In Pushing Back against China, U.S. Finds Few Allies

As the Chinese Communist Party continues the process of enforcing its restrictive “security” law, barring pro-democracy candidates in Hong Kong from participating in the September legislative election and arresting protesters, dissenting academics, social-media influencers, and even a 15-year-old banner-waving schoolgirl, it would appear quite challenging to speak in an equivocating, wishy-washy manner about the evils this government is perpetrating. Still, some manage. Several weeks ago, German chancellor Angela Merkel — the most powerful figure in Western Europe — promised that she would “continue to seek dialogue and conversation” with the Chinese government. Andreas Fulda, a senior fellow at the Asia Research Institute at the University of Nottingham, offers a theory behind the chancellor’s words: “Angela Merkel is not able, in my view, to understand the gravity of the challenge of continued one-party rule, whether it’s COVID-19 or the treatment of minorities or the suppression of Hong Kong or the military threats against Taiwan. . . . If the German Government does’’t take the threat of the CCP seriously then, by extension, the EU will not be able to make progress in terms of developing a more coherent China policy.”

That Merkel is simply misguided on the threat China poses, as Fulda believes, is certainly possible. However, given the political climate, there is likely a graver impulse behind Merkel’s placating remarks: fear of retribution. After all, Merkel is far from the only prominent politician to skirt the issue of the CCP’s atrocious human-rights record — far from the only politician to pretend that the Chinese government is a fair party on which one can count to honor its agreements and to act with benevolence.

Last month, representatives of Spain, Portugal, Greece, Italy, Croatia, Poland, and the Czech Republic on the U.N. Human Rights Council, among others, refused to condemn China for its encroachment on Hong Kong’s autonomy — a serious blow to a unified Western countermovement against the CCP’s actions. In all, just 27 governments expressed criticism of China’s oppression law, with 53 in favor and the rest staying silent. Just as it is hard to believe that Angela Merkel is oblivious to the crimes China is committing, it is hard to believe that only 27 governments actually found fault with an effective ban on free expression and self-determination for Hong Kongers. (Granted, fewer governments around the world are democratic than one accustomed to Western laws might believe.) Rather, history has likely taught many nations that it is more expedient to keep their mouth shut than to take a firm stance on the global superpower with the world’s second-largest economy.

Consider Spain, one of the countries that remained silent throughout the U.N.’s vote. In 2013, a Spanish court issued arrest warrants for a former Chinese president, a former Chinese prime minister, and other important Chinese Communist officials for allegedly bringing about genocide in Tibet. Just days later, a Chinese spokesperson was expressing Beijing’s dissatisfaction with the warrants, warning the Spanish “not [to] do things that harm the Chinese side and the relationship between China and Spain.” Fearing harsh retaliation from a country holding a fifth of Spanish bonds and consuming many Spanish exports, Spain’s government quickly passed a reform limiting the use of universal jurisdiction.

Though the motive behind this reform was relatively open, it would not be shocking if much other action and rhetoric surrounding China from freedom-loving nations were similarly induced by a fear of economic retaliation. This may help explain why Canada refused to request an independent inquiry into the origins of COVID-19 in May. Or why New Zealand prime minister Jacinda Ardern, unlikely not to share President Trump’s personal outrage at China’s activity, nevertheless is reportedly “seeking to be less confrontational than the Trump administration” with regard to the CCP. Even U.K. prime minister Boris Johnson, who has taken very strong action against China by offering a path to citizenship for Hong Kong natives, suspending the U.K.’s extradition treaty with Hong Kong (so as not to be obliged to send back Hong Kongers at Beijing’s whim), and extending the U.K.’s arms embargo on China to Hong Kong, nevertheless has felt the need to send something of a mixed message in assuring that his government is “going to be tough on some things but also going to continue to engage” with China. One imagines Boris Johnson putting China in a timeout for bad behavior but giving it a pat on the head and a cookie to munch on.

This sort of diplomatic behavior is understandable. It is difficult to summon the moral courage to openly condemn a global superpower such as China, especially when large GDP growth and stable diplomatic relations are on the line. In any case, it would appear that the United States, in enacting sanctions against Chinese officials for abusing Uighur Muslims, terminating trade benefits for now-CCP-controlled Hong Kong, closing the Chinese consulate in Houston, and imposing export controls on corporations enabling China’s activity, stands virtually alone on China.

To be sure, there is an occasional discontinuity between the Trump administration’s official policy and the president’s rhetoric. As Trump himself has admitted, he had little desire to press China on its treatment of Uighur Muslims in the middle of trade negotiations with the nation in late 2018, even though top White House officials were already viewing the situation with concern. And as late as February 29, weeks after the CIA had already warned that China had vastly underreported its coronavirus infections and that its information was unreliable, Trump stated in a COVID-19 briefing: “China seems to be making tremendous progress. Their numbers are way down. . . . I think our relationship with China is very good. We just did a big trade deal. We’re starting on another trade deal with China — a very big one. And we’ve been working very closely. They’ve been talking to our people, we’ve been talking to their people, having to do with the virus.” But despite occasional confusion, the commitment to a solidly anti-Beijing foreign policy has been perhaps clearer in the Trump administration than in the government of any other country besides India and Taiwan. This is reflected not only in the U.S.’s recent policies but in Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s denunciation of Xi, last week, as a “true believer in a bankrupt, totalitarian ideology” and in his insistence that the United States “induce China to change” lest Communist China “surely change us.”

