病的)孩子的事情,实际上大多数中国人心里不会感到舒服,可能还有一部分人感到十分气愤,但他们不敢管,或者也管不了。”

王军涛还指出,中国公众之所以大都主动或被动地接受乃至认同中共的防疫做法也是因为中国公众被中共的误导性宣传所迷惑,错以为外国,尤其是美国的疫情使美国变成了难以令人忍受地狱,中国公众不知道即使在美国的疫情重灾区的纽约,公众的生活还是基本如常,公众的基本个人尊严和个人自由没有受到多少限制,只是大家现在都变得更加小心,要遵守社交距离之类的规定,总而言之,美国或世界任何文明国家都没有中国的那种为了防疫要忍受监狱般的生活的情况。

学者胡平也承认,中共当局之所以反复敢于并乐于采取不管具体个人死活的防疫手段,并且会在可见的将来继续采取这种把人不当人的手段,确实是跟中国人/华人的基本人权理念缺乏有一定的关系。他说:“(许多中国人/华人)不把别人当作有个人尊严的人来尊重,多少接受这种(不尊重他人尊严和生命的)想法,至少是对这种想法不是那么反感,才会有这种状况。”

被潘金莲灌毒药的武大郎?

在胡平发出上述感叹的同时,中国一位网民因家人遭受了他们所说的非人道防疫措施待遇痛定思痛,从基本人权的角度向中国公众提出了如下的讨论题:

1. 在非疫区实施封闭式管理作为防疫措施,以牺牲公民权利与正常生活为代价,换得的是什么?投入与产出如何比较?尤其是在医院这样的重要公共机构。

2.从中央到地方的防疫措施越捏越紧,调正与修改的依据是什么?各地管理措施是否有通过民主程序,或从法律上是否有据可循?

3.政策制定实施后与基层情况是否有磨合期?如有建议和求助该通过何种渠道,如何保证有效解决?

在中国社交媒体豆瓣上发表的这一讨论题已经被禁止回应。原先的回应则被全部隐藏或删除。熟悉中共网路舆论控制的人说,中共当局没有删除上述的讨论题已经是格外开恩了。

在中共当局采取的严厉防疫措施令文明世界感到震惊之际,一位因职业原因不愿意透露姓名的华人对美国之音表示,中共当局要中国人吞下防疫抗疫的苦药,犹如中国古典小说《水浒传》中的杀人犯潘金莲用毒药毒杀丈夫武大郎。

这位华人在回答美国之音书面提问的时候写道:“像金莲喂大郎药一样: ‘大郎先把药吃了,一切都会好起来的。’ 中国共产党当局目前对中国人民用的金莲妙法。中国人民就是大郎啊,已经没有力气说不了。”

中共被指玩毛泽东的老把戏

但中国国内外观察家大都认为,在中共严酷统治下的中国人富有幽默感,尤其是富有黑色幽默感,这有近日来中国网络间流传的讽刺中共当局层层加码的防疫措施的段子为证:

卫健委:高风险的要隔离/ 中风险的要核酸测试 / 低风险的没事。

省里:高风险的不要回来 / 中风险的要核酸测试+居家隔离 / 低风险的要核酸测试。

市里:高风险的不要回来 / 中风险的要核酸测试+集中隔离+居家隔离 /低风险的要核酸测试+居家隔离。

镇里:高风险的不要回来 / 中风险的也不要回来 /低风险的要核酸测试+集中隔离+居家隔离。

村里:滚。

或许是层层加码的防疫措施引起太多民怨和讽刺抨击的缘故,近日来,中共当局又通过中共当党报《人民日报》这样的所谓中央级媒体发布中共政府高官的批评意见,即防疫措施“不能擅自加码,层层加码,不能一刀切。”

有观察家指出,中共当局显然是在玩弄毛泽东当年的老把戏,这就是,在所谓的大跃进运动造成经济灾难,导致饿死人的事件发生之后,毛泽东的老部下、当时的国防部长彭德怀就此提出委婉的批评意见随即遭到毛泽东的无情打击,但毛泽东随后又在中共党内转发一份下级干部提出的跟彭德怀高度相似的意见,并号召中共各级干部说实话,报实情。

但中共各级干部眼看着彭德怀的下场,无人敢说实话,报实情,更不敢对毛泽东的瞎指挥提出批评或反对,生产大跃进运动于是在毛泽东的推动下继续进行,中国几千万人在毛泽东如此制造的经济灾难和人造大饥荒中饿死。