Of course, even within the United States, there is not a unanimous consensus that China constitutes a major threat. As National Review’s Zachary Evans reports, Democratic senator Dianne Feinstein of California had some flattering things to say about China yesterday. Speaking in a Senate Judiciary Committee hearing, she remarked: “We hold China as a potential trading partner, as a country that has pulled tens of millions of people out of poverty in a short period of time, and as a country growing into a respectable nation amongst other nations.” Senator Feinstein’s statement came in the context of a debate over whether U.S. citizens should be allowed to sue the Chinese government for damages caused by the coronavirus — an idea that Feinstein argued could “launch a series of unknown events that could be very, very dangerous. . . . A huge mistake.”

Encouragingly, however, the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives passed a bipartisan bill in late June condemning China’s oppression law; Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi spoke eloquently of the bill as “an urgently needed response to the cowardly Chinese government’s passage of its so-called national security law, which threatens the end of the ‘one country, two systems’ promised exactly 23 years ago today.” Moreover, Pew Research reports that sentiment against the Chinese government is at an all-time high since U.S. adults have been polled: Sixty-six percent say they view the government unfavorably.

In all, it would appear that, barring a massive change in European attitudes and in the fragile economic positions of nations such as Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, the United States will not have many reliable allies in the fight against China’s most egregious abuses. The courageous pro-democracy residents of Hong Kong, as well as a few nations including Taiwan, India, and Israel, are notable but rare exceptions.

Xu Zhangrun and the Chinese Communist Party’s Betrayal of Confucius

In the ancient world, Greek and Roman intellectuals acted out the principles of their ethical systems. To defend the precepts of hedonism, Epicurus established a “garden” where people in search of tranquility would gather to dance, share meals, and enjoy the delights of the quotidian. A fervent believer in the virtue of deep education, Plato founded the Academy to allow young men to live what he thought was the true life of the mind. As for Socrates, the champion of epistemic humility famously wandered in the streets of Athens, asking strangers and supposed experts to justify their most deep-rooted certitudes with sound reasoning. The list goes on: Epictetus derived his Stoic account of human psychology from his life as a freed slave, Marcus Aurelius used his Meditations to inform his political decisions, and Seneca spent his life tempering the totalitarian excesses of Nero by applying the prescriptions of his treaty On Anger. In short, the ancients considered that thought and action go hand in hand, and that the role of philosophy extends way beyond the dusty walls of empty libraries.

Among this panoply of dedicated intellectuals was Tacitus, a Roman historian who wrote about the perils of tyranny while serving the murderous regime of Emperor Domitian. For Tacitus, active intellectuals could reshape the world by entering public life and plunging vigorously into political debates. In the opening paragraph of his Agricola, Tacitus writes: “An outstanding personality can still triumph over that blind antipathy to virtue which is a defect of all states, small and great alike.”

The value of exceptional minds was especially important to counter the disinformation of tyrannical regimes. As a well-connected statesman, Tacitus had witnessed the power of ruthless propaganda. Recounting the words of a general from the British Isles, he writes: “To robbery, butchery, and rapine, [the Romans] give the lying name of government; they create a desolation and call it peace.” Tyranny vanquished republicanism because of its ability to reframe reality, to hide its vices under a mountain of handy slogans, to deconstruct the achievements of those who opposed its unquestionable grip. In the face of infamy, courageous intellectuals could choose between two paths. Like Tacitus and Seneca, they could become insiders and try to temper the violent inclinations of tyrants — the path of “responsibility.” Alternatively, they could use their platform to expose hidden truths and denounce authoritarian excesses — the path of “resistance.”

Last week, one of the last champions of Chinese “resistance” was silenced by the Chinese Community Party. Tsinghua University professor Xu Zhangrun, one of the few remaining critics of President Xi Jinping and the Communist government, was arrested by police on Monday. According to a friend of Xu’s, the police told his wife that he was detained for visiting prostitutes in Chengdu. Naturally, this kind of allegation is not uncommon when it comes to Chinese political dissidents — in a sense, Xu is but a collateral victim of Xi’s generalized crackdown on all kinds of opposition.

Beyond his extensive work on legal philosophy and constitutional theories, Xu has published a series of major essays on modern Chinese politics. In these astringent critiques of the Communist Party’s failures, Xu provides an elegant and erudite analysis of Xi’s abandonment of Confucian principles. In “Viral Alarm,” a recent piece in which Xu attacks China’s response to the coronavirus, he writes:

The bureaucratic and governance system of China that is now fully on display is one that values the mediocre, the dilatory, and the timid. The mess they have made in Hubei Province, and the grotesque posturing of the incompetents involved [in dealing with the coronavirus] have highlighted a universal problem. A similar political malaise infects every province and the rot goes right up to Beijing.

Overall, Xu’s message to the CCP is simple: In importing Marx and Lenin, the Communist Party has forgotten Confucius. In his writings, the dissident academic tries to reclaim the Chinese tradition and show that Xi has betrayed every major tenet of proper Confucian rule.

Let us begin with the elephant in the room: free speech. While the Chinese constitution technically protects freedom of expression and of the press, the experience of Xu and others illustrates the Orwellian reality in which the Chinese population is forced to live. From the New York Times to The Economist, the Communist Party has banned virtually every major Western print outlet from operating in the country. Worse still, according to a recent paper in The American Political Science Review, the CCP “fabricates and posts about 448 million social media comments a year” to drown opposing voices in an ocean of polished propaganda.

This kind of dystopian censorship is diametrically opposed to the teachings of Confucius. In the Analects, the philosopher repeats time and again that a proper gentleman must “listen to others” and “harmonize” conflicting viewpoints to find a form of balance. Confucius invites his students to speak up against misgovernment, insisting on the duty of public servants to “accept the opinions, suggestions, and supervision of the people [they] serve.” How can the CCP do all of the above when it ruthlessly challenges the likes of Xu? Confucius might have defended hierarchies, but he certainly did not endorse the ostracization of respectful disagreement.

The same inconsistency applies to China’s treatment of religious and cultural minorities. As Ben Blanchard aptly observes in Reuters, the CCP requires its members to embrace an atheistic and materialist vision of the world, thereby reducing hundreds of millions of Chinese believers to second-class citizenship, since party membership is a prerequisite to accessing certain services and holding public office. The CCP has, among other forms of religious persecution, ordered the destruction of churches and crosses, endorsed the replacement of Christic images with pictures of Xi Jinping, banned online sales of the Bible, and jailed innocent pastors for defending the teachings of Christianity. As for Muslims, in Xinjiang, more than a million Uighurs have been locked up in concentration camps where their religious and cultural identity finds itself dreadfully attacked.

Once more, the CCP’s coercive actions run against Confucian prescriptions. In the Analects, Confucius rejects the use of “ordinances and statutes to keep [the people] in line,” and invites the proper gentleman to “guide [the citizens] with exemplary virtue” so that they will “know how to reform themselves.” As Confucius scholar Mark C. Modak-Truran explains in a 2008 paper, while the Chinese philosopher did allow the use of force in extreme cases such a war, he generally favored li, an abstract term referring to shared rites, decorum, and rules of propriety. In this sense, while Confucius insisted on the importance of community bonds, he also advocated the kind of moral autonomy and self-cultivation that is incompatible with President Xi’s repressive policies. Further, when it comes to cultural tolerance, Confucius argued that everyone, regardless of origin or religion, deserves to be treated with jing — that is, with respect and reverence. In Analects Nos. 12 and 13, he even demands that this universal sense of deference be applied “in times of crisis” — in other words, even if the Chinese government’s claims about Uighur-separatist threats were true, a Confucian government would still not be allowed to impose inhumane sanctions on Muslims at large.

In fact, ironically enough, the very existence of the CCP represents an affront to Confucian ideals. The Analects are filled with arguments against partisanship. Confucius instructs the gentleman not to act out of “blind loyalty,” not to become a “tool” of others, and not to follow anyone but “great men and . . . sages.” Refusing servile obedience, the gentleman is to pursue rightness, Heaven, and The Way, independent of corrupt external influences. Naturally, Confucius is by no means an individualist. Not only does he refuse Western conceptions of the sovereign individual, but he emphatically requires people to improve the moral fabric of society as a collective unit. Nevertheless, as Chinese-philosophy professor Irene Bloom has repeatedly argued, Confucianism includes a robust conception of freedom that has been perverted first by the Chinese Empire and then by the Communist Party.

Given this slew of incompatibilities between the CCP and its supposed source of philosophical inspiration, scholars such as Xu Zhangrun represent a huge threat to the Chinese establishment. By providing an erudite and rigorous defense of principles that the party has long abandoned, Xu exposes the hypocrisy of a regime hiding its turpitude behind the veil of tradition. A public intellectual in the noblest sense of the term, Xu lays bare the fatal flaws of what he calls China’s “new personality cult.” In an online essay translated into English by sinologist Geremie Barmé, Xu writes: “It is feared that in one fell swoop China will be cast back to the terrifying days of Mao.” Ultimately, far from being a devout Confucian state, China has replaced its illustrious philosophical tradition with a dreadful combination of cold-hearted utilitarianism, obdurate Marxism, and radical corporatism.

The life and fight of Professor Xu should inspire Westerners to defend heterodox intellectuals, to protect dissenting voices, and to cherish freedom of expression. Perhaps more than anything, his story acts as a timely reminder that the university need not be a well-insulated ivory tower; in times of disinformation and post-truth, audacious thinkers become the pillars of civil society.