1962年1月,在大饥荒过后,毛泽东含糊其辞地承认他犯了错误,但他提拔的新国防部长林彪则在当时举行的中共七千人干部大会上则发表讲话则,声言先前中共犯的错误,包括大跃进的错误都是下级干部没有能正确的执行毛泽东指示造成的。林彪随即成为中国第二号权势人物。

2021年1月,中国国内外观察家在关注中共高官和官方级媒体有关“不能擅自加码,层层加码,不能一刀切”的说法,究竟是习近平为了给自己打掩护,还是习近平当局确实是意识到了截至目前的中共防疫措施确实是非人道并受到文明世界的鄙视,因此不应当继续坚持。

Sunday, January 31, 2021

Joe Biden shows his hawkish side on China

 After months of Republican worry that Joe Biden would be lenient on Beijing, the new U.S. president received unexpected praise from a Chinese Big Hawk after less than two weeks in the White House.

“President Biden [and his team] are off to China, ”said Robert O’Brien, Donald Trump’s last national security adviser, at a US Peace Institute event with his successor, Jake Sullivan.

After four years of turbulent policy making, Democrats and Republicans expect a more structured approach under the leadership of Mr. Biden. But experts are watching closely for signs of just how hawkish he will be towards the most important US bilateral relationship.

“The concern about the evolution of Biden’s Chinese policy is very high. This is true in Washington where there are strong concerns about a return to Obama’s approach in the mid-2010s, ”said Eric Sayers, an Asian security expert at the American Enterprise Institute, who said that some in Japan and Taiwan were also nervous.

The White House has said Biden will exercise “patience” in shaping his Chinese policy. But he did provide some clues as to the future direction of the administration’s response to events in Asia and the responses of some of its cabinet candidates during their Senate confirmation hearings.

A clear example is that of Taiwan. Before setting foot in the White House, Mr. Biden invited Hsiao Bi-khim to become the first Taiwanese representative to the United States to attend a presidential inauguration.

Three days later, the State Department warned China to stop trying to intimidate Taiwan after Chinese fighter jets and bombers entered Taiwan’s air defense zone and faked attacks on a door. -American planes nearby.

During his confirmation hearing, Secretary of State Antony Blinken said Mr. Trump was right to be tougher on China. He later admitted that the Chinese crackdown on Muslim Uyghurs in Xinjiang was “genocide”.

At the US Peace Institute, Sullivan said Biden would work with allies on China. But he said he was prepared to “impose costs for what China is doing in Xinjiang, what it is doing in Hong Kong, for the warmongering and threats it is projecting towards Taiwan.”

The change on Capitol Hill is bipartisan. There are Democrats who don’t want a softer approach

His words were a sign that Biden would be tougher than when he was vice president in the Obama administration, and officials spoke of encouraging Beijing to become a “responsible stakeholder.”

“This assumption that greater economic engagement with China would make it a responsible stakeholder on the world stage has been proven wrong – this era of US policymaking is over,” said Lindsay Gorman, an expert on China to the German Marshall Fund of the United States.

“Biden’s expectations of a policy that is ‘gentle on China’ do not correspond to reality given the threats democracies face from authoritarian actors around the world.”

While Mr Biden has taken action that has been welcomed by some hawks, his team has also raised concerns.

During her confirmation hearing, Gina Raimondo, the candidate for the head of the trade department, refused to commit to keeping Huawei, the Chinese manufacturer of telecommunications equipment, on the “list of entities” – which makes very difficult for US companies to export technology to companies. the list.

Michael McCaul, the top Republican on the House foreign affairs committee, said it was “remarkable and frankly disturbing” that she did not make a commitment. In the Senate, Marco Rubio and several other Republican hawks from China, including Tom Cotton, also hoisted flags, signaling a possible slowdown upon confirmation.

A former senior official said Mr Biden would face fierce opposition from career bureaucrats if he took a softer approach to China on issues like Huawei, saying there would be “violent disagreement” .

Some critics also sounded the alarm when Mr Biden extended the deadline for a ban – created by the Trump administration – on Americans investing in companies with suspected ties to the Chinese military. But some experts have privately said his team wanted time to clarify a policy that was causing confusion in financial markets and said he was unlikely to reverse course due to pressure from Congress.

advised

Paul Haenle, former Chinese director of the National Security Council (NSC) under George W. Bush and Barack Obama, said Biden had so far “done it right” on China.

“The Trump administration was right to make a change, but the way they did it was self-defeating, very inconsistent and dispersed,” Haenle said, adding that the new administration would also have to face Congress who advocated a tougher approach from China.