川普拿博尔顿没辙！美国就是这样强大的

博尔顿「揭秘」，无论是褒扬川普还是为显现其领导缺陷，总之美国人从来无须震摄于神秘感和距离造就的权威，这正是民主自由国度可贵之处。（汤森路透）

儘管美国政府层峰经常围绕着一团迷雾，但拜言论自由之赐，外人不会完全不知当中的权力游戏，不只来自媒体挖掘内幕，偶尔还会有总统幕僚公开回溯工作内容，就算真有其他政治攻防目的，那也多半是政治圈自己去伤脑筋就好，具备真实度的情节，都是人民有资格知道的事，因而，对美国前国安顾问博尔顿近期出书「大爆料」的动机或有质疑，却未必减损它提供钜细靡遗记录的意义。

多年前，曾任美国四位总统文胆的大卫‧葛根曾写了本《Eyewitness To Power: The Essence of Leadership Nixon to Clinton》（台湾翻译成美国总统的七门课），开宗明义就提到了「美国总统不再是唯一的指导原则，却仍是美国社会引领民众追求梦想、鼓动潜藏于国家背后那股庞大而源源不绝动力最主要的人，因此国家要进步，端视领导者的品质而定」，且美国人当然有权利知道是什麽样的人在领导自己的国家。

回到博尔顿的新书《The Room Where It Happend》，裡头描述，川普的问题有部分即出在当他终于度过执政初期的不稳定，继而不再受制于国之元老后，却开始变得独断独行，尤其逐渐被只对他说「是」的人包围，对之后加入团队者也经常抱持怀疑态度。川普的领导风格有太多是建立在本能之上，对国家安全政策的制定，又过于仰赖和外国领导者的私人关係，亦摆脱不了电视台、演艺圈的治理模式，处事屡屡缺乏严谨的分析、计划和纪律，并无视对后果的评估，徒让官僚主义的惯性和草莽斗争不断循环，遂导致了政府几乎陷于瘫痪。

此外，博尔顿说，曾经在一次关于塔利班的谈判任务中，他和美国国务卿庞佩奥共进午餐时，庞佩奥说他感觉川普对这件事好像有点「不安」，但博尔顿看到的是，川普其实是在担心之后要承受更多意料之外的个人政治风险，川普执政之下，美国诸多外交战略，一定程度原来得迁就川普自我的政治考量，接着，幕僚们还要一再忍受总统无预警在推特上发出许多震撼推文，让团队成员为之人仰马翻。

书中，我们也看到川普的特性之一就是经常只想压制坏消息，尤其在2018年国会期中选举那段时间，川普摆明只想听到关于北韩去核武的正面进展，但北韩问题千头万绪，另有南韩角色的变数，以及中国因素，根本没有人可以保证一定会在选前有好结果，但为了选举，川普似乎不在乎于谈判中做出轻率的让步，又或者风云变色，突然宣称要给对方没有任何呼吸空间的制裁。



博尔顿新书太多细节陈述，是很多以独家新闻为志的媒体人一辈子都触及不了的环节。（汤森路透）

至于在俄罗斯议题上，川普则是自信过头，以为普丁是最简单应付的，然而事实上，川普从不遵循任何国际大战略准则，也不理会应然的外交政策轨迹，就博尔顿的说法，川普脑袋裡装的多是细琐的个人房地产交易逻辑，而不是任何具有创见的政策想像。

从叙利亚到伊朗，从俄罗斯到乌克兰，从两韩到中国，从欧洲到北约，美国总统管涉幅员之广，当是全球之最，然而川普上台后许多棘手问题，未必是他能力使然，很多都来自于个性决定命运，他却又经常过度轻视别人，像是博尔顿新书裡说的，川普因为北约问题，曾不假辞色批评在他之前的美国一直是由白痴在统治。

博尔顿虽然像是流水帐地详述他如何与川普共事，硬邦邦的内容仍让人读来津津有味，太多细节陈述，是很多以内幕新闻为志的媒体人一辈子都触及不了的环节，像是博尔顿提到，有回他和和班农（当时川普政府首席战略顾问）在白宫和川普讨论俄罗斯、中国等世界热议的战略威胁，以及恐怖主义和核武器扩散，绝大多数时间是他在发言，他以为川普很仔细在聆听，因为川普并不像之前一样会同时忙着打电话或接电话，直到川普的女儿伊凡卡走进来讨论家族生意，并试图把川普带走，这段谈话才受到干扰。这些情节的可读性，自然不在于其中有无白宫八卦或是惊为天人的秘辛，博尔顿在某些关键上的点到为止，已足够让我们为其中的美国政治权力运作啧啧称奇。无论川普是正面、负面教材，这本书都可以是活灵活现的国际政治参考书。

博尔顿的书距离大卫‧葛根对美国总统的近身观察，前后差了近20年，倒也间接给出了一致的结论，即总统的内心渗透到他个人领导能力各个层面的程度，确实远超过外界想像，也就是一位领袖的人格，对他在做任何决策时都有深远的影响，并且同时塑造了整体团队的个性。最后，即如大卫‧葛根所说，最重要的是，身为美国总统，如果对国际社会和历史很无知，将是相当危险的。

当然，博尔顿的「揭秘」无论是褒扬一名元首的真正实力也好，是为显现其领导缺陷也罢，总之美国人由此从来无须震摄于神秘感和距离造就的权威，这正是民主自由国度可贵之处，也是美国能够真正强大的原因之一。

※作者为《上报》主笔

Sweden Has Become the World's Cautionary Tale

LONDON — Ever since the coronavirus emerged in Europe, Sweden has captured international attention by conducting an unorthodox, open-air experiment. It has allowed the world to examine what happens in a pandemic when a government allows life to carry on largely unhindered.

This is what has happened: Not only have thousands more people died than in neighboring countries that imposed lockdowns, but Sweden’s economy has fared little better.

“They literally gained nothing,” said Jacob F. Kirkegaard, a senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics in Washington. “It’s a self-inflicted wound, and they have no economic gains.”

The results of Sweden’s experience are relevant well beyond Scandinavian shores. In the United States, where the virus is spreading with alarming speed, many states have — at President Donald Trump’s urging — avoided lockdowns or lifted them prematurely on the assumption that this would foster economic revival, allowing people to return to workplaces, shops and restaurants.

In Britain, Prime Minister Boris Johnson — previously hospitalized with COVID-19 — reopened pubs and restaurants last weekend in a bid to restore normal economic life.

Implicit in these approaches is the assumption that governments must balance saving lives against the imperative to spare jobs, with the extra health risks of rolling back social distancing potentially justified by a resulting boost to prosperity. But Sweden’s grim result — more death and nearly equal economic damage — suggests that the supposed choice between lives and paychecks is a false one: A failure to impose social distancing can cost lives and jobs at the same time.

Sweden put stock in the sensibility of its people as it largely avoided imposing government prohibitions. The government allowed restaurants, gyms, shops, playgrounds and most schools to remain open. By contrast, Denmark and Norway opted for strict quarantines, banning large groups and locking down shops and restaurants.

More than three months later, the coronavirus is blamed for 5,420 deaths in Sweden, according to the World Health Organization. That might not sound especially horrendous compared with the more than 129,000 Americans who have died. But Sweden is a country of only 10 million people. Per million people, Sweden has suffered 40% more deaths than the United States, 12 times more than Norway, seven times more than Finland and six times more than Denmark.

The elevated death toll resulting from Sweden’s approach has been clear for many weeks. What is only now emerging is how Sweden, despite letting its economy run unimpeded, has still suffered business-destroying, prosperity-diminishing damage and at nearly the same magnitude of its neighbors.

Sweden’s central bank expects its economy to contract by 4.5% this year, a revision from a previously expected gain of 1.3%. The unemployment rate jumped to 9% in May from 7.1% in March. “The overall damage to the economy means the recovery will be protracted, with unemployment remaining elevated,” Oxford Economics concluded in a recent research note.

This is more or less how damage caused by the pandemic has played out in Denmark, where the central bank expects that the economy will shrink 4.1% this year and where joblessness has edged up to 5.6% in May from 4.1% in March.

In short, Sweden suffered a vastly higher death rate while failing to collect on the expected economic gains.

The coronavirus does not stop at national borders. Despite the government’s decision to allow the domestic economy to roll on, Swedish businesses are stuck with the same conditions that produced recession everywhere else. And Swedish people responded to the fear of the virus by limiting their shopping — not enough to prevent elevated deaths but enough to produce a decline in business activity.

Here is one takeaway with potentially universal import: It is simplistic to portray government actions such as quarantines as the cause of economic damage. The real culprit is the virus itself. From Asia to Europe to the Americas, the risks of the pandemic have disrupted businesses while prompting people to avoid shopping malls and restaurants, regardless of official policy.

Sweden is exposed to the vagaries of global trade. Once the pandemic was unleashed, it was certain to suffer the economic consequences, said Kirkegaard, the economist.

“The Swedish manufacturing sector shut down when everyone else shut down because of the supply chain situation,” he said. “This was entirely predictable.”

What remained in the government’s sphere of influence was how many people would die.

“There is just no questioning and no willingness from the Swedish government to really change tack, until it’s too late,” Kirkegaard said. “Which is astonishing, given that it’s been clear for quite some time that the economic gains that they claim to have gotten from this are just nonexistent.”

Norway, on the other hand, was not only quick to impose an aggressive lockdown, but early to relax it as the virus slowed, and as the government ramped up testing. It is now expected to see a more rapid economic turnaround. Norway’s central bank predicts that its mainland economy — excluding the turbulent oil and gas sector — will contract by 3.9% this year. That amounts to a marked improvement over the 5.5% decline expected in the midst of the lockdown.

Sweden’s laissez faire approach does appear to have minimized the economic damage compared with its neighbors in the first three months of the year, according to an assessment by the International Monetary Fund. But that effect has worn off as the force of the pandemic has swept through the global economy, and as Swedish consumers have voluntarily curbed their shopping anyway.