“Change at Capitol Hill is bipartisan. There are Democrats who don’t want a softer approach, ”he said. “The key is to have a smart approach that aligns with American interests.”

Some Democrats fear that John Kerry, the international climate czar and friend of Mr Biden, may push the president to compromise with China to get a climate deal, prompting the former secretary of state to defend himself. “I know some people are worried. Nothing will be diverted from one area to another, ”he said.

This concern has also been alleviated somewhat by the appointment of Kurt Campbell, a Chinese hawk, to coordinate overall Asia policy within the NSC, and the appointment of a cadre of next generation Chinese experts who are considered more belligerent on China, including Laura Rosenberger at the NSC, and Kelly Magsamen and Ely Ratner at the Pentagon.

“A new generation of Asian hands has emerged within the Democratic Party which takes a much more competitive approach in Beijing,” Sayers said. “It is this group that we are now seeing evolving into mid-level jobs in administration and that leaves me encouraged.”

Friday, January 22, 2021

The U.S. Deported The Man Who Would Become China's 'Father of Space Technology' Out of Fear

 America may not have won World War II and landed on the moon later if not for the contributions of a brilliant Chinese scientist named Qian Xuesen. Fearing communist presence after the war, the U.S., however, deported Qian to China, clueless that he would eventually spearhead programs that would target American troops and eventually propel China into space. Born to well-educated parents in 1911, it was evident from an early age that Qian had superior intellect. He graduated at the top of his class at Shanghai Jiao Tong University and won a scholarship at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). Qian arrived in Boston in 1935. He eventually moved to the California Institute of Technology (CalTech) to study under Hungarian aeronautical engineer Theodore von Karman, one of the field’s most influential at the time. It was in CalTech when Qian became a member of a group of innovators called Suicide Squad, which aimed to build a rocket on campus. They earned their nickname, however, due to botched experiments involving volatile chemicals. Just before World War II, the U.S. military, which had been paying for research into jet propulsion systems, caught wind of the Suicide Squad. In 1943, the Jet Propulsion Lab was established under von Karman -- and Qian was at its core. Qian, a national of the Republic of China (ROC; now Taiwan) -- then a U.S. ally -- was given security clearance to work on classified weapons research. At the end of the war, he was among the world’s leading experts in jet propulsion, even flying to Germany as a lieutenant colonel to gather intelligence from Nazi engineers. Unfortunately, Qian’s American career faltered when Mao Zedong established the communist People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949. Chinese nationals were then seen as a threat to the U.S. The FBI accused Qian of being a communist based on a 1938 document, which showed that he had attended a social gathering of the Pasadena Communist Party. He denied being a member, but research proved that he joined the group with JPL co-founder Frank Malina, who was also part of the Suicide Squad. Qian’s membership was more inspired by anti-racism than Marxism, however. For instance, they campaigned against the segregation of the local Pasadena swimming pool. Despite the absence of evidence that he actually spied for the PRC, Qian was put on house arrest for five years. In 1955, President Eisenhower deported him to China. Qian left America by boat with his wife and two U.S.-born children. He vowed never to return again. The scientist arrived as a promising talent in China. However, he was not immediately welcomed into the CCP, since his wife was the daughter of a ROC leader. Qian was admitted to the CCP in 1958, later serving on its Central Committee. In the following years, he oversaw the launch of the first Chinese satellite into space -- and a multitude of other projects that laid the foundations of China’s Lunar Exploration Program. In a slap of irony, a missile program Qian helped develop produced weapons that were fired back at the U.S. These were silkworm missiles fired at Americans in the Gulf War of 1991, as well as the USS Mason by Huti rebels in Yemen in 2016. “So there's this odd circularity. The US expelled this expertise, and it has come back to bite them,” said Fraser Macdonald, author of “Escape from Earth: A Secret History of the Space Rocket,” according to BBC News. Despite the turnaround of his life, Qian reportedly remained fond of the American people. In 2002, Frank Marble, a CalTech colleague, stated that Qian had “lost faith in the American government” but “always had very warm feelings for the American people,” according to The New York Times. Qian died as an accomplished scientist at the age of 98 in Beijing. He has since been revered as a hero in China. 

特朗普将如何输掉与中国的贸易战

 编者:本文是 保罗·克鲁格曼于2024年11月15日发表于《纽约时报》的一篇评论文章。特朗普的重新当选有全球化退潮的背景,也有美国民主党没能及时推出有力候选人的因素。相较于民主党的执政,特朗普更加具有个人化的特点,也给时局曾经了更多的不确定性。 好消息:我认为特朗普不会引发全球...