Researchers at the University of Copenhagen gained access to credit data from Danske Bank, one of the largest in Scandinavia. They studied spending patterns from mid-March, when Denmark put the clamps on the economy, to early April. The pandemic prompted Danes to reduce their spending 29% in that period, the study concluded. During the same weeks, consumers in Sweden — where freedom reigned — reduced their spending 25%.

Strikingly, older people — those over 70 — reduced their spending more in Sweden than in Denmark, perhaps concerned that the business-as-usual circumstances made going out especially risky.

Collectively, Scandinavian consumers are expected to continue spending far more robustly than in the United States, said Thomas Harr, global head of research at Danske Bank, emphasizing those nations’ generous social safety nets, including national health care systems. Americans, by contrast, tend to rely on their jobs for health care, making them more cautious about their health and their spending during the pandemic, knowing that hospitalization can be a gateway to financial calamity.

“It’s very much about the welfare state,” Harr said of Scandinavian countries. “You’re not as concerned about catching the virus, because you know that, if you do, the state is paying for health care.”

This article originally appeared in The New York Times.

这世间，总要有人出来讲理

文 | 许章润

人世熙攘，人性隐曲，人生仿佛一团乱麻，总有讲理的和不讲理的，也总是有能说会道的和刚毅却木讷的。那时节，虽说有理走遍天下，无理寸步难行，可事实并非总是如此。

人要讲理，不讲理便是禽兽。世间要有讲理的地方，否则顿成地狱。人生是一个讲理的长旅，所以生而为人却要学着做人。可是，古往今来，就是有人不讲理；人间朗朗，常常就是找不到讲理的地方；漫长一辈子里，总会遭遇蛮不讲理的人和事。有人不讲理，有理没处讲，于是，芸芸众生，愁肠百结，一不小心，便辗转于沟壑。它们如同黑云压城，让绚烂人世黯然失色，叫我们这个号曰人类的物种忍垢蒙羞。

譬如，今天下午的会址早已约定，可商家悍然背信弃约，致使我们被迫跼蹙于斗方，大家自神州四方惶惶奔至，只好“济济一堂”。这便是不讲理，无理可讲，无处可讲。因为，商家和官家联手，权钱勾搭成奸，便是那上空的黑云，理路消歇无踪之际，人间不再是安全和安宁的居所，也就是我们备受欺凌之时。

可是，天下总有理在，人间不可或缺一个理字！要过日子，过好日子，好好过日子，一刻都离不开讲理。黑云如墨，让人世黯淡，但却无法将真理的天光笼罩殆尽。相反，天行有常，天理自在人心。这理儿如同澎湃的春水，可受阻于一时，却终将冲决冻冰，奔流蹈海。——朋友，人活一口气，讲的就是个理儿，你力气再大，能将她们永远藏于自家肘腋！？

毕竟，凡事皆有事理，是人就会有情理，人间总归不可或缺道理，一如它们必将体现为某种法理。而无论是事理、情理、道理与法理，它们无一不是天理之昭昭。天大地大，海啸山风，夏雷冬雪，是一个理字儿支撑着我们活了下来，也是一个理字儿鼓荡着我们必须活下来！

找地方讲理，把理儿讲清，是人的秉性，除非你不是人，除非这个人世堕落成为地狱。

在此，“个案正义”与“人民出场”，是两种主要的讲理方式。

如同江平教授所言，法庭是讲理的地方，或者，应当是一个讲理的地方，个案正义是讲理的一种方式。依恃法权程序安排，首先让事实铺陈于目前，从而让事理袒露于人间，道理和情理可望联袂排闼而出，流淌于心间。经由法理的精致梳理，最终讨得一个是非。可能，也终会明白仁忍高于是非，就是最高的是非。

可法律不是万能的，法庭更且常常难免为强权所辱弄。于是，人民出场，或许有助于实现正义，遂成一种讲理的方式。可能，也是一种没有办法的办法。当今之世，人民的出场不外三种方式。一是革命，可不到万不得已，没人会走此绝路。拈出此项，正在于努力避免革命，以政治改良取代玉石俱焚的山呼海啸。二是选举。人民具体化为公民，公民换身为选民。万千选民，劳生息死，养家糊口之余，手拿选票，在挑选自家代言人的博弈中，表明自己的立场和诉求，实现自己的组织化生存。各以组织化阵势陈竭己意，于容忍各自的选择中表达自己的选择，其实是代价最小的政治存在方式。而这便也就是在讲理，一个讲理的过程，并终究给出讲理的结果。三是游行示威、集会结社。借由凡此方式，公民彰显自己的存在，表达着自己的选择，于讨要公道中可能促进公道。至少，它给予弱者以号哭的自由，哭声震天之时，可能就是石砌的大墙轰然坍塌之际。

人世熙攘，人性隐曲，人生仿佛一团乱麻，总有讲理的和不讲理的，也总是有能说会道的和刚毅却木讷的。那时节，虽说有理走遍天下，无理寸步难行，可事实并非总是如此。因而，好人与好人讲理，各拥理据，各秉德性，尽管其理轩轾，但终究保有沟通的善意，也总有沟通的可能，事情大致不会太难办。坏人与坏人讲理——如果讲理的话，至多讲究的是盗亦有道，可能也能沟通。江湖上刀光剑影，自有一套拚搏之道。难办的是，好人与坏人讲理，哪里有理讲呢！特别是，当坏人权高位重，一手遮天之时，你到哪里去讲理呢！又特别是，当不讲理的就是政府或者国家本身，天哪，还怎么讲理呢？！小民百姓，又当何如呢？！

因而，总要有人出来讲理，这世间才为人间，也方才适于人类居住。当今之世，律师之为一业，职业所系，志业所在，就是专门替人讲理的，也可能是最会讲理的。既秉其心志，复禀其心智，他们挺身而出专门讲理，是现代的巫，而恰恰是正义的祭司！

再说一遍，这世间，总要有人出来讲理。谁来讲理，大家一起来讲理，而首先是特具禀赋的法律人出来讲理。社会之有律师一业，众生之养育了法律人，就在于指盼着他们出来讲理呢！

为了讲理，法律人，站起来；为了过上讲理的顺畅安宁的日子，亿万同胞，站起来！

大清记者报道甲午战争：“腻害了，我的军！”

执笔 ashes of time

甲午战争，大清帝国一败涂地。现在，很多人写文章，扒出大清种种不堪，然后下结论说——清军本来就必败无疑。

持这种看法的人，恐怕是“事后诸葛亮”。

当年，国际社会普遍认为大清帝国赢面大，就是日本自己也没有战胜大清的把握。至于大清帝国统治者，更是认为自己必胜：我打不过西方列强，我还打不过你小日本？何况我现在有北洋海军。

然而，战争一开打，清军一败涂地。值得玩味的是，真实的战局全世界都知道就一个群体不知道——大清普通子民。他们不是不知道消息，而是从报纸上看到大量报道——我朝大军屡战屡胜，日军一败再败……

然而，用再厚实的纸包裹谎言，也很容易被真相之火烧得灰飞烟灭。当台湾被割走，全国还要赔偿2亿两白银，谎言编不下去了。大胜的宣传和大败的事实，形成了巨大反差。

这么大一口锅，当然需要一个大人物来背——李鸿章。尽管他在马关挨了一枪，为国家节省了1亿两银子，回国后仍被痛骂为汉奸，人人喊杀。慈禧当然知道李鸿章是代自己受过，为了保护他，让其出洋考察，避避风头……

战前的大清，有些外强中干，就好像一座外表光鲜，结构腐朽的房子，外面的人只看到油漆很新也刷得漂亮。只有里面的人比如李鸿章才知道真相，但他不敢说破。而且，大伙儿需要一个强大的国家，媒体满足了大家的心理和愿望。李鸿章的战略是“保持猛虎在山之势”，威慑对手，但很清楚不能真打……

讲多少道理，都不如一堵南墙，头破血流才知道疼知道错知道改。甲午战争后，出现了留日大潮，中国现代史上政界、军界、文坛不少牛人大咖都有留日经历……

下面，是大清媒体对甲午战争的图片报道，有火牛阵大破日军（以及放狗打败日军），擒杀日军统帅桦山资纪（实为日本海军军令部部长），还有娘子军，甚至还知道日本人民不愿当兵卖命等……而且，关于大陆战场和海上战场很简略，关于朝鲜和台湾战场很详细，个中玄妙，诸位边看边品吧。

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大清记者XXX按：

甲午一战，我大清雄师水陆并进，大败蕞尔倭寇。下面是我朝摄影记者从前方发回的综合报道，分7个部分展开：（1）综述；（2）海上战场；（3）朝鲜战场；（4）大陆战场；（5）台湾战场；（6）花絮；（7）附录。

所谓“有图有真相”，本次报道主要以图片为主展开。

为扩大国际影响，扬我国威，特别双语刊出，考虑到中西文化不同，语句略有不同。

综述

我军水、陆皆捷

Victory at sea during the Sino-Japanese War



二、海上战场

1.鸭绿江海战大捷

The victorious battle at the Yalu River



2.我军击沉日舰

Japanese ships are sunk



3.我海军在朝鲜大获全胜

Victory in the naval battle in Korea



4.我海军大胜

Naval battle victory



三、朝鲜战场

1.我军陆战在朝鲜大胜

Victory in the land battle in Korea



2.我军叶志超部水陆并进（1）

The soldiers of General Ye Zhichao march and fight on land and at sea



3.我军叶志超部水陆并进（2）

The soldiers of General Nie Shicheng fight on land and at sea



4.我军叶志超部水陆并进（3）

The soldiers of General Ye Zhichao march and fight on land and at sea



5.牙山大捷（1）

Victory at Asan Japanese slaves in the Korean capital



6.牙山大捷（2）

Victory at Asan



7.牙山大捷（3）

Victory at Asan



8.牙山大捷（4）

News of the victory at Asan



9.我军在朝鲜利用牛阵取得夜战胜利

Victory with cattle during the night in Korea war



10.平壤夜战（1）

The night battle of Pyongyang



11.平壤夜战（2）

The night battle of Pyongyang



12.我军叶志超、聂士成两部联合左宝贵部，收复平壤

Soldiers of Ye Zhichao and Nie Shicheng join together the battalion of Zuo Baogui and retake Pyongyang



13.宋庆将军光复平壤

General Song Qing conquers the Korean capital



14.平壤大捷

Victory in Pyongyang



15.克复朝鲜（1）

Retaking Korea



16.克复朝鲜（2）

Retaking Korea



三、大陆战场

1.我彭将军坐镇边境

The battalion division with horses illustration



2.我军宋庆、聂士成部在连山关大败日军

Victory at Lianshanguan by the soldiers of Generals Song Qing and Nie Shicheng



3.宋庆将军在摩天岭用地雷战击败敌军

Fenhuangcheng landmine ambush leads General Song to victory at the Motian pass



4.威海卫大捷

Victory in the battle of Weihaiwei



五、台湾战场

1.日军攻入台北，全岛人心惶惶

Everyone who is coming from Tainan reports that Japanese soldiers got into Taipei government house



2.日寇向国外借8000骑兵进攻台南，被击退后不敢登岛

(Left)The Japanese reportedly borrow from another country eight thousand cavalry to attack Tainan...

(Right) Japanese forces are wounded and do not dare to land on the Chinese shores.



3.台湾乡绅议定绝不割地

Taiwan's officials and prominent citizens refuse to allow cession of territory



4.台湾有钱人家慷慨解囊支持军队和政府

Commoners from all over Taiwan donate silver to the President of the Republic Tang Xianmin to support the costs of war



5.刘永福将军率领大军进军安南

Recent news General Liu recruits tens of thousands of people to march towards Annan



6.日寇听说刘将军回师新竹，吓得赶紧跑路

Japanese army retreats inexorably after General Liu's army takes back the city of Zhuqian modern day Hsinchu



7.我军在台湾用狗击败日寇

(Left) Lin Chaodong is famous also in Taiwan.

(Right) Inciting dogs to defeat the Japanese



8.刘将军收复海关

Some days ago, General Liu's army has recaptured Taiwan's customs post



9.刘将军擒获日寇首领桦山资纪

General Liu Yongfu interrogates the captured Japanese governor Kabayama



10.日寇被刘将军打败后畏之如虎

After repeated defeats, the Japanese fear Liu Yongfu as if he were a tiger



11.刘永福将军领导军民联手，成功保卫台湾

Liu Yongfu protects Tainan after the victory obtained together with the native people



12.台湾各界欢庆胜利

(Left) Ministers of world countries greet the Emperor

(Right) Commemoration of Taiwan victory



13.台湾保卫战宣告胜利

Bulletin about victory in Taiwan



14.刘将军保卫台湾，黑旗军名扬四海

The battalion of General Liu protects Taiwan from the world famous Heiqibin



五、日本谈判

1.李中堂大人受到热烈欢迎

Li Fuxiang receives greetings



2.李鸿章与外国使节谈判

Foreign countries work with the imperial commissioner Li Fuxiang Li Hongzhang



六、花絮

1.飒爽英姿娘子军

Women also joined the army



2.孙将军之子为父报仇，痛击日军

General Sun Gengtang's son risks his life to save the country at Sandiao Ridge



3.军民关系如鱼水

General Liu Dajiang's army estabilish friendly relations with the native people



4.日本人民不愿当兵卖命

A soldier is arrested



5.上海商人收到林将军的台湾来信，诸事顺利

Last month merchants in Shanghai received a letter from Lin Chaodong who is in Taizhong



6.公审正法倭奸（1）

Arrest and interrogation of Japanese soldiers



7.公审正法倭奸（2）

Arrest and interrogation of Japanese soldiers



8.烧死日军统帅桦山资纪（实为日本海军军令部部长 笔者注）

The Japanese general Kabayama has been captured



七、附件

1.宣传册第1卷

Volume 1 of the illustrated book Defeat the Japanese



2.宣传册第2卷

Volume 2 of the illustrated book Defeat the Japanese



说明

以上图片均出自甲午战争时期晚清媒体的图片报道，后由英国图书馆收藏。部分图片散见于网络，但不全，也缺少英文图注。笔者特地从英国图书馆下载了这51张图片并写明中英文图注，在此分享给大家，图片版权归原作者和英国图书馆所有。

特此说明。

许述工作室创始人简介

许述，四川宜宾人，军事学博士，曾在《书屋》等媒体发表文章70余篇，接受过凤凰卫视等媒体采访，受邀到华为等演讲十余次，出版专著《这才是美军》，出版一年5次加印，在京东新书热卖榜常居TOP3，登上三联书店畅销书排行榜，进入美国纽约公立图书馆和澳大利亚国家图书馆